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I . SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of the paper to which this is the introduction is to 
investigate the nature of the relationship between the private automobile 
and society in Latin America. The report makes no attempt to quantify 
the benefits ..conferred by the use of the private car ; these are undoubtedly 
significant but their quantification is not easy. In an appendix, however, 
we present a methodology by means of which such benefits could be estimated. 
But much is said about some of the undesirable features of lifestyles which 
revolve around the private car. We are.aware that the concentration on., 
the malefits and the- comparative disregard of the benefits may lead the 
reader to the drawing of biased conclusions. I t is only fair to point this 
out; we have not been able to present a more balanced picture of the position 
of the automobile in Latin America due to a lack of resources. 
The treatment is specifically directed to the private automobile, 
rather than the net being cast wider so that a l l motor vehicles be included. 
The fundamental reason for such restriction was not to simplify the study; 
in fact the need to separate out a consequence attributable to the private 
car from global information on vehicle fleets tended to complicate matters. 
The private car is.fundamentally different from other vehicles in that 
the benefits from i t s use accrue largely to the user alone. On the other 
hand the benefits from buses tend to.be passed on to anyone who jumps on 
board, and the fares of buses in Latin America are not such that buses 
be solely a preserve of a privileged class. In the perfectly competitive 
world which often surrounds bus operation in the Region, the owner of the 
bus may not reap any reward other than a nothing-more-than adequate return 
on his capital and energies. In the same way the benefits derived from 
the services performed by. trucks and vans accrue to those who consume the 
products conveyed by them, rather than any one class of persons gaining 
a l l the reward. In some countries, such as the United States of America, i t 
may not be true that truck owners and operators do not benefit from the 
distorted nature of the supply function of their industry, but in Latin 
America trucking is rarely excessively regulated (except in international 
trade) and the owner gets nothing more than his fair return on the services 
which he provides. 
/But a l l 
But a l l vehicles force-costs on society in various ways. They may 
create congestion, they may stimulate the demand for more infrastructure, 
they k i l l and tòàim their occupants and innocent bystanders, and they 
pollute thè atmospherè.- Only the car résults in the benefits being -
concentrated in the hands of i t s owner whilst inflicting social costs on 
us al l . - I t is clear that the benefits from car usage may be diffused 
throughout the populace, through taxation, but this rarely occurs in a 
-sufficient degree, not in Latin America at any rate . • . . . 
The paper is divided into six-chapters overhand above this introduction. 
These sections are summarized as follows.'^ 
Section II In section II we present some results from,statistical analyses 
of car ownership in 27 Regional and non-Regional countries 
in the years 1950, 1962, and 1971; appendix 1 provide's 
information of the s t a t i s t i c a l analyses performed. The 
: principle result from the analyses is that there exists a 
tendency for a l l countries to become increasingly ali™Ke as -
regards -car ownership, in thè sense that the number of cars 
per head is more and more' explicable by means of income per 
head '(through the proxy GDP per head) 'alone as time passes. 
Inter-country differences of social and economic structure are 
becoming steadily less influential. Countries are'séemingly 
tending to adopt the same kind of l i fes tyle , a focal point 
of which is the private car. 
From 1950' to 1962 and again from 1962 to 1974, the number of 
cars owned' 'Per person increased at given real income level. 
This provides evidence that not only are countries taking 
oii a similar style of living but this style is evermore 
dependent on the automobile. Further results drawnare:- the 
> splitting ;of growth in car ownership between the effect of 
. income growth, and a secular trend independent•of income; and 
the derivation of income elas t ic i t ies for car ownership. 
Section III In section III are presented forecasts of car ownership rates 
by country in Latin America to the year 2000. Two sets of 
forecast are made. The first , assumes that the annual rate 
/of change 
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of change in the propensity to own a car : at given real.income 
per head observed from 1962 through'1974 will continue 
henceforth. The second assumed that the factors leading to 
higher car ownership at given real income had worked themselves 
out by 1974. 
Section IV In this' section we investigate, in a necessarily somewhat 
superficial manner, whether automobile ownership and usage 
has any contribution to make towards overall economic growth. 
In some ways it 'has a negative impact: for instance i t 
reduces the amount of foreign exchange which may be spend on 
development projects", especially through the need to feed 
the car with gasoline; furthermore the inability of many Latin 
American families to pay cash for cars may reduce the amount 
of, and increase the costs of , credit for development projects; 
the automobile may also have the impact of leading to an 
undersirable expansion of the public sector. On the positive 
side one should count the employment provided by the industry 
of car construction and upkeep, much of which may otherwise 
not be fully utilized in other sectors. These activities also 
'serve the useful function of raising the level of skills in 
the economy. However, employment'in the motor vehicle sector 
in Latin America never reaches appreciable significance, and 
the concentration of considerable power amongst the workers 
of assembly plants can lead to undesirable economic, as well 
as social , consequences. 
Section V Section V traces the evolution of transportation in the c i t ies 
of the Region. The private car is only one of the revolutions 
which have occurred in the c i t ies of Latin America in the 
field of transportation, although i t may be unique in being 
the only novel mode which has made conditions worse rather 
than better , although metros may be argued to have the same 
unfortunate characteristic in view of their alarmingly high costs. 
The ci t ies of the Region were iong dominated by the tram/street-
car /ban de/tranvia . As late as 1950 in at least one capital 
/ c i ty of 
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city of the Region bondes carried more people than any other 
. mode.. The fa l l of the tranvia was very rapid. I t was largely 
replaced by the more flexible motor bus, which was a very 
late, arrival in Latin America," but which since the second 
world war has produced a revolution a.t .least ; comparable with 
that of the. private car . In Latin America, bus systems are 
very different from .those of the central countries. Rail 
• systems have been important in some c i t ies . There has 
recently been a fashion for metros, which has produced some 
disillusionment. New ideas are being sought, one of which 
could be the trolleybus, which has so far led a somewhat 
.— checkered history in Latin America.. 
Section VI. .In. this section we analyse to what extent car ownership is 
concentrated in Latin America. I t is found to be highly 
concentrated in the highest income categories. The nature of 
spatial economic structure of La-tin; America infers that 
there be concentration too in the areas with the highest 
-demographic densities. Thus cars are concentrated where they 
. . cause the most environmental harm; and this harm is inflicted 
on a l l by an affluent privileged minority.. .The more affluent 
are found-to make excessive demands on the urban transportation 
system, on four counts: 
( i ) They make more trips since trip-making is positively 
correlated with income, 
( i i ) They make more trips since they have higher probabilities 
• of being car-owning, and car ownership i t s e l f leads to 
increased trip-making at any income level, 
( i i i ) They make more of their, trips by car , which is wasteful 
, in terms of road space, 
( iv) In Latin America the more affluent seem to concentrate 
their trip-making„in the peak periods, when road space is 
especially at a premium. . .. 
.. . The trip-making hajbits of the. rich force inferior travel 
^.conditions on the captive users o-f collective transportation. 
/The responsible 
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• The responsible authorities have never attempted to oblige 
car users 'in congested conditions in Latin America to pay 
the costs of the harm they inf l ic t on society, even though 
at least one study has been.conducted in the Region recommending 
a workable scheme of so doing. There is some recent 
evidence that certain ci t ies are starting to adopt physical 
methods of giving priority to bus t r a f f i c , although this seems 
to usually be fostered by a concern, for things other than the 
nuisance caused by the.private car in terms of the congestion 
i t generates. But in most c i t i e s , attempts to improve 
collective transportation have generally tried to avoid 
disturbing those who wish to use the. private car. Thus recourse 
has sometimes been made.to,unnecessarily expensive solutions, 
such as Metro systems, -the private car is treated as a kind 
of Latin American sacred cow, which must not be tampered.with. 
Section VII. Section VII deals with some effects that the car has on 
health, through highway accidents, and air and noise pollution. 
Generally, the highways of Latin America are very much more 
dangerous than those of the central countries. The reasons 
ii: why are not known for sure, but they seem to include inferior 
roads, vehicles not up to the current safety.standards of 
the .central countries, inexperienced drivers, and the 
preponderance of vehicle types which are inherently less safe 
than others. In this respect., i t should be mentioned that i t , 
appears that , whilst the private car is less.safe than the . 
taxi in respect to the probability of being involved in an . 
accident, trucks and buses are considerably more dangerous 
than the private car. 
In the central countries the evidence shows that the gasoline 
powered car is by far the most liberal diffuser of possibly 
toxic gases into the atmosphere, especially carbon monoxide and 
nitrogen oxides. The situation is less clear in Latin America 
where many buses and trucks are gasoline powered, in some 
countries, and badly regulated motors are prevalent. Certainly 
/in one 
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' in one- capital city of the Region, the car is a relatively 
insignificant polluter compared with buses and' taxis . But 
• 'nevertheless some of the countries of the Region-have been 
' concerned' enough about thé pollution problem to have enacted 
legislation designed to combat thé problem. Unfortunately the 
• intent of the legislation has sometimes been different from 
the outcome of i t s application. 
Noise pollution from cars is not important compared with that 
from other vehicles. Latin 'America seems to rather deny that 
there is a problem of noise pollution from t r a f f i c , and in any 
case i t is not easy to visualize an effective solution were any 
problem to be deemed to exist . 
I f there is an overall conclusion to be made i t - i s that, regardless of 
the benefits which the owner of the private car reaps from i t s use, the 
automobile in Latin America should be made responsible for the costs which 
i t forces upon society, preferably through pricing schemes designed to 
bring user costs up tt> the level of the full social costs caused. The 
revenues ctoul'd be circulated to those who are disadvantaged, often the 
collective"transportation rider. 
Latin America neëds a series of benefits cost analyses of the forms 
of l ifestyle which involve' varying amounts of reliance on the private car. 
The Region may' not be best served by the unthinking drift into the North 
American consumerist way of living Which revolves around the car. The car 
is an increasingly expensive'piece of equipment. I t is at least possible 
that Latin America in general- never reach the levels of car ownership 
currently found in even the middle income countries of Western Europe, 
largely due to the energy cr is is . I t may be worthwhile to s tar t considering 
what are the alternatives. 
/ I I . POST 
I I . POST WAR GROWTH IN CAR OWNERSHIP IN LATIN AMERICA 
In a l l parts of the world the most visual representation of post war 
economic prosperity is the automobile. Latin America is no exception to 
the global trend towards the car-owning consumerist society on the North 
American model. Nevertheless i t is s t i l l , in the main, a long way' from 
reaching this goal essentially due to higher car prices in Latin America 
than in the central countries which have lead the consumerist revolution and 
the combination of lower general incomes in the Region with a more skewed 
income distribution. However the desire to follow the North American 
style of l i fe seems probably even stronger in Latin America than, in 
countries in similar stages of development elsewhere. 
In the late nineteen '^forties and early nineteen f i f t ies car ownership 
levels in Latin America varied up to twenty cars per thousand persons, but 
only Venezuela, Argentina and Uruguay (amongst 17 Latin American nations 
analysed) had ownership rates greater than ten. In the same period car 
ownership in the United States of America was over 250 per 1,000 persons 
whilst the European levels ranged up to f i f ty . The Australian level was 
around the hundred mark whilst Japan was virtually at zero. Table 1 shows 
car ownership rates in 27 countries, including 17 in Latin America, in the 
years 1950, 1962 and 1971. 
To 1962 the percentage growth rates in - car ownership in Latin America 
tended to be less than those.in most of the central countries. Thus Latin 
'America.generally fe l l behind in car ownership both in relative and absolute 
terms. In the period from 1962 to 1974 there has been evidence in some of 
the central countries that growth rates have been tailing off as the supposed 
saturation level of car ownership,approaches. Growth rates in Latin America 
have tended to be higher. But nevertheless ownership levels in Latin America 
are currently very much less than those in the central countries. In 1974 
car ownership in the Latin American countries considered .ranged from 5 to 
eighty cars per thousand persons whilst•the corresponding figure in the 
United States of America was almost 500 and in Western Europe around 300. 
Thus Latin America is not yet a mass consumer of cars, and may never be so. 
In Latin America,car ownership in most countries is concentrated in the upper 
/ t a i l o f 
t a i l of the often markedly skewed income distribution.. However in the 
city centers of the Region there often appear to be more cars than there 
are in the qenters of the central countries due to the greater permissiveness 
regarding the use of cars in Latin America. Latin America has as many 
problems generated by cars as has Europe or North America9 even though the 
physical size of .the fleet in Latin America is very much less. We have 
analysed car ownership propensities in 27 countries, including 17 in Latin 
America, in. the three evenly-spaced of 1950, 1962 and 1974.. For each year 
a s t a t i s t i c a l function of the same form was calibrated relating car ownership 
per head to GDP per head in constant US dollars. The form of the function 
i s : . . - - - . , 
Cars per head = Saturation level of cars per head ^^ 
1 + aYb 
where Y is GDP per head and a,b are constants calibrated to best f i t thè 
data. The functions are plotted as Figure 2-1. in contrast to some other 
research of this general type the saturation level of ownership was not 
determined by reasoned deduction from observation of actual ownership levels 
in different places with high per capita incomè levels but rather we 
calculated the equation for various saturation levels (for each year) and 
chose the one which gave the best f i t to the data. The resultant saturation 
levels are highér than those assumed in the few known previous -analyses 
(for forecasting fleet-size) but there are valid reasons to justify them 
and in any case they will only be approached at income levels that the world 
will probably never attain over more than a few square meters. -
Details of the s t a t i s t i c a l exercise are contained in Appendix'1. From 
i t one may draw certain interesting results. We discuss these below. 
2 
1. Firstly the coefficient of regression (r ) increases through time 1/ 
thereby indicating that countries are tending to take on similar characteristics 
at given income level with respect to car ownership* There are several 
reasons which may be proposed to explain this . In 1950 to a significant 
degree Car ownership levels were distorted' due to the effects and aftereffects 
1/ From 0.Ó43 in 1950 to 0.925 in 1962 to 0.977 in 1974. • 
/of the 
of the second world war. Certain countries, notably thè United States of 
America, were comparatively l i t t l e affected by the war and in 1950 possessed 
car ownership levels significantly above those which one would have 
expected from the function estimated from the data for a l l countries. The 
European countries were obviously the most devastated by the war (as well 
as Japan); even those not directly involved could neither renew nor expand 
their f leets . The Latin American nations did not choose to involve themselves 
in the war, with the notable exception Of Brazil, but even so could not buy 
vehicles from the belligerents, which in those days were the only manufacturers 
of motor vehicles (apart from Sweden). During the war some Latin American 
nations, notably Brazil and Argentina, accumulated reserves of foreign 
exchange through selling on differed terms goods to the nations at war. 
Immediately after the war such vendor nations imported quite large quantities 
of motor vehicles until the early nineteen f i f t ies when supplies of foreign 
exchange ran out and imports of cars were severely cut back. For example 
imports of cars to Argentina climbed from almost zero in 1945 to 31,000 in 
1947, almost double any subsequent figure. Thus Latin American nations in 
general and some, such as Brazil and* Argentina in particular, would have 
been expected to have more cars per head than one would have foreseen from 
their 1950 per capita . income levels due to thè combined effécts of the 
relative immunity from the effects of the war and the importation of cars 
in the immediate after war period. Table 2-1 indicated that amongst the 
Latin American countries with significantly Higher than expected car ownership 
rates in 1950 were Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Costa Rica, Venezuela, the 
Dominican Republic, and El Salvador.' 
On the other hand in this year other countries, such as Bolivia and 
Paraguay, had very much lower car ownership than one would have expected. 
Both of these countries had very low per capita income levels in this period."' 
.There seems to be a close correlation between countries with lower than ' -
expected car ownership and countries with low per capita incomes. Some of 
this is probably due to the form of th§ s t a t i s t i c a l relationship calibrated 
imt i t is also probable that these countries had not yet entered into the- ~ 
kind of l ifestyle which revolves around the automobile that had'then spread 
from the United States of America into other countries of the Region, notably 
/Table 2-1-\« ' " : 
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Table 2-1 
OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED.OWNERSHIP LEVELS EX COUNTRY FOR, THE THREE YEARS CONSIDERED FOR DETAILED ANALYSIS 
WITH RESPECTIVE REAL PER CAPITA DOMESTIC PRODUCT DATA 
Country Z 1950 ' z 1950 z 1962 z 1962 Z 1964 Z 1974 Y 1950 ï 1962 ï 1974 
Argentina 18.5481 13,698 29.3871 . 31.276 80.9284 80.334 817 , 932 1 599 
Bolivia 0.6293 : 1«269 1.9202 2.008.. , 4 . 6 1 8 1 . 5.138 231 198 293 
Brazil . 4.8561 , , I.290 10.3157 5.96Q.. 35.5810 20.611 233 364 636 
Chile 6.5558, . 7 . i a . 9=1459 19.943 , . 23.3711 34.628 5?6 720 ' * • A * 554 
Colombia 3.1910 3.093 . 7.8427 , 8.420 14.1138 17.767 370 442 585 
Ecuador , 1.2070 . l ° h k l 2.4073 r . 4.222 6.3501 .10.421 ,247a/ 800 434 
Paraguay 0.5957 2.147 . 2.6781 „ 4.554. 6.7653 7.410, ... 3 0 5 313 , 359b/ 
Peru 3,9752 . 2.255 9.2980. ,9.109 17.5235 . 18»038 313 462 590 
Uruguay 19.7282 . • 15.929 39.8388 27.038 • 49.2358 36.054 886a/ 857 874c/ 
Venezuela 13.5277 .. 9.OII.,. 
> 
33.9602 33.514 78.2117 70.488 653 970 1 293c/ 
Costa Rica 5.9441 2.740 13.3183 g.966 28.7578 29.216 347 486 775 
Dominican Republic 1.8213 , • 1.259 . 4.4489 4.606 12.7884 11.611 230 315 461 
El Salvador 2.26^0 L 1.646 . 8,^907 5.558 10.1889.,, 10.164 265 . 350 428 
Guatemala 2.5828 . 1.990 . .7.4751 5.004 11.6947 12,589 293 330 478 
Honduras 0.9358 1.280 . 2,7785 . 3.070 5.3738 . 4.795 232 .251 282 
Mexico 6.5023 . - .5.173 1.3.195? . 16.392 35.8951 44.906 486 644 992 
Nicaragua 1.3526 . 1.108 , 5.1923. 4.323 154659 11.031 • 21.5 304 448 
United States 264.7984 • 149.082 351.8833 278.235 492.296 461.462 3 1 8 0 3 798 . 5.174 
Australia , 43.8187 •42.593 214.2559 128.307 555.2664, 275,846 1 516 2 187 3 208 
Sweden 36.0553 .717.233 188.7993 . 210.421 329.526 404.537 2 127, 3 088 4 499 
Switzerland 31.3166 59.785 117.1709 165.798 278.670 . 298.442 1 835 2 594 3 419 
France 35.9400 33.811 147.8824 111.824 87.455 295.791 1 334 2 002 3 394 
United Kingdom 45.7760 25.437 127.5722 92.348 253.676 178,698 . 1 369 1,775 , 2 332 
Japan 0.5139 2.983 •9° 3628, 29.325 , 144.2600 174.385 363 898 2 293 
Federal Republic 
of Germany 12.5612 26.158 111.7756 Ì34.560 ' 275.495 291.534 1 159 2 256 3 354 
Holland 13.7038 28.005 61.7077 86.783 233.124 229.987 1 203 1 708 2 791 
Belgium 31.7166 34.643 99»0363 101.419 255.046 272.920 1 352 1 882 3 181 
Mote» Z = cars per 1 000 persons (observed),, 
Z = cars per 1 000 persons (synthesized)» 
Ï = GDP per head in USI of 1970. , , 4 • 
a( Data point refers to 1951. 
b/ Data point refers to 1971. 
c/Data point refers to 1975. /Venezuela. There 
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Venezuela. There is a tendency lor those countries with low rates of car 
ownership in this period in relation to income also to have-low rates of 
urbanization, although s t a t i s t i c a l proof of association has not been'attempted. 
By 1962 there were fewer and less marked deviations from trend, the 
regression coefficient having-increased from 0.843 in 1950 to 0,925 in 
1962. And, as Table 2-2 shows, the nufflber of-countries significantly 
deviating from' the expected trend decreased markedly over the twelve year 
period. In Latin Americaj Brazil and Argentina,-both of which had significantly 
greater car f leets ' in 1950 than one would have expected from their income 
level (due to the effects and aftereffects of the war and other reasons), 
severely curtailed their car imports in the period to 1962. For instance, 
in the nineteen f i f t ies imports to Argentina never'in any one year attained 
hardly more than half their 1947 total , and varied widely, as low as two 
thousand in some years,^depending on•the strictness of the regulations then 
current regarding importation. In 1962 neither Brazil nor Argentina had been 
producing cars on any scale for long, Argentinian production was lesg than 
4,000 in 1958, less than 7,000 in 19591 but then climbed'sharply to attain 
close to eighty thousand "in 1962. In 1962 Brazil was s t i l l producing fewer 
cars than was Argentina and clearly not enough to satisfy'the demand of 
that country (at reasonable prices). Thus the extent to which both Brazil 
aiid Argentina were over trend in 1962 was less than in 1950; .' In the cases of 
those countries with lower per capita income, which in 1950 were somethat 
isolated s t i l l from the pursuance of the North American style of consumer 
society, such as Bolivia, Paraguay and Honduras, by 1962 were approaching 
the expected values for their income range from below; Their relatively 
rapid growth in car ownership may-have had something to do with the growth 
in the amount of usable infrastructure, the construction of which is to some 
extent an indication of the goal of a consumerist l i festyle . 
By 1974 the regression coefficient had increased to 0.977 and most 
of the 27 countries considered had ownership levels within about 14% of 
the expected, as may be deduced from Table 2-2. By this year the industries 
of Brazil and Argentina were producing relatively efficiently and were able 
to keep supplied their home markets. •Chile, which in 1962 was significantly 
below trend due to difficulties of importing cars due to foreign exchange 
/ c r i ses , was 
- 12 
crises, was producing cars domestically by 1974.,v.Also this country had 
suffered , a setback in economic growth ..which .ĥ d tended to bring i t s income 
level. into line with i t s car ownership level. Uruguay had,¡a relatively high 
ownership level in relation to income due to the same cause, in part at 
least , as had the United Kingdom outside ,the. Region.1/ In these two la t ter 
countries the relatively even income distribution may have played a part in 
explaining ownership levels. : Ecuador was below the -trend to a noticeable 
degree due:probably to the fact that car acquisition had not managed to catch 
up with the recent boom in that country brought about by i t s exploitation of 
i t s petroleum reserves and t^e rise in the international oi l ..price pf ,1973. 
2 . , , The second interesting, result from the calibration of.the functions 
is the increase in ownership at constant real income as time passes. Note 
too that the. saturation rate is 800 cars per 1,000 persons i.n ,1950 but . 
900 in each of the two subsequent years. The reasons for the higher propensity 
to own cars at fixed real income are the following: . 
. ( i ) In general there was a tendency for car prices to f a l l throughout 
the period., This was certainly true in the central countries due to increasing 
scale economies. In Latin America too, for,those countries which currently 
produce cars one may observe, a tendency for , at f i r s t , real car. prices to 
f a l l in the immediate post-war period. Then exchange-crises caused the 
elevation of import duties (and other barriers affecting prices) , partially 
to stimulate•the production of cars locally. The local production had to be 
able to sel l at- less than the price of the imported product, thus the arrival 
on the local market of ..the first,.domestic vehicles resulted in a fa l l in-
prices. Increasing.scale economies and competition steadily lowered prices; 
for instance real prices of cars in Argentina fe l l cqntinually (from very 
high level) from 1960. through:1972. Furthermore, with the development of 
car ownership, us^d car prices tend to f a l l , which in turn stimulated ownership 
amongst- those who cannot afford a.new car. 
( i i ) There was probably a like f a l l in car operating costs. Crude ... 
petroleum price?;,fell continuously from the early 1950s to 1973. An 
1/ Also these countries in 1974 had a-relatively'high number of cars 
bought in .earl ier years- when their, income levels were l i t t l e . l e s s . , 
/increasing car 
increasing car fleet size brings with i t economies of scale in. maintenance. 
In Brazil there must have been a significant reduction in maintenance costs 
due to the spread of cars such as the VW Beetle, the Auto-Union DKW, and 
the Renault Dauphin in place of the previous collection of elderly cars 
from the United States and. elsewhere. Throughout the .period intervals 
between, maintenance and o i l changes increased. 
( i i i ) Until 1974 .one may discern a policy of providing for the car 
rather than limiting i t s use. For instance urban freeway construction 
continued apace in many c i t ies such as Caracas and Rio de Janeiro. Brasi l ia 's 
transportation system was an attempt to provide enough road space to meet 
the demand for "car use. On the other hand serious attempts to limit car 
usage even in the centers of the largest c i t ies are very recent,-and 
sometimes are yet to- come. Were there to have been a polioy of controlling 
car usage i t is possible that ownership would have been affected. However, 
outside the Region such control started much ear l ier . 
( iv) In the central countries quality of collective transportation , 
generally declined throughout the period. This could have affected car 
ownership, especially the ownership of second cars. In Latin America the 
situation is less Clear, and the levels of accessibility by public 
transportation may not have fallen much, i f at. a l l , in the overall sense. 
But the events in the central countries would have affected the equations 
anyway. 
(v) The change in l i festyles so that a car i s thought upon as a 
necessary ar t i c le of consumption rather than a foreign object that i s seen 
on the streets rather than parked in front of one's,.home. The older 
generations may not have considered the possibility of learning to drive. 
Their l ifestyles were adapted so that they had no cause to need a, car. 
Constantly throughout the period the gaining of a licence,to drive became, 
as much a part of a chi ld ' s education (in the central countries which 
influence the form of the calibrated equations) as learning how to use an 
escalator or switch on a television. City patterns changed so that residential 
densities f e l l and collective transportation services declined in quality. 
as more and more of the local population owned cars thereby stimulating others 
to do the same. In some Countries i t became steadily more easy to shop by 
/car and 
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car* and steadily more difficult to shop on foot or by bus. In Latin 
America through the media of the.cinema and television the way. of l i fe 
of the central countries became more well-known and pictured as the goal 
to be attained. 
I t is probable that the change in lifestyles in favour of those which 
revolve around the private car was the main contributant to the upward 
movement of the' calibrated function throughout the period covered. 
Table 2-2 
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES'RECOGNIZED IN THE CALIBRATION 'OF THE EQUATIONS TO EXPLAIN 
CAR OWNERSHIP AS A FUNCTION OF INCOME WHICH DEVIATED FROM THE TRENDS IN 
THE THREE YEARS CONSIDERED, 1950, 1962 AND 1974 
Number of countries correspond-
Degree of deviation ing.to the category in: 
19.50 . 1962 1974 
Very much lower ownership than trend' a/ :6 2 0 
Considerably less ownership than trend b/ 2 , 4 2 
Somewhat less ownership than trend,c/ 1 2 4 
No difference from trend d/ 4 . 9 16 
Somewhat higher ownership than trend.e/ 5 1 
Considerably higher ownership than trend f / 6 - 4 
Very much: higher ownership than trend g/ 3 ,0 0 
Source: Annex 1. 
a / Minus 50% and less. • 
b/ Minus 25% to minus- 50%. 
c / Minus 13% to minus 25%. . 
d/ Plus 15% to minus 13%. 
e/ Plus 33% to. plus >15%. : , 
f / Plus 100% to plus 33%. 
g/ Plus 100% and more. . 
3. Thirdly, one may manipulate the calibrated equations to derive the 
elast ic i ty of per capita car ownership with respect to per capita real 
income for each of the three years, in this way deriving further interesting 
/ resul ts . In 
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results. In the derivation of the e las t i c i t ies , as Appendix 1 explains, 
we have considered that as a country increases i t s per capita income 
i t does not change i t s demographic structure, so as to concentrate solely 
on the effect of income. (As a clarification of this la t ter point, 
countries with lower per capita, income generally have lower percentage 
of persons of such an age that they be likely to own a car than countries 
with higher incomes. But we have assumed that as a country which presently 
has a demographic structure of "x" gets richer i t maintains this same 
demographic structure rather than take on.the structure of countries 
which are currently richer than i t is now.) Table 2-3 details the 
e las t ic i t ies derived. 
In each year the elast ic i ty f i r s t r ises and then fal ls as income per 
capita increases. At low income levels a rise in incomes is insufficient 
to bring many people into the car-owning range regardless of the income' 
distribution. After the peak interaction has been attained the elast ic i ty 
steadily declines as extra income is spent on other things due to the 
increasing probability that a family already own a car. The income at 
which the relationship between car ownership and income falls below 
proportionality is about US$ 5,750 (in 1970 dollars) in 1950 but only 
US$ 3,900 in 1974; Elast ici t ies generally fall , through time at fixed 
income level. Thus one would conclude that as time passes (over the period 
considered).the propensity to own a car at any given income level rises 
but that the impact-on car acquisition of changes in income f a l l s . 
/Table 4-4 
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" ..Tàble 2-3 •• - . 
THE ELASTICITY OF CAR OWNERSHIP WITH'• RESPECT TO INCOME (APPROXIMATED BY 
GDP) BOTH EXPRESSED IN. PER.CAPITA TERMS IN. 1950, 1962 AND 1974 AT . 
VARYING PER CAPITA INCOME LEVELS 
Income per capita in • Elasticity of car ownership int 
US dollars of. 1970 1950 1962., ...1974 
200 ; 1.72 . 1.61 1.63 
500 . " ; 1.73 1.62 1.64 
750 1.72 1.61 • ' - 1.62 
1 000 1.71 1.59- 1.59 
1 500 1.67 1.52. .. . , 1.50 
2 000 -li61 ' ' v i . 4 5 ; : ,1.40 
3 000 •....:• .1.45- ' :. 1.27 1.18 
4 000 1.28 : . ; 1.09 ••- 0.98 
5 000 1.12. . . . • 0.92 • . . 0.80 . 
6 000 - 0.<96; -..-. 0.78 . 0.65 
Source; Annex 1 . : 
4. Fourthly, one may use the calibrated functions to partition growth 
in car ownership into that part for which income growth is responsible 
and that part which is due to the increase through time in the propensity 
to own cars at given fixed income level. There are- two ways to do fthis. 
Once one has assumed a growth (or f a l l ) in per capita income from one year 
to another (e.g.,from 1962 to 1974) one may derive the time effect by 
moving from one curve to the other at fixed income and then estimate the 
income effect by moving along the la t ter curve from the in i t ia l income to 
the subsequent one. Alternatively one may f i r s t move along the curve for 
the in i t ia l year and then switch curves at the income level of the subsequent 
year. We vised the f i r s t method to determine,, for each country and from 
each possible starting year, i .e . ,1950 and 1962, the part of the expected 1/ 
1/ I.e.,assuming that i t be exactly on the curve, with car ownership 
corresponding to the observed income data for each year. 
/change in 
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change in car ownership which one may be attributed to non-monetary 
factors which evolve through time and the part due to income growth» 
In general the conclusions are that from 1950 to 1962 the greater part of 
i 
the growth in car ownership in Latin America was due to the influence 
of time (and more fundamentally change in l i festyle , e t c . ) whilst in the 
central countries the opposite was true, i.e.,income being the more 
important influence. The la t ter result was even more valid for the 
central countries between 1962 and 1974. Between the la t ter two years 
the growth in car ownership in Latin America too was essentially due to 
the effect of income. The exceptional case is thus Latin America between 
1950 and 1962.1/ This indicates that perhaps the change in lifestyles in 
favour of consumerism on the North American style in this earlier period 
in Latin America had a fundamental impact on the growth in car ownership. 
The calibrated equations, apart from permitting a greater insight 
into the determinants of car ownership in Latin America during the post-war 
period, also may be used to predict car ownership into the future. 
1/ Table 2-4 shows the results of the exercise to partition growth in 
car ownership by causant factor. 
/Table 2 - 4 
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Table 2-4 
TO SHOW TIME AND INCOME COMPONENTS OF OWNERSHIP GROWTH a / 
1950-1962 AND 1962-1974 BY COUNTRY AND COMPARISON OF 
TOTAL ESTIMATED CHANGES WITH OBSERVED CHANGES , 
1950-1962 • • Est.- 1962-1974 % E£t. 
Coun- Observed Estimated Growth . Observed Estimated Growth 
try ownership ownership due to ownership ownership due to 
growth ' growth Time In- growth growth Time In- ' 
come . come 
RA 10 839 17. .579 64 36 49.057 51 541 18 82 
BOL 1 291 . 0 739 .186 -86 .3 130 • 2 698 17 83 
BR 5 958 4 670 30 70 14 651 24 765 11 89 
RCH 2 590 12' :822 49 51 14 685 14 .225 39 61 
CO 4 .652. 5 328 57 43 A 347 6 271 25 75 
EQ 1 200 2 781 "55 45 9 199 3 943 ' 18 82 
PY - 2 082 2 : .407 91 9 • 2 856 ' 4 087 43 57 
PE 323 6 854 34 .66 . 8 930 8 226 29. 71 
U 20 131 11 110 115 -15 9 017 " ' 9 380 87 13 
YV . 20 433 • 24 .503 54 46 36 954 • 44 252 26 74 
CR 7 374 7 226 38 62 19 251 15 440 15 85 
DOM 2 628 3 347 41 59 7 005 8 310 18 82 
SAL 6 029 3 912 44 56 4 606 1 898 33 67 
GCA 4 892 3 014 68 32 7 385 4 220 18 82 
HON 1 843 1 790 77 23 1 726 2 595 47 53 
MEX 6 693 11 220 43 57 28 514 22 648 16 84 
NIC 3 840 3 214 38 62 6 709 9 974 17 83 
USA 86 885 129 153 56 44 183 227 140 613 32 68 
AUS 120 438 85 714 34 66 147. 539 141 010 23 77 
S 152 704 133 187 34 66 194 116 134 767 26 74 
CH 85 854 106 013 35 65 132 644 156. 499 32 68 
F 111 942 78 023 31 69 183 958 139. 574 17 83 
GB 81 796 56 911 44 56 86 351 126. 104 30 70 
SAP 8 851 26 342 11 89 145 030 134,897 6 94 
D 99 217 108 402 18 82 156 974 163 720 23 77 
NL 48 004 58 777 35 65 143 204 171 416 17 83 
B 67 319 66 776 36 64 171 501 156 010 16 84 
a/ Cars per 1,000 people. 
/Figure 2-1 
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Figure 2 .1 
FOR 1950, 1962 AND 1974 CALIBRATED FUNCTIONS GIVING CARS PER 1000 
PERSONS FROM GDP PER CAPITA SHOWN TOGETHER WITH DATA POINTS 
Cars per 1000 
persons . - . 
Y a GDP per capita in US$ dollars of 1970 
/ I I I . THE 
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I I I . THE EXPECTED GROWTH IN THE LATIN AMERICAN CAR FLEET 
The forecasting of the size of the car fleet of Latin America at 
the present moment is diff icult , i f not impossible. There is unlikely to 
be as much growth per annum in the world economy in the years to 2000 as 
there has been in the years since 1950. However, even supposing future 
growth rates (income effects) there must be considered the petroleum 
problem (price effect ) . Some countries in the Region are already taking 
steps not just to cut back the use of each car but also the level of car 
ownership. Brazil is a notable example where credit repayment for car 
purchases must now be made over only 12 months whilst not long ago one 
could repay over 24- months and before that 36. Brazil is also attempting 
to develop i t s own renewable supplies of liquid fuel energy; one may pay 
back a loan to buy a car which runs on alcohol over 36 months. But there 
are doUbts about the economic viability of the country to produce large 
quantities of alcohol in the long run. One may surmise that due to the 
energy cr is is car ownership in Latin America will never attain the levels 
of today in the central countries unless e lectr ic cars become viable and 
safe and cheap means of providing electr ical energy be developed. Even so 
one wonders whether there would be enough resources of rubber, lead, and 
other materials (and enough energy for their processing) to go round. On 
the other hand there i s much scope for increasing the energy and materials 
efficiency of some cars currently made in Latin America. One could obtain 
two modern cars from the resources tied up in many of the older cars s t i l l 
circulating in countries such as Uruguay, Chile and Argentina. 
However i t is not likely that the steady reduction in car acquisition 
and upkeep costs of the period to 1973 continue into the future. Also 
the movement of Latin America into the kind of l ifestyle which depends on 
the automobile already has occurred and the movement i t s e l f -can give no 
further growth in ownership. 
Moreover i t is even possible that the upward movement in the car 
ownership curve as witnessed by Figure 2-1 may even be reversed in the 
future. In these times of so much uncertainty i t i s impossible to be 
confident in any assertion that one cares to make. Nevertheless we have 
/made two 
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made two alternative projections of car ownership by country in Latin 
America, for the years 1980, 1990, and 2000. The f i r s t set of estimates 
refer to the (probably optimistic) assumption that the rate of change 
in the equation parameters from 1962 to 19.74 continues into the future. 
This implies that the evolution of lifestyles', change in car prices, 
movements in perceptions.of operating costs, evolution of the income 
distribution and so on, a l l continue to move at the same annual rate as 
they have done from 1962 to 1974. The second set o,f: estimates deal with 
the (probably more rea l i s t i c ) case in which the 1974 equation holds good 
up to the year 2000. The forecasts are reproduced, in Table 3-1.. 
Under the former assumption the European level of car ownership of 
the mid 1970s would be attained by 2000 in Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil, 
Costa Rica and Mexico. Were the lat ter assumption to be the true one 
such levels would only have been reached by Argentina and. Venezuela. 
/Table 3-1. 
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-" ' •' Table 3-1 
ESTIMATED CAR OWNERSHIP PER HEAD̂ IN SOME LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO 2000 
Country 
v GDP estimated .per head 
(in USS of 1970) 
Conservative forecast "Trend" forecast 
1980 1990 2000 Z 1980 Z 1990 Z 2000 Z 1980.; 2 1990 Z;2000 
Argentina i 473 ' 2 058 2 876 87.451 141.828 . 219.278 99«315 195.633 291.037 
Bolivia ; '358 " -495 685 6.616 11¿614 • 20.085 7.581 16.777 . 37.007 
Brazil 799 1 253; 1 965 ; 44.793 - 7 5 . 7 6 5 ' 133.609 48.980 : 101.461 217.171 
Colombia 669 ' - 890 1 185 18.449 '• 31.372 51.414 • -21.541> 46.481 95.410 
Costa Rica 949 - ' 1-517 •2' 404' • 39*969 • 83.269 162.034 .45.645 117.714 265.796 
Chile 885 1 028 '' 1 256 -22.143 35.276. 53.191 26.834 55.248 104.196 
Ecuador 535' 797 i - 1 180 ' 10.738 - 23.964 - 48.205 12.791 36.089 89.994 
El Salvador 477 587 722 : -12.163 - 17.061 • 29.873 13.834 24.369 . 43.465 
Guatemala 550 683 ¿49 14.889 21.477 30.806 17.052 31.033 56.605 
Honduras 302 311 384 5.944 7.126 8.533 6.660 9.844 14.897 
Mexico 1 071 1 480 2 051 41.268 84.259 134.783 48.721 109.196 218.026 
Nicaragua 493 631 608 17.037 23.436 32.937 18.817 31.787 56.576 
Paraguay 508 689 935 12.441 20.856 34.499 15.249 31.124 64.185 
Peru 613 792 1 024 18.684 28.565 43.305 21.361 41.121 78.889 
Dominican Republic 528 744 1 050 15.644 26.471 45.086 17.652 37.402 80.656 
Uruguay 437 995 1 056 53.479 57.517 61.892 59»137 76.574 101.303 
Venezuela 1 533 214 2 991 49.013 155.360 284.579 111.415 210.891 351.357 
Notes; GDP per capita forecast derived from GDP projections to 2000 of the Centro de Proyecciones Económicas of CEPAL, 
using ''head" forecasts 1980-2000 rather than high alternatives, and population projections from "Boletín 
Demográfico", año XI, N? 22 de CELADE. 
Z = estimated per 1 000 persons, 
a / Car ownership. 
/IV. SOME 
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IV. . .SOME MACRO-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES. OF; AUTOMOBILE . 
ACQUISITION AND USAGE IN LATIN AMERICA 
In the subsequent chapters of this paper we shall develop arguments 
which infer that in Latin America automobile usage has various regressive 
characteristics with regards to the distribution of welfare» i . e . , t h e 
benefits from the automobile accrue.to the richer members of society who, 
in the accrual of such benefits, infl ic t costs on society in general, both 
themselves and the poorer majority of the population, for which they are 
often not held responsible. Such implications are generally undesirable. 
However i t is possible that there are effects of.the private automobile, 
not directly concerned with the distribution of income, which so stimulate 
the generation of wealth by the nation that any such undesirable implications 
be at least partly compensated. We shall consider two of these such 
economic effects in some .detail, these being the effect of the automobile 
on employment and i t s impact on the balance of trade of the country. 
But, beyond this , there are other ramifications of automobile usage 
and ownership about which comment should be made, even i f lack of the 
chance to make a detailed investigation prohibits that there be anything 
better than a conceptual introduction of them. 
The automobile has an impact on the financial markets of countries 
through the need of many potential car owners to borrow money were they to 
realize their dream of car ownership. In Latin America cars are expensive 
in comparison with incomes; thus the proportion of car buyers who must 
resort to borrowing funds is probably higher than,in the central countries 
where prices are usually lower and incomes, on average, higher. The 
existence of the automobile stimulates demand for financial resources by 
families; were a family to rule out the possibility of buying a car i t 
would probably increase i t s purchases of less durable items which would 
not have such a requirement for financing. The demand for funds would tend 
to push up interest rates and increase the returns to he who has capital1 
to invest, and raising the total amount invested. Furthermore the demand 
for finance for car acquisition probably diverts funds from other investments 
which may have higher (or lower) social priority. 
/Increasing ownership 
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Increasing ownership and, more so» usage of private cars probably 
generates a greater demand for public spending. Many transportation 
fac i l i t ies are constructed in Latin America as a result of , arguably, 
biased evaluation exercises; others are constructed since the social, 
benefits which would accrue from them exceed their social costs.' These f 
schemes are 'thus socially desirablé. ' But were there to be lesser car usage 
there would be a lesser demand for infrastructure provided at public 
expense. Were a family not to buy a car, i t may decide to allocate the 
funds thereby made available to a color television sé t , an extension to 
the family home, or 'a vacation. The color televisions would stimulate the 
demand for those services which provide color television 'programs, which 
services are usually provided by the private sector; the extension to the 
home would also generally involve construction services provided by thè 
private sector; and the vacation need not require significant intervention 
from the public authorities. The stimulus that the car probably gives to 
the activities of the public sector through the linked demand for 
infrastructure (and also police services, control of license" issue, e t c . , 
provided at a public expense) is not necessarily either a bad thing nor 
a good thing. In practice, however, the expansion of the public sector in 
Latin America has not always been neutral; i t may stimulate inflation, 
and the raising of réveriue- tó finance -capital -works may be! such that . 
economic efficiency' suffer." 
The generation of wealth may be fostered through the ownership:of a 
car being seen as a'goal to be reached even at' the cost of working long 
hours spending the evening hours studying'etc. Thé automobile may be 
unique in such stimulation of human effort . 
•1. The impact of the private automobile on employment 
in Latin America 
In a .fully employed economy the use of manpower is a cost and not 
a benefit. The stimulation of an industry intensive in i t s requirement 
for labour implies, under such circumstances,, that labour must be diverted 
from the production of other goods and services. The labour cost of the 
new industry would be the reduction in the value of such other goods and 
services through the transfer of labour resources to i t . 
/However, there 
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However, there i s l i t t l e evidence in the current economic condition 
of the world that any country genuinely considers employment as a cost 
in the way that the theory of.the fully employed economy would dictate, 
but rather i t is considered that the foregone production due to the 
establishment of a new .industrial activity be small and, moreover, that 
to be employed is. a basic human right. Even in the cases of such fully 
employed economies as Japan, governments go. to considerable lengths to 
maintain employment in. industries (such as shipbuilding) which suffer from 
reductions in orders by one means or another, maybe subsidized financing, 
public sector orders, or incentives to build for stock. 
In recent years in the United States, Canada and Western Europe 
governments have gone to considerable lengths both to .gain new automotive 
sector investment, and to maintain such investment as already exists . 
Specific examples of such involvement include: 
( i ) A contest between Puerto Rico, Eire and Northern Ireland to 
be selected.as the si te of the assembly plant for the DeLorean Car Company. 
This was "won" at high cost in terms of effective subsidy by Northern Ireland. 
( i i ) A contest between several United States' states to be chosen 
as the location of the Volkswagen assembly plant. This was "won" by 
Pennsylvania through the offer of providing infrastructure, e tc . 
; ( i i i ) A competition between several European countries involving 
France, Portugal, Austria and maybe others, to be selected as the host 
nation of a new Ford assembly plant. I t had been quoted in-the press 
that such was the desire to be selected as the s i te for this plant, that the 
President of France spoke personally with Henry Ford offering grants and 
loans to the value.of 1/M- of the minimum investment cost of a billion US 
dollars so that the plant be,established in the depressed region of 
Lorraine. (The Ford company decided finally not to construct the envisioned 
plant . ) 
( iv) In a like manner to ( i i i ) the Ford company was persuaded to 
locate a factory for :the.; product ion of engines for i t s new world car , the 
Erika, in Wales only after Mr. Henry Ford spoke with the British Prime 
Minister. 
/Behind a l l 
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Behind a l l of these and other similar competitions* employment was 
probably thè main -primer; mover (rather than.the balance of trade impact, 
e t c . ) . I f such competitions are entered into'by the governments of the 
central countries one would scarcely expect any .'lesser interest from 
their counterparts in Latin America, where any opportunity costs through 
resource divèrsion would tend to be less . One recent example òf a similar . 
contest in "Latin America was the competition between the Brazilian states 
of Rio de Janeiro (Guanabàra)'i SSo Paulo, and Minas Gérais to be selected 
by the FIAT company for' the center of i t s Brazilian operations. This 
contest was won by Minas "Gérais, again"at great Cost in terms of financing, 
tax advantages, eifc. ' • ' « 
Thus, there i s clear evidence a l l over the world that , in the case 
of the automotive sëctor at least , ' employment generation is seen as a 
benefit and not a cost. Even in those few cases where a government has 
taken steps to reduce the size of the national -car production-.Sector, the 
need to provide employment s t i l l enters into the argument. In Chile, for 
• example, arguments wëre lodged by the proponents of the early 1*979" ' 
government-sponsored:scheme to reduce t a r i f f duties on car imports that 
the incentive thereby given to car ownership and usage would more than . 
compensate for the réduction in'employment in the assembly plants. 
Thè motor vehicle providës employment in various a c t i v i t i e s , which 
may be conservatively'enumerated as vehicle fabrication, the production of 
components for such vehicles, the part of more basic 'industries which 
input to the l a t t e r , selling and aftersales service, and repair and other 
garage services* Ovër and above' these ac t iv i t ies other sectors are 
dependent on the accessibili ty afforded by the automobile, such as hotels 
and supermarkets. Excluding the l a t t e r indirectly affected sectors i t appears 
that ' in the main central countries employment in the ac t iv i t ies concerned 
with motor vehicle production (embracing both cars and other vehicles)- • 
involves' around 5% of the labour force. In the German FR and Italy the 
rate exceeds-5 1/2%, whilst in Britain, Spain and thè ;United States the ' 
rate is less than 5%* Tabìe' 4 .1 details the proportion of-thè-labour . 
force of certain central countries engaged in ac t iv i t ies directly relatecl. 
to the motor vehicle. 
/Comparable information 
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Comparable information for the countries of the Region is not : <• 
available in a 'reliable manner. The employment s ta t i s t i cs for even the 
advanced countries of the Region often seem .to be affected by under-
reporting. However, we have found i t possible to synthesize comparable 
estimates for some countries of the Region by assessing the employment 
related to the motor-vehicle in a selected central country, France, and 
expressing each .component of .the total as a ratio of,.the most appropriate 
independent variable of which estimates are...available for the countries 
of the Region, for instance .vehicle production and fleet size. One 
commercial vehicle.was counted as being equivalent to three cars. The 
ratios were applied to the independent variables -for- the Latin American 
countries considered, the resultant indicated level of employment being 
calibrated so as to correspond to an estimate available for Brazil by more 
direct calculations. The calibration involved the modification of the 
in i t ia l estimated level of .employment by the ratio of GDP per head in 
France to GDP head in the country being analysed raised to an exponent, 
so as to approximately recognize that those countries with lower GDP per ' 
head are likely to employ more "labour intensive means of production. The 
resultant estimates are shown also in Table -4-1..-. I t is indicated that in no 
Latin American country does employment in automotive related activities-.'. 
exceed 4% of the labour force., Brazil having,:the highest proportion, 3.9%,. 
which i s , however, quite close to the equivalents in some' central countries, 
especially those which are at lower stages of development (such as Spain),-.-... . 
or are net- importers' of motor vehicles (such as. ;the. United States and 
United Kingdom). In countries with no local productive'capacity the 
percentage of the labour force engaged in. automotive activities is less, 
than one. 
The primary matter of interest in the present paper is the private 
automobile rather than the motor vehicle, in general. Thus we have considered 
two countries for the estimation Of the amount of employment attributable 
to the private car, one with the most developed motor vehicle industry in 
the .Region and the other typical of countries at the opposite extreme which 
have no local production capability. " The choice of countries was determined 
by the availability of information at the detailed level from employment 
/surveys. For 
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surveys. j-For each country, by the most appropriate means available, we 
took each category of' employment- related with the automobile, and split 
the total employment in the category, into the part accounted for by the 
car and the part, accounted for by trucks, ..buses, etc..,- though partitioning 
via rat ios , (such as the amount of tyre wear attributable to- the car .to the 
total;ampunt of tyre wear, of appropriate independent variables which may 
approximately reflect the corresponding ratios of employment. Finally, 
there had to be considerable adjustments to the total amounts of employment 
related to the automobile estimated in this way so that: total employment 
by broad sector (-industry,' commerce, and-" services-) as measured in thfe 
employment censi be equal to similar estimates from population censi. 
( I t is not known fully-why the information from the employment censi should 
generally be under-reported; 'probable-reasons include the non-coverage 
of small firms and the-informal sector, and the reluctance of companies to 
disclose information which could, be disadvantageous to them*) Finally ; 
some hitherto excluded categories of employment were added i n . l / It. was 
estimated in- this -manner that in Brazil in the year 1970, slightly in excess 
of half of one million persons were employed i-n act ivit ies = connected with 
the private car. > ¡This, represents come 2% of the economically active 
population-of Brazil in this year. The procedure-: was simplified, in-the 
case pf Guatemala, for which country: i t was estimated that as l i t t l e as 
,0.83%: of the economically, active, population, was engaged in activit ies 
connected with the private car .2 / 
One may conclude that, in few cases is the contribution to "employment 
of the private automobile in the countries of the Region so significant 
that the overall*level of economic activity would be markedly affected 
were, for any reason, the use of the automobile to be restricted in -any way* 
1/ Certain other categories of employment, such as government officials 
concerned with the private car, and highway.police, were s t i l l excluded 
from the estimates, which are thus conservative. 
2/ " Note that this estimate is not comparable with that shown in table 4 .1 
„ which is anyway only a rough estimate; for instance the estimate quoted 
.. „ on this page includes employment in a part of the hotel sector. 
/Governments could 
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Governments could invoke.policies to transfer at least part of such 
employment to other activities i f , for any reason, there should be a 
cutback in employment in activit ies connected with the private automobile. 
Nevertheless, thè employment offered by the private automobile in Latin • 
America does perform an undéniable economic and social function. Although 
the assembly of vehicles' themselves is capital intensive, especially 
when production is on the scale of Brazil, and even Argentina, there are 
many: subsidiary activities•which enable the wealth of the car owner to 
generate employment to those less fortunate. '• At the lowest level the car 
gives some income to persons who-park, mind, and wash cars, which .activities 
have disappeared from the central countries ( i f they ever existed in the 
f i r s t place) whilst service stations, maintenance and repair garages, 
hotels, e t c . , a l l provide employment opportunities and often have further 
social value in the training afforded to. the workers so occupied in. 
technical and other operations which contribute to economic development. 
On the other hand the employment generated by the automobile may 
have upsetting social consequences, which may have economic ramifications., 
The employees of assembly plants often receive very high wages by the 
standards of similarly skilled workers in other act ivi t ies , in Brazil in . 
1970 the mean wage of those!employed in the fabrication of road motor 
vehicles was more than double that in the. industrial sector generally, 
and almost four times as much as the mean in the commercial sector. 
Increasingly the employees of such plants are using their bargaining power 
to extract from their foreign controlled employers considerable wage increases 
made possible, in some cases, by the good profits that their employers 
may make from the protected industrial1 activity in which, they operate. 
The industrial unrest thereby engendered may raise wage levels generally , • 
in other engineering industries, and indeed other sectors, which could 
raise wages above their marginal revenue product, thereby, possibly lowering 
the total Volume of-employment, and--value of production, i 
/ 2 . The 
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2. The impact of the private automobile, on the balance .. 
• of trade in Latin America 
- Considerations of foreign'exchange were influential in the decisions, 
made by "certain countries of', the Region to initiate, the total .production 
of motor vehicles.1/ In Brazil, for:example, the heavy drain that the 
importation of motor vehicles was having on-the trade balance of the 
country, and i t s contribution to the'exhaustion of reserves of foreign 
exchange by the beginning of .the nineteen« f i f t i e s , were, the prime movers .-
behind the f i r s t steps toward, the. development of. large scale automotive 
production. ' On the other hand, recently,.in some countries of the Region,' 
(Chile and Argentina), the a r t i f i c i a l development of motor vehicle assembly 
has been to some'extent associated with economic models acredited as . 
having adverse effects on trading performance through, the diversion of ; 
human and Capital resources atoay'from those act ivit ies in. which the country 
has comparative advantages.: 
As in the "case of employment , the estimation of . the true .-.impact of 
the automobile on''the balance of trade' ( let alone the more, complicated 
problem of the'balance of payments ) is impossible without the availability 
of a'calibitf&ted inter-sectorial model of the economy, together with 
detailed information about•the•structure, of consumer spending and automobile 
industry 'cost structure.. Some .of . the impacts. which. could hardly be 
estimated in any other way-include:. 
( i ) Car usage either.causes a ' f a l l in petroleum exports or a r ise 
in petroleum imports. • • . - , -
( i i ) ' The requirement of'gasoline by automobile users-, in most 
countries,-entails that more revenue be transferred to the government 
through sales-type taxes than would be the case were the resources of the 
consumer to be spent -on other goods and services (which usually bear lower 
rates of taxation). The government would o n l y by coincidence use the 
funds transferred to i t to affect the trade balance in the. same way as 
would have occurred were they to remain in private hands. 
1/ In other countries, other factors may have been at least equally 
important, such as economic nationalism. 
/(iii) Car 
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( i i i ) Gar operation,"«consumes parts , which may be imported, or may 
consume resources that might otherwise be devoted to exportation. 
( iv ) Car acquisition either implies that the vehicle be imported 
or that parts would have to be imported and assembled with resources 
that could otherwise have been partially assigned to exportation. ' 
(v) Were there to be a local vehicle production industry:it may be 
feasible to generate exports at low marginal costs . 
(v i ) Car assembly operations, as-we have seen above, tend to pay 
high wages, "and be instrumental in spreading higher wages through to a 
privileged sub-section of the labour force. This has effects on the overall 
propensity to import. 
We have been unable to even consider the use of models of the 
required degree of sophistication that these and-other relevant impacts 
be internalized in our calculation. But we • have, made some tentative 
moves towards the estimation of the proportion of both imports and 
exports .of certain countries which may be attributed to the private car . 
The results are necessarily not a fa i r reflection of the overall impact 
of the- automobile on the balance of trade. . 
The estimation of the part of the tota l import b i l l due to the 
private automobile is the more complicated. The basic procedure was 
f i r s t l y to tabulate from the annuals of international trade the t o t a l 
amounts of those imports in categories which may be assignable in- part 
to the private car . Then these totals were partitioned into the part 
accounted for by the private car and the part accounted for by other 
vehicle types, and other, non-automotive, uses. In the case of imports 
of crude petroleum, for instance, this partitioning routine involved the 
estimation of the proportion of Crude refined into gasoline, and into" the 
various other products derived from each barrel of petroleum. Each product 
was assigned an international market value and the proportion of the to ta l ' 
import b i l l due to gasoline was calculated as the market value of the 
fraction refined into gasoline relative to the to ta l market value of other „ 
refined products. Finally there had to-be an adjustment to ref lec t that 
private cars consume only a proportion of gasoline, some being used for 
taxis , some being exported, e t c . . The calculations were performed for 
/Brazil and 
Brazil and.Nicaragua, using the year 1976 in"both caseá. ' I t was found 
that in the case of Brazil 9<62% of the import b i l l was attributable to 
the private automobile. In thercasé;of . Nicaragua the-percentage was 
5.12. (See;..table 4 . 2 . ) ; 
Morevthan 75% of the estimated share in the case of Brazil was due 
to gasoline, with the only other category"of any significance being parts 
for vehicle construction„or upkeep. Brazil imported no cars in 1976 
(except a - few to the higher diplomatic ranks and to manufacturers'for 
testing purposes) and.only about 2 1/2% of the value of the typical car 
was imported.l/ Brazil has insufficient petroleum for i t s needs, having 
to import something over 80% of consumption; were the calculations to 
have been repeated for, say, Argentina, the proportion estimated-Would 
have been less ' 
on 'account of the"ability of Argentina to cover most of i t s 
petroleum consumption from nationál supplies. (Thus i t would have been 
inferred that the car has a lesser impact on the Argentinian tradé balance 
than really is ' the case, since non-consumed petroleum is exportáblé.) 
In the case df Nicaragua, less" thán 30% of the proportion of a l l imports 
due to the private car were attributed' to gasoline imports. The major 
component,' some 55%, was due to imports Of máde-up vehicles. The parts 
share was lower than in Brazil whilst the t i r e s and tubes (plus raw materials 
for their fabrication) was double that in Brazil. The results are'shown' 
on Table 4-2. 
For Brazil in the same year Table 4-4 shows that only 1.4% o'f a l l 
exports were from the automobile"-production sector, although the proportion 
may have increased slightly since.2/ Brazil exports considerable" quantities 
of gasoline which were not included in the calculations. The volumes 
exported are a. function of the residual not. consumed within the country : 
from the refining fraction accounted for by gasoline; were there to-be 
less car-usage in Brazil the difference between the amount of -petroleum 
1/ ' However, this 2 1/2% would not reflect imports of basic inputs such 
as energy, copper, and designs. 
2/ in 1978 Brazil was exporting as much as 10%-of i ts car production. 
/which must 
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which must be imported for diesel oil-, fuel o i l , etc.,would leave an 
even greater volume of spare gasoline left over. In the case of Nicaragua, 
one is not able to assign any exports to the private automobile. 
Brazil, Argentina and Mexico are the only countries in the Region 
which source a noticeable proportion of their exports from the automotive 
sector. Of these three , i t is-probable that the relative importance of 
the sector as an exporter has passed i t s peak in Argentina. In the future, 
the countries of the Andean Pact are iikely to export considerable 
quantities of vehicles and parts for Vehicles to one another as the 
integrated automotive sector of this economic grouping assumes a tangible1 
form. • ; . •• 
Table 4-3 shows, for some Latin American countries, import and export 
trade in (a) cars and (b) motor vehicle (including trucks and buses) 
parts as proportions of their total trade, from off ic ial trade returns. 
From this table certain general conclusions may be drawn: 
( i ) Imports of made-up cars tend not to be of great significance 
even in the cases of the smaller countries which have no productive "capacity. 
Only in the case of Venezuela did imported cars exceed 5% of the total 
import b i l l ; this country also assembled considerable quantities of cars. 
( i i ) Imports of parts for motor vehicles are usually less important 
than imports of made-up cars except in the cases of those countries which 
have highly protected local manufacturing capability. In the case of 
Mexico, in' contrast to Brazil and Argentina, the national components 
industry is not as protected as the assembly operations; hence Mexico imports 
large quantities of parts for locally produced vehicles. 
( i i i ) Only Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Argentina, are significant 
exporters of cars, although some other countries with local assembly 
operations have developed an export trade in components, especially in the 
cases of those countries, such as Chile, which have complementation 
agreements in the sector. 
Thus even in the case of Brazil the significance of the automotive 
production sector as an exporter is not fundamental although automotive 
sector exports from Brazil have recently been expanding considerably. The 
development of the automobile manufacturing industry in Latin America has 
/been essentially 
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been essentially tQ: substitute for imports, rather than to generate 
e,xports. In, this respect th.e industry in the Region differs from those 
of some countries in. Asia, such as Japan and Korea, and also from those 
of the. central, countries, where on occasion, whole car plants have been 
set,up (or maintained) with, the export market in mind, for instance :• 
DeLorean in Northern Ireland, Ferrari in I taly , and Lotus in England,. , 
Only recently has the industry of Brazil become noticeably export 
oriented, to some degree as a result of the diminished internal growth 
prospects due to the energy c r i s i s . Government persuation has also been 
important. 
Those countries with no local productive capacity tend to res t r i c t 
their imports .of cars, . through. varying combinations,-Of. lack of buying, 
power and high import.duties. The import trade- in motor vehicles, and' 
parts , is rarely ..significant; the two exceptions to this général rule, are . 
Venezuela, where local buying power exacts appreciable quantities of 
car imports although the•country possesses a. local industry which enjôys 
considerable protection, and Mexico, where the ;stimulation of a vehicle 
production capacity has -not-gone hand-in-hand with a similarly determined 
effort to foster the local production of components. (Mexico, by pursuing 1 
this policy has been able to enjoy a cost structure .considerably lôwér 
than would otherwise be the case, and has, since 1977, been employed as 
the source of Volkswagen Beetle cars for export, to Europe in preference 
to Brazil, where local content rules are much s t r i c t e r . However, Mexico's 
•policy has implied large scale imports of parts, representing a considerable 
drain on the foreign exchange earnings of.the country.) -, 
One may conclude that countries .are well able to manage their trade 
in vehicles, and parts., and more especially cars, and parts for cars, to 
minimize unfavourable impacts on the. trade balance through the .fomentation , 
of a national industry or the restriction of sales, although both of 
these policies have a cost in terms of the allocation, of resources within 
the cpuntry. Some countries notably Chile in recent years have; accepted 
the cost of large quantitu.es of imported cars in order to.open up. their 
economies and.correct the.allocation of national resources. The greater 
potential threat to the trade balance stems from the appetite for petroleum 
/of the 
of the car f l e e t . Concern-about the balance-of^payments.impact from the 
petroleum importation requirement of the national car f-léet would naturally 
be f e l t most in a country which has made strident attempts to f es ter the 
national automotive sector and which lacks large'petroleum reserves. The 
country which best f i t s this description in the' Region is Brazil. The 
i n i t i a l reaction of Brazil to the energy c r i s i s was to raise the price of 
gasoline and limit i t s availability an an attempt to restrain car usage 
without affecting the welfare derived from the car industry,• whilst a 
policy was developed to mix"alcohol, from national crops such as sugar 
cane and manioca, with gasoline up to 20% concentration. 
More recently Brazil has seen the need to adopt stronger measures, 
such as severe limitations on the repayment period for loans used for 
car purchase, which must be expected to impact upon the rate of car ownership, 
and hence the output of the local industry. Furthermore Brazil is 
incentivating the production and usage of car which-run on 100% alcohol, 
rather than a mixture which comprises 80% gasoline. 
The true balance of trade impact of the automobile is hidden in those 
countries of the Region, such as Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago, which are largely self -suff ic ient , 
or better than self-sufficient in petroleum. In these countries, thé 
development of a l i fes tyle base around the conventional private car does 
not, in the short run, imply that ever more expensive petroleum has to be' 
bought on the world market. There is a tendency to disregard the 
possibility that petroleum not consumed local ly may be exported; for 
instance certain nations of the Region, such as Bolivia and Venezuela, 
charge the local consumer of petroleum products prices very much less than 
those asked of the foreigner. A thorough appraisal of the balance of . 
trade impact of the private automobile in the Region would no doubt 
conclude that the cost in terms of petroleum imports or foregone exports 
is high, and may cause the frustration of important features of development 
programmes through the reduction in the amount of foreign exchange available 
for capital and other projects and the diversion of scarce national 
resources to the production of substitute fue ls . 
/ 3 . Conclusions 
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3, Conclusions as to the impact of the private; ..automobile • • 
on the economic performance of Latin American 
economies' ""'"•'* ; i • • -w ' 
We are clearly in no position to say anything definitive abo-;t the . 
contribution of the automobile on the national income of the countries 
of the Region. The following are some of the factors pertinent to any 
attempt to quantify such a contribution: 
( i ) The energy cr is is has, markedly raised the economic cost of 
those lifestyles which revolve around the utilization of the private car , 
either by diverting foreign exchange resources to petroleum imports and 
away from other goods and services which may have a greater'effect on 
economic growth, or by consuming potential exports which could have 
otherwise been traded for imports useful in the development process. 
( i i ) Governments have had success in restricting the loss of foreign 
exchange through the importation of cars and parts, but this has 
necessarily been at the cost of a distortion of the allocation of resources 
in the economy. 
( i i i ) The employment generated by th,e private car almos.t certainly 
raises the total volume of employment, and also contributes to the 
development and diffusion of ski l ls . However the high wages paid to 
assembly plant workers may have the effect of stimulating labour unrest 
which could result in the diverting away from the country other investment 
which could have provided employment. 
( iv) The stimulus which the automobile imparts to the demand for 
finance may divert investment from projects of social value which would 
have raised national income. 
(v) The automobile probably increases the level of public sector 
involvement in the economy, which could, under some circumstances, affect 
the rate of economic expansion. 
(vi) The automobile probably stimulates productivity by acting as 
a goal, attainable only through earning enough money for the down-payment 




COMPARISON OF EMPLOYMENT IN CERTAIN AUTOMOTIVE ACTIVITIES a/ 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE LABOUR FORCE BETWEEN SELECTED 
LATIN AMERICAN AND OECD COUNTRIES IN 
THE MID-1970S . 












Costa Rica 0.78 
Britain 4.39 
France 5.23 





United States of America 4.29 
a / Motor vehicle and t ra i ler fabrication (excluding motorcycles); 
components for these act ivi t ies ; basic supply industries; selling and 
aftersales service; repair and other garage services. The estimates 
for the OECD countries were derived directly from data presented in 
"The role of the motor vehicle in modern industrial economies" by the 
Permanent International Office of Automobile Constructors, Paris, France, 
1977, and the United Nations Statist ical Yearbook. The estimates for 
the Latin American nations were synthesized using also data from 
"Anuario Estadístico de América Latina", CEPAL, 1978, and World Bank 




THE BREAKDOWN BY TYPE OF IMPORTS UTILIZED IN PRIVATE CAR 
ACQUISITION IN BRAZIL (1977) AND NICARAGUA (1976) 
Type of- good imported 
Percentage of t o t a l imports 
' to private car sector 
Brazil Nicaragua 
Gasoline and other oilbased 
products. (Gasoline general-
ly imported in the form of 
crude) 
Made-up private vehicles 
Parts for private vehicles either 
for construction or upkeep 
Tires and tubes and raw 
materials for these products 
Other products a / 
Total 
Total US$ value of 
imports b/ 
Percentage that imports for 















US$ 532 136 x 103 
5.12 
a / This percentage, due to the method of calculation which makes the . 
best available use of the available s t a t i s t i c a l data which data 
varies in format from one country to the next, has a built in tendency 
to be higher in the case of Brazil. In the case of Nicaragua, i t would 
not include certain types of equipment imported for gas stations and 
vehicle re ta i lers and distributors, although these would be counted 
in the case of Brazil . 
b/ The estimates are based on F.O.B. values in the case of Brazil and C.I .F . 
values- in the case of Nicaragua. 
/Table 4 - 3 
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Table 4-3 
PROPORTION OF ALL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS IN STANDARD INDUSTRIAL 
TRADE CLASSIFICATION CATEGORIES 7321 a / AND 7328 b/ 


















Argentina 0 .00 2. ,56 1. ,42 0. ,41 1976 
Bolivia 1 .21 1. ,22 - - 1972 
Brazil 0 .00 0. ,91 0, ,67 0. ,70 1977 
Chile 0 .47 1. ,06 0, ,00 0. ,17 1974 
Costa Rica 1 .88 0, ,81 0, .00 0, .00 1976 
Cuba 0 .90 2. ,16 0. ,00 0, .00 1974 
Dominican Republic 3 .85 ? 0, .00 0, .00 1971 
Ecuador 1 .02 1. ,49 0, ,00 0, .00 1974/5 
El Salvador 1 .17 0. ,71 0. .00 0. ,00 ' ,1975 
Guatemala 1 .55 1« ,35 0, .00 0. .38 1975 
Mexico 0 .13 10. .44 0, .01 0, .57 1976 
Nicaragua 3 .41 . 0, ,95 0, .00 0. .00 1976 
Peru 0 .33 1. ,21 0, .00 0, .00 1974 
Trinidad and Tobago 2 .37 0, ,50. 0, .00 0, .00 1977 
Uruguay 2 .22 0, ,57 0, .00 0, .50 1976 
Venezuela 6 .49 1. ,91 0. .00 0, .00 1975 
a/ Category 7321 shows imports of passenger road vehicles other than 
buses, and exports of the same. . 
b/ Category 7328"shows imports of parts for motor vehicles ( a l l types), 
and exports of the same. 
/Table 4 -4 
Table 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR TO 
THE EXPORTS OF BRAZIL IN 1976 
Discrimination a / Value FoOaB. in US$ 10 000 
Percentage of 
total exports 
Made-up cars and car-type 
vehicles ,29 616.72 0.29 . 
Cars and car-type 
vehicles in CKD form 78 653.9,7, 0.78 . 
(Parts for motor 
vehicles) (55 900.98) (0 .55) 
Of which assigned to 
cars and car-type vehicles 30 801.65 • 0.30 
Tires for cars . 4 296.40 0.04 : 
Total of exports from 
automobile production 
sector 143 388.74 1.41 
Total of a l l Brazilian 
exports 10 128 303,42 100.00 
Source; Based on s ta t i s t i cs from "Brasil-Comercio Exportaçao". 
Banco do Brasil-CACEX and supplementary information from 
"Quatro Rodas" of december 1978. 
a / In Brazil certain models of what most people would cal l cars are 
classified as "Veiculos de uso misto", which have a third door of 
certain dimensions thereby enabling them to be used for the 
transportation of goods as well as people. Such vehicles qualify 
for a lower tax rate . Several popular Brazilian "cars" such as the 
Passat and Brasilia fa l l into this category. 
/V. THE 
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V. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF URBAN TRANSPORTATION 
. IN LATIN AMERICA 
1. Introduction: the dominance of the streetcar 
In order to understand fully the relationship between the- private 
car and the city,-'where the car has probably had the most impact on society, 
i t is useful to know'something about the evolution of urban transportation 
in the urban.areas of Latin America. Such evolution appears to have 
shown certain significant differences compared with corresponding 
developments in the central countries. However the history of Latin 
American urban transportation is very poorly documented and i t is not 
possible therefore in the present paper to present a full and comprehensive 
picture of the development of urban transportation in the Region. We 
must by necessity concentrate on those parts of the Region where the most 
information is currently readily available, these countries being Brazil 
and to a lesser extent Argentina and Chile with ancilliary information ' 
drawn from elsewhere. 
In some ci t ies in the Region horse-drawn omnibus services started 
soon after their initiation in ;the developed countries. For instance the 
f i r s t bus service in Recife started in 1841 not too long after Paris (1819) 
and London (1829). But i t appears that the arrival of the omnibus as a 
significant force on the urban scene occurred much la ter ; Sao Paulo appears 
to have made no use of bus services at least until- close to the turn of 
the century. Prior to this time, to travel other than on foot in the city 
meant hiring a coach by the hour. In the second half of the last century 
the development of urban transportation focUsed around what is variously 
known as the bonde 1/ (Brazil) , tranvla (Spanish Latin America), tram 
(UK) and streetcar (US). These were ini t ial ly drawn by horses and from 
1892 (in Rio de Janeiro) by electr ic i ty . Some systems used steam in an 
intermediate period, Such as in Rio de Janeiro and elsewhere. 
1/ This interesting word apparently derives from the english "bond" 
sold by a tram company to. users to avoid problems caused by lack 
of small change. 
/The bondes 
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The bondes had an enormous impact on city development in Brazil, 
even before electrification. They enabled the use of land previously too 
inaccessible for employment as residential or work areas and thus 
contributed to the expansion of thé city and the raising of i t s productivity. 
In Lima top tranvfas had the same impact. Tramway systems were not always 
publically owned even though they ran on tracks lain in the public 
right-of-way, for instance in Sao Paulo the Light and Power Company ran 
a large part of the streetcar service. (The later trolleybus system was 
generally publically owned however.) Until 1930 streetcars had a virtual, 
monopoly of transportation within the city of Sao Paulo. In, the 1920s 
streetcars accounted for about 80% of the (non-walk) person trips made 
in the city of Rio de Janeiro. In Lima Las Empresas Elêctricas Asociadas 
reaped large profits from their monopolistic situation. 
Motor buses did not arrive on a significant scale in Rio de Janeiro.,: 
nor Sao Paulo until the decade of the nineteen twenties, very much after 
their introduction in the c i t ies of the central countries (but earlier 
than in Argentina 1 / ) . For instance the f i r s t motor bus services appeared 
in London around 1904 and by 1914 this city was densely threaded by bus 
services a l l motor powered (gasoline, steam, or petrol -electr ic ) . The 
arrival of the motor bus presented a threat to the tramway operators whose 
vehicles were inherently less flexible in their operation. At the same 
time as the motor bus appeared on the scene, there were the f i r s t developments 
of significant congestion, which clearly held a much greater threat to 
the operation of trams than of buses. Congestion seemed to have, been the 
reason behind the attempt of a private tramway operator to be allowed to 
construct a Metro system in Sao Paulo in 1927, But permission so to do 
was not.granted. Although investment f e l l off in tramways their usage 
continued to increase for some time. Surprisingly enough, for instance, 
ridership on the streetcars of Rio de Janeiro peaked as late as around 
1950 in terms of riders, although the share of the system in the overall 
modal split had started to f a l l earl ier . The Light company in Sao Paulo 
1/ According to ADEFA s t a t i s t i c s until 1934 Argentina imported neither 
any complete buses nor any chassis for buses. 
/saw no 
saw no future in tramway operation and advised; the Prefecture of the 
city that i t would not seek the renewal of i t s contract when i t would 
come up for renewal.in 1941. The second World war caused the declaration 
of a "forza maior" by the authorities and in fact the company continued 
to operate bondes in the city until 1947. The tramway system then became 
completely publically owned. 
For a while more the authorities of Sao Paulo continued to invest 
in upgrading vehicles and even built a prototype of what was intended to 
be a national tramcar, which however was to remain an only child. Cheap 
petroleum» the greater rate of technological evolution of the motor bus-, the 
development of congestion and the inflexibility of the tracked right-of-way 
a l l contributed to the decline and fa l l of the tramways in Latin America. 
The decline was very rapids and today i t scarcely seems possible, that. 
only a few decades ago the streetcar was the most important transportation . 
system in many Latin American c i t ies . Figure 5-1 illustrates the typically 
sharp f a l l in the fortunes of the streetcar , using the examples of Rio de 
Janeiro. In Santiago9 Chile the tranvia disappeared in 1959, in,Lima 1/ 
in 1965, the last tram ran in Buenos Aires in 1962, whilst in Rio.de 
Janeiro the last bonde (apart from those serving Santa Teresa.which s t i l l , 
run.and are being renovated) ceased to operate in 1964. These dates of-
termination broadly paralleled those.in some central countries. .For 
instance -it was in 1952 that London.finally abandoned i t s tramway system. 
Other English c i t ies followed shortly after . In other central countries, 
particularly those in continental Europe on either side -of the NATO-Warsaw 
Pact divide streetcars are s t i l l popular, as they are in certain other 
c i t ies such as Boston (USA), Cleveland, Melbourne and San;Francisco, 
although sentiment plays a greater part.here than in Europe. 
In London in the early nineteen thirties the trolleybus was conceived 
so as to make use. of investments in power generation and transmitting 
equipment provided init ial ly for the tramway service after the la t te r had 
fallen out of favour due to its, inflexibility in the rise of. motor vehicle 
1/ In their late years at least the tranvías of Lima became a largely 
intermunicipal carrier operating services such as Lima-Callao. 
/created congestion. 
_ 
created congestion. I t is probable that similar reasons were behind the 
introduction of trolleybuses in some of the c i t ies of Latin America; ;T 
Santiago, Chile, initiated i t s trolleybus services in 1947, the same 
year as the trolleybus established i t s e l f in Sao Paulo. Other c i t ies 
which have had, and sometimes s t i l l have, trolleybus services include 
Valparaiso, Buenos Aires, Mexico, Recife, Belo Horizonte and Rio de 
Janeiro. The fortune of the trolleybus in Latin America has been varied. 
In Santiago they f e l l gradually out of favour to be intermittently 
resurrected in the later nineteen1seventies as a form of non-polluting 
vehicles compatible with the Metro system. Santiago refurbished existing 
vehicles during these attempts at resurrection rather than buy new vehicles. 
Trolleybuses have disappeared from some c i t ies completely, such as 
Belo Horizonte and Buenos Aires. The trolleybus experiment in Rio de 
Janeiro lasted only a few years, the-buses being converted to run subsequently 
as diesel powered vehicles. Some ci t ies in Latin America acquired the 
usable buses from other c i t ies which had abandoned their trolleybus 
system-. This occurred-t'Oo in: the central countries. For instance 
trolleybuses from other English-cities appeared in Bournemouth, one of 
the last English cit ies ' to run trolleybuses and- some double-deck 
trolleybuses from London were bought for subsequent use in several Spanish 
c i t i e s . 1 / In Brazil , Recife acquired buses from Belo Horizonte and 
elsewhere and was Very pleased with them. They were cheaper to operate 
than diesel buses and the inherent inflexibility of the system was 
countered by not completely advisable practices such as running trolleybuses 
both ways along streets that carried t ra f f i c only in one direction of 
other types of vehicles. Recife would have liked to have been able to 
have purchased new trolleybuses in 1976 but was unable to do so due to the 
non-availability of production capacity in Brazil (and the limited amount 
of capacity available elsewhere) and the limitations on importation due to 
restricted amounts of foreign exchange. Recife resorted to the thorough 
overhaul of 25-year old buses already on i t s books. These are recent signs 
of an even stronger turn in favour of the trolleybus however, particularly 
in Brazil, stimulated by the deficiency of this country in petroleum resources. 
" . ' ' ' ' • - ' ' ' ' -
1/ As in the case of Rio de Janeiro, some were later converted to diesel 
power -
/Sao Paulo 
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Sao Paulo, dismayed by the costs of expanding i t s Metro system is turning 
to the trolleybus by ordering over one thousand to a new standardized 
design from a Brazilian manufacturer to run throughout the c i ty partially 
on reserved lanes. Other Brazilian ci t ies could follow suit . 
3. The rise of the motor bus 
The motor bus was a late arrival 1/ in Latin America but has since 
caused a revolution in city.transportation at least comparable with that 
brought about by the private, car . The f i r s t motor bus ran in Rio in 1908 
but there was no real impact of the motor bus on. Brazil until around 1930. 
In Argentina no buses at a l l were imported until 1934. Real progress was 
made only after the war. From 1945 to 1970 the car fleet increased by a 
factor of five, but the bus fleet was not far behind at four in the 
Republic. The rate of growth in bus usage is evidenced for Rio de Janeiro 
in Figure 2. For some years the available s ta t i s t i cs would indicate that 
the rate of increase in the bus fleet in Buenos Aires exceeded the same 
for the car f leet . In Lima the f i r s t buses, imported second-hand from 
the United States arrived around 1930. The factors contributing to the 
growth in the bus fleets of c i t ies in Latin America include the,following:. 
( i ) The replacement of tram and trolleybus fleets in certain c i t ies . 
( i i ) The migration of.people from rural to urban areas. ... . 
( i i i ) The growth in city-size rendering-walking an increasingly . 
non-viable transportation option. 
( iv) The intervention of the public authorities in placing large 
orders for buses in some c i t ies , e .g. »Santiago» ,„ Chile, Caracas, Rio de 
Janeiro. > - . . . . 
(v) The attractiveness of the bus as a form of investment to the 
small investor who wishes to personally supervise the productivity of his 
investment, e.g.,owner-drivers, in Santiago, Chile, and Buenos Aires. 
(vi) The development of congestion which has the effect of requiring 
more buses to do the same amount of work. 
1 / Maybe the streetcar companies inhibited the development of bus services 
through their considerable political and economic influence. 
/ ( v i i ) The 
- tó -
(v i i ) The stimulus given by local manufacture of complete,buses, 
in Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, and bodies¿ in almost a l l countries, 
including, for example, Bolivia. : • 
The form of operation of bus fleets, varies widely from one city to 
another. In Buenos Aires individual owner-operators, predominate leading 
to the proliferation of medium sized buses able to be operated by one man 
and almost always well maintained and obviously looked upon with affection 
by their owners. In Santiago, Chile there are aiso owner-operated buses, 
(small sized taxi buses or microbuses), but the system works less well 
than in Buenos Aires, partially due to the lower per capita income of the 
r 
ci ty . Buses are smaller and less well maintained than in Buenos Aires 
and often appear completely decrepit, due, according to the owners, to the 
low controlled fares set for social reasons by the authorities. Santiago 
also has fleets of largér buses some privately owned and some owned by the 
State. These are generally better maintained arid more modern but are 
one-man operated whereas the same type of buses in Brazil, for instance»are 
operated by a crew of two, with clear advantages from the point of view 
of the reduction of unemployment and the speed of t r a f f i c . In Rio de 
Janeiro most services are run by private" companies with full sized single 
decker buses, intensively used, and quite well maintained compared with some 
of other parts of Latin America.!/ Rio de Janeiro also operates 
municipality-owned buses, which largely ply the less profitable central 
routes. In Brasilia , services are operated-by private companies, although, 
as in Rio de Janeiro, and elsewhere, considerable investments have been 
made on behalf of bus services by the authorities in terminals,etc. In 
most c i t ies fares are basically independent of distance travelled. In 
Santiago a f la t rate applies to almost a l l routes whilst in other c i t ies 
such as Rio de Janeiro the rate varies with the kilometerage of the line. 
In Caracas there is a very coarse'zone fare system in operation in which 
buses on the longer routes wait at zone boundaries whilst fares'are collected 
from passengers who wish to continue on into the next zone. 
1/ Maintenance•of urban buses is rarèly good in Latin America. : in some' 
case? „such as ; the•publically-owned EMTSA of Caracas, i t is bad.' Of 
220 Mercedez-Benz buses that this entity bought in the end of 1960s . 
only 80 were le f t in service in 1971. 
/The physical 
The physical nature of a bus varies substantially from one within 
Latin American cities® Many c i t ies have what are generically known as 
microbuses which are clearly distinguished from regular buses in the 
minds of citizens. These buses, which are usually but not always smaller 
in size than regular buses, are often operated by the smaller enterprises 
or by the indiyidual capitalist . Many such buses are imported fully 
assembled from-abroad, often from companies in the United States such as 
Wayne or Thomas, whilst many more comprise truck chassis with locally made 
bodies. There i s some trade within Latin America in such vehicles, such 
as from Mercedes-Benz of Argentina to Santiago, Chile. The larger micro-
buses may be physically identical to a regular bus the only difference 
being that the former would be operated privately whilst the la t ter 
publically. In some ci t ies a bus which would be called a micro in Santiago 
or Lima would be known as just a bus, the term micro not being a part of 
the local vocabulary, such as in Rio de Janeiro or Caracas for instance. 
The regular bus tends to be more often bought in some scale by a large 
public or private operator than is the case with the micro and this leads 
to some standardization within any one company and to a preference for 
sourcing from a large scale producer of integral buses or from a large 
scale-chassis manufacturer which has an arrangement with an industrialized 
body producer. In Brazil Mercedes-Benz produces standard designs which 
are very widely teed both within ci t ies and on interurban runs in Brazil,, 
also being exported to other countries in the Region. Mercedes-Benz do 
Brazil, for instance, exported over 200 buses to Caracas in the mid-1960s, 
and many to Santiago, Chile in the mid 1970s. Sometimes similar buses 
are imported for Latin American urban use from Spain, United States, England, 
Germany or elsewhere. In Brazil, notably in Rio Grande do Sul, and 
elsewhere there have developed a few companies specialized in the production 
of high quality bus bodies which are fit ted to chassis from national 
manufacturers such as Scania or Cummins to produce what are probably the. 
highest quality of urban bus produced in Latin America. . . 
The State is gradually tending to play a larger role in bus transporta-
tion in Latin America. This is usually through i t s operating publically 
run buses but Brazil , for instance, has recently instigated a system of 
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financial incentives for private operators to buy new vehicles. Also 
fares are almost always controlled by the national or local government' 
authority, based upon estimated cost increases. Operators in somé'cities 
claim that the increases granted are insufficient to cover the costs òf 
depreciation thereby reducing incentives to buy new vehicles. On thè othér 
hand in exceptional cases the operators choose not to take full advantage 
of the increases allowed by the authorities, in an attempt to maximize 
profits through stimulating demand, for instance in the case òf the 
fresqpes ,(-see below-) of Rio de Janeiro, The State is often Caught in 
a difficult situation, trying at the same time to prevent social unrest» 
which sometimes breaks out in Latin American c i t ies when bus fares are 
raised, and to. maintain service quality by providing operators with financial 
incentives.' (In Rio de Janeiro some operators have become bankrupt due 
to fare control.) This causes the temptation to allow operators to charge 
higher fares only on certain services. For instance in Santiago, Chile 
early in 1979 there were initiated services by quite regular buses', non-
air-conditioned and oh which standing was permitted as in "any other bus, 
but at double the regular fare. In Rio de Janeiro services by luxury, 
a ir conditioned frespoes commenced in 1975 at a fare of three'times the 
standard rate (on.average), although, as mentioned, operators have since " 
opted to cut their per passenger profit margins. In Sao Paulo there are 
luxury (although non-air-conditioned) executive services. The danger of 
such variations, especially :those on'the Santiago model, is that investment 
occur only on the premium fare routes leading to intolerable conditions 
for people unable to take advantage of such services either because they 
cannot afford to or because :they do not want to travel on the axes travelled 
by such services. 
There are features of bus operation in many ci t ies of Latin America 
which makes bus travel unsafe. In Rio de Janeiro shortages of bus drivers 
due to. low wages 1/ (blamed by thè operators•on low permitted fares) leads 
to undesirably long shifts per day which causes tiredness and seems to be 
1/ These have led to strikes recently in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. 
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a cause of buses leaving roads at speed, crashing into other vehicles, 
e t c . Also in Rio de Janeiro buses attract pick-pockets, Sometimes armed. 
Buses in Rio de Janeiro are driven very hard by the standards of the 
central countries and even by those of Sao Paulo or Brasilia, but the 
drivers are skilled. In Santiago, Chile bus drivers appear more 
dangerous than in Rio both to other road users and to their own passengers. 
This has roots in, ( i ) thé requirement that the driver both collects 
fares and issue tickets as well as drive, ( i i ) the poor mechanical'condition 
of many buses, alledgedly due to low controlled fares which make i t 
necessary to run a bus as many hours of the day as possible and the putting-
off of maintenance spending as long as possible, ( i i i ) the competition 
between driver-operators on the same route which causes each driver to 
attempt to maximize the time-between himself and the bus in front so as to 
increase as much as possible his own revenue.1/ In Buenos Aires buses are 
driven much less violently, but even here buses are assigned an "index 
of danger" of 19 in a recent transportation study for this city compared 
with 4 for a private car , 2 for a t a x i , and 14 for a truck,2/ 
The bus services of the Region are-heterogeneous compared with 
those in the central countries on the basis of the quality of service 
offered. This is largely a function of the personal income distribution, 
being more skewed in Latin America. The income distribution affects the 
variety of qualities of service offered directly and indirectly. Indirectly, 
as we have pointed out, the authorities sometimes tend to adopt the easy 
way out (and play down or do not recognize the long run consequences) and 
1/ When two buses are close together a chase often develops between 
them in a sometimes violent manner in the consequent attempt by each 
driver to get in front of the other one. 
2/ Furthermore, over and above the danger of being in a bus or near one 
from the standpoint of accidents, buses are sometimes significant 
contaminators of the a i r . Diesel buses are often not well, regulated 
and emit dirty fumes which are molesting although their danger to 
health has not been proven. But in Latin America petrol buses are 
much more common than they are in Europe and even in the United . 
States. These too are often badly regulated. In Santiago, Chile 
buses are responsible for the exceptional high proportion of 41% of 
a l l CO emited into the air of the c i ty . See section VII. 
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allow the operation of services at premium fares, although not necessarily 
of premium quality, as a way of. avoiding fare increases for the pooer 
classes who sometimes spend as much as 25% of their family income' (in 
Brasilia and Sao Paulo and maybe more so in less prosperous expansive 
c i t ies ) on collective transportation. Directly, the mere existence of 
categories of persons willing to pay (and able to pay) differing amounts 
for different qualities of service leads by the market mechanism to the 
provision of such different qualities. 
For instance ih Rio de Janeiro there has been a rapid expansion in 
the past four years of the frescoes to a l l parts of the c i ty , generally 
linking with the center, offering a guaranteed seat (that is i f the bus 
stops - often the bus does not stop since i t has no spare seats) , a ir 
conditioning, ambiental music, reclining seats, free daily new sheets, 
and fare collection at one's seat by a rodo-mosa. These buses charge 
about three times the regular bus fare. They have had considerable success 
even in attracting persons who once used private cars. In La Paz there 
are services by mini-buses accomodating about 20 passengers and on which 
no standing is allowed and for which a premium fare is charged. 
But at the same•time there exists a tendency for a l l services to 
decline towards the common denominator. The situation seems to be instable. 
For instance in Santiago, Chile there were once "liebres" on the same 
model as the mini-buses of La Paz. But in hours of high demand'passengers 
were prepared to pay the premium fare even to stand. Although this was 
contrary to the contract entered into by the operators-with the 
authorities, the drivers were severely tempted by the opportunity to gain . 
the whole amount of the premium fare without incurring one Cent of extra 
cost. After warnings, the authorities reclassified ..these liebres as 
regular microbuses allowed to carry standing passengers but at the regular 
fare (for a l l passengers). The operator-driveis were at a disadvantage 
compared with the regular microbuses which were less luxurious (and 
therefore cheaper) and sometimes larger. The threat that the same might 
happen in La Paz seems to be restricting the carrying of standing 
passengers on the premium"minibuses Of this city to a few'on short distances 
in the reasonable surety that some already seated passengers will disembark 
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to make way for the admitted standees. The fresgoes in Rio de Janeiro 
are required to have" operating air-conditioning. But the equipment is 
intrinsically less reliable than other systems on the bus and rather 
than lose the services of the bus through the failure of the air-conditioning 
system operators are apparently increasingly running their vehicles for short 
periods with no air-conditioning, to the extent that they can get way 
with. Basically, the fact that i t pays to break the rules leads to the 
ever-present possibility that the premium services descend to the level 
of the regular buses. 
Kote that the stratification of services has the effect of reducing 
the quality of service for he who has no option (through lack of money) 
but to use i t . The frescoes in Rio de Janeiro at tract passengers from 
the regular buses, and thus reduce frequencies for the captive users of 
the regular buses. Also bus companies may direct investment from .their 
regular services to premium services. 
The collective taxi 
A further feature of service differentiation in transportation in 
the c i t ies of Latin America is the existence, where tolerated by the 
authorities (sometimes against the off ic ial regulations) of vehicles, 
usually United States small or medium sized sedans . (pre-oil c r is is 
dimensions), which ply a route, which may be loosely described as being 
fixed, picking up and setting down passengers anywhere along i t who pay 
a set fare to the driver. - Such vehicles are known as "por-puestos" in 
Caracas, the "trufi" in La Paz,1/ the taxi colectivo in Santiago, Chile, 
the lota$ao of Brazil, etc . : The system may generically be described as 
the collective taxi . I t has considerable variation. In Caracas the 
system originated in a period after the war when bus transit sunk to an 
intolerable low.2/ There are officially recognized por-puestos which ply 
1/ The inhabitants of La Paz have forgotten the origin and meaning of 
this interesting term. One may conjecture that i t is an abbreviation 
of "taxi ruta f i j a " . 
2/ The same thing happened at the same time in Sao Paulo where trucks 
were temporarily used as buses, as happened in London after the f i r s t 
world war. 
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fixed routes and others which basically trade as ordinary taxis but 
the driver of which keeps a set of route destination boards close at 
hand. Were he to pass by a crowded bus stop with no passenger on board 
he might stop, fiiid but which is the most popular destination, and load 
up as à por-puesto displaying his destination accordingly. This practice 
i s i l legal but tolerated. Attempts at controlling the system in Caracas 
and elsewhere not always met with success. The por-pue.stos of Caracas 
charge double the bus fare. I t is a popular system and in 1971 had a 
passenger volume 60% of that of the bus system. In La Paz there are 
genuine fixed route collective'taxis and other cabs which have their route 
determined by the f i r s t 'passenger who hails them whilst empty (or in the 
process of setting down) whom the driver is prepared to accept. In Rio 
de Janeiro the system is i l legal too but exists on a reduced scale especially 
out from the center in the evening peak period. 
5. Taxi services in the Region 
There is sometimes considerable variety amongst the qualities of 
regular taxi service offered within a c i ty . Taxis are widespread in a l l 
Latin American c i t ies and are long established in most. In Sao Paulo 
the system was already a part of the scene in 1912, much earlier than the 
arrival of the motor bus. They are today very visible but are nowhere an 
important means of conveyance in the quantitative sense. Systems of 
opération vary from city to c i ty . In some c i t i e s , such as Rio de Janeiro, 
most taxis are owned by large companies which make themselves responsible 
for maintenance but which hire .their cabs out to different drivers on 
several shifts during the 24-hour period. In Buenos Aires taxis are 
individually owned and are sometimes operated by persons who have difficulty 
in finding employment in their preferred occupation. A taxi driver is a 
kind of "reserve" occupation to some extent. They are legally obliged to 
operate between certain hours of the day in an attempt by the authorities 
to provide enough cabs at a l l times of the day. In Santiago, Chile taxis 
too are individually owned but are sometimes bought by large associations 
of owners on a large scale with bank finance and are-sold to members of 
the association over a niimber of years. As in Buenos Aires some operators 
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are unable to find employment in their chosen field. In some c i t i e s , 
such as Rio de Janeiro, entry into the industry is either difficult or 
expensive. This protects the existing operators but reduces the convenience 
of the service in the eyes of the public. Elsewhere entry is sometimes 
easy; in Santiago, .Chilej for instance, where the advantage passes from 
the operator (who may have a weak geographical knowledge of the ci ty) 
to the public who uses the system, there even being effective subsidy 
on entry since to register a taxi is cheaper than to register a private 
car. In Sao Paulo (and.in some other cities, to a lesser degree) there 
are as many as four different grades of taxi . The cheapest is the VW 
Beetle with the front passenger seat removed for easier access to the 
rear seats whilst the highest category includes vehicles such as the 
Ford LTD and is used effectively as a telephone-hailed limosine service. 
6* The importance of suburban railways 
Railroads have existed in certain Latin American c i t ies for the 
transportation of persons within the urban area or around i t since the 
eighteen sixties (in Buenos Aires). Some were constructed specifically 
as urban or suburban railways whilst other services were provided on 
stretches of longer distance lines. In terms of numbers of passengers 
carried, railroads are sometimes significant as a form of urban transportation 
in Latin America and they are considerably more important in terms of 
passenger-kilometers. In Rio de Janeiro suburban train travel is more 
important than in most other c i t ies in the Region. Here in some years 
the share of r a i l in the total number of trips made annually has exceeded 
20%. Rail travel has much greater importance on certain axes of the c i ty . 
I t is in Buenos Aires that r a i l suburban travel has attained i t s maximum 
importance in Latin America. In the nineteen thirt ies forty million passengers 
annually used the steam suburban services from the Plaza ConstituciSn 
station in Buenos Aires, second in the world after Liverpool Street in 
London, and there were other stations of major importance too in the c i ty . 
In 1957 r a i l transportation peaked in Buenos Aires at 558 million passengers 
(-these figures exclude the underground railroads of the c i ty - ) which 
probably represented slightly less than 20% of the total number of tr ips . 
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Including the underground system the railroad total would have been around 
875 million passengers, surely.not attained anywhere else in the history 
of the c i t ies of the Region. However i t is possible that in the inter-
war years the percentage of a l l mechanized trips in Buenos Aires which, 
were realized by r a i l could have exceeded the late nineteen f i f t i e s 
proportion of close to 30%. 
In Buenos Aires, as well as elsewhere, railroads to some .extent . 
created their own clientele by permitting the population of. outlying áreas. 
Surface railroad transportation is significant today however in only a . 
handful of Latin American c i t ies and there is wide variation in the type 
of service offered from place to place. In Rio de Janeiro the service 
is largely electrified and heavily subsidized to meet the travel needs of 
the lower income families in the north zone suburbs. Moreover, i t has 
suffered from low investment. In Sao Paulo the nature of the services 
conforms in a general way with that in Rio de Janeiro. In Buenos Aires 
there is a widespread network of suburban r a i l services to three different 
gauges and embracing both diesel locomotive and elec t r ic set traction. 
The system runs hére too at a financial loss. ' In Recife there is a 
reasonably frequent diesel' locomotive hauled service to Jaboatao and 
Sao Laurenço. In Valparaíso there is an'electric service for commuters. 
In Porto Alegre there are hardly any suburban trains to speak of ( - 2 per 
day-), although there are plans to resurrect the service. In Santiago, 
Chile, there are now no true advertised suburban train services. The 
general trend with surface r a i i transportation seems to be to upgrade in 
the largest c i t ies and elsewhere where there are clear right-of-way or 
other advántages but to abandon' in other places. 
7. The fashion for metropolitan railroads 
However there has been a recent upsurge of interest in underground 
r a i l transit conforming with the worldwide fashion in this form of 
transportation. Only in orte c i ty , Buenos Aires, i s there a Metro of long 
standing.!/ This was built from 1913 onwards by á mixture of public and 
1/ The f i r s t Metro Was in London in 1863, followed by Chicago (1892), 
Budapest (1896), Glasglow (1897), Paris (1900), Berlin (1902) and 
New York (1904). 
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private funds In a technically incompatible but outwardly similar manner 
and currently forms a widely usied network in the inner area of the c i ty . 
I t comprises 34 tunneled kms and serves as a means of transportation 
for inner movements and for-access/egress to/from the main r a i l terminals. 
The first-extension since the end of'the nineteen thirties has recently 
been approved. Other metro systems are currently partially operational 
in three other c i t ies of the Region. In Mexico (opened in 1969) 
there are 16 kilometers in tunnel to the French-inspired rubber tired 
system. I t is envisioned however that further construction will be td the 
traditional • steel-on-steel system. In Sao Paulo a metro was proposed 
as long ago as 1927 but the system of today results from a study made 
in the late nineteen sixties and was opened in 1975 along 17 route 
kilometers, in both tunnel and elevated sections. The city is somewhat 
dismayed by i t s metro due largely to high cost which is 80% borne by 
the ci ty . ( I t is noticeable that there is much more enthusiasm for Metros 
when the bi l l i s covered largely by other than city funds.) One may 
conclude that the announced'expansion of the trolleybus network in 
Sao Paulo to some degree be an alternative to expansion of the metro 
involving very much less capital cost. The Santiago, Chile system was 
opened in 1973, since extended,-and currently forms about 25 kilometers 
of route on two lines partially in tunnel on the French rubber-on-concrete 
system. The system is currently being extended but future plans are in 
debate due to the high cost , very much greater than forecast. Currently 
revenues cover only two thirds of operational costs without contributing 
anything to the huge investment outlay"and the system is bringing forth 
criticism from the operators of bus services who obviously have to cover 
their operating and capital costs. ' 
A metro system was recommended for Rio de Janeiro in 1968 and 
construction was started a year la ter . After ten more years there is 
s t i l l only t r i a l operation and the full inauguration of the f i r s t phase 
has been recently put back until 1981 or 1982, lack of funds is causing 
the laying off of some construction workers of contractors, but the city 
continues to be severely molested by the construction works., A metro is 
currently being constructed also in Caracas along the Pro Patria-Petare axis 
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of the linear city as a result of late nineteen sixties feasibility study. 
A similar study was recently prepared for San Salvador. Quito is ' 
considering the commissioning of a similar study. Other c i t ies have had 
realized for them in-the past, studies of the feasibility of a rail-based 
transit system, such as Guadalajara and Brasilia, which have to date come 
to nothing. One suspects that the fashion for metro systems in Latin 
America is waning. There have, undoubtedly been some bad experiences with 
such systems in the past although these may not have been anticipated by 
the city authorities concerned since the foreign consultants' study reports 
have seemingly painted too rosy a picture of metros from standpoint such 
as construction costs., the costs of trains, etc . Users of metros 
sometimes mistake themselves into favouring the mode since they are unaware 
t 
of how much city and federal tax revenue they are paying for their ride, 
over and above the fare paid. The current problems of financing the 
completion of the Rio de Janeiro metro after years of the city being 
severely disrupted by construction works cannot be endearing the concept 
to Brazil. The way ahead for Brazil may be evidenced by the Sao Paulo 
precedent in buying a. large fleet of nationally-built and designed 
trolleybuses. 
The Metro may be visualized as a reaction to the problem based by 
congestion created by automobile-generated t r a f f i c congestion which disrupts 
the surface transit system. There are other reactions, such as.the 
reservation of lanes on existing streets for buses, but these in the -past 
have not been considered as alternatives (and few currently exist in 
Latin America) and i t is at least arguable that the fashion for metros 
in the c i t ies of Latin America illustrates the adoption of not wholly 
appropriate technology recommended on the basis of studies by foreign 
consultants who seem not to have understood the true overall nature of 
the problem. Metros and the private car may share the dubious distinction 
of being the only two technical innovations in urban transportation in 
Latin America which have ended up costing more than they are worth. 
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8. The development of car visage in ci t ies 
The private car has been present in Latin American c i t ies for almost : 
as long as there,have been private cars. There were four cars registered .' 
in the city of Sao Paulo ,as long ago as 1901., Whilst car ownership was 
very low, cars gave increased accessibility to a few at l i t t l e cost to 
others since ehough road space was available. The real impact of the 
pattern of urban transportation starts when i t causes congestion and this 
occurs when i t is s t i l l unimportant as a mover of persons. When there 
are few cars in a city there is no need to . res t r i c t their use. In Latin 
America measures to limit the use of private cars in city centers have 
only taken place once the problem of congestion became very severe and 
i t even seems that in some cases such restrictions were only imposed after 
another problem, over and above congestion i t s e l f , the energy c r i s i s , or 
public concern about atmospheric pollution, became apparent. We lack 
information but suspect that automobile-generated congestion was already 
significant in some ci t ies before the second world war. I t is noted that 
congestion was starting to affect the efficient operation of the bondes of 
Sao Paulo in the nineteen twenties and much of , this may have been,caused 
by the private car , although there.woyld have been other causes too» e . g . , 
the cumbersome commercial vehicles of the e ra . , , In the nineteen twenties 
car ownership in Argentina was high by world standards (1930 car ownership 
per head in Argentina was not attained again until 1959, a somewhat stunning 
item of information) and therefore i t is probable-, that automobile-generated 
congestion was important in Buenos Aires in this period. 
But the era of explosive growth in the. car populations of Latin 
American c i t ies has come in the post war era. Tables 5-1 and 5-2 i l lustrate 
such growth for the c i t ies of Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro. Growth in 
the major c i t ies of other countries in the Region would in most cases have 
tailed behind that in these two relatively affluent c i t i e s . , The trend 
for Rio de Janeiro can be divided into distinct-phases. From 1947 to 
1952 growth was rapid, as high as 17 1/2% per annum. In this period Brazil 
was importing cars with foreign exchange reserves accumulated during the 
war. Then came a period in which the exhaustion of these funds occasioned, . 
a policy of restricting non-essential imports such as private cars, which 
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policy had the additional aim. of stimulating the development of a 
national car production industry. Throughout the nineteen f i f t ies growth 
in the c i ty ' s car fleet averaged only two to three per cent annually which 
implies a f a l l in the number of cars owned per citizen of Rio de Janeiro 
during this period. From around 1960 the local automobile production 
industry started to be able to fulf i l the pent-up demand for cars. From 
1960 to 1970 the growth rate averaged 13% annually. I t should be borne 
in mind that this decade included the progressive transfer of the c i ty ' s 
federal administrative and political functions.to Brasilia, the 1964 military 
revolution and three years of economic stagnation to 1966. But in spite 
of this the size of the c i ty ' s car fleet grew at high rates . Growth has 
since continued at even higher rates , although there is probably at present 
a considerable downturn due to s t r i c t controls on the repayment period 
for loans used to buy cars (-reactions to inflation and the energy c r i s i s - ) . 
In Argentina the cycles in car ownership growth parallel those in 
Brazil in a general way. 
The f i f t i e s and sixties in Latin America witnessed to a large extent 
a certain conviction that c i t ies must adapt themselves to the car rather 
than the car to the ci ty . Urban freeways were built a l l over some c i t ies 
such as Caracas and Rio de Janeiro in an expensive and hopeless attempt 
to provide a supply of road space to meet the demand for i t . The whole 
city of Brasilia is built around the notion that the private car could be 
the basic mode of transportation, the city being unsuitable for movement 
by any other means. In this era there were few attempts to limit car 
usage even in the most heavily congested parts of c i t ies except by 
congestion i t s e l f . Quite intolerable travel conditions developed. The 
situation was worse in those c i t ies with no reserved track transit alternative. 
Where there was ho such alternative, the car was s t i l l always the quickest 
(or least slow) mode available, unless one had to park some considerable 
distance from where one wanted to get to. So the usage of cars grew. 
Traffic in the peak periods usually moved at very slow speeds with constant, 
interruptions. When a small incident occurred, such as a motor failure 
or a collision, or when i t rained, the entire t r a f f i c circulation in large, 
areas of some ci t ies became paralyzed for.periods of several hours. Caracas 
may have been the most extreme example of this . 
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In cities with reserved track transit systems the situation was not 
quite as bad. In Buenos Aires the subterráneo and the suburban railroads 
provided alternatives. In this city it is evident that car ownership 
grew at higher rates than car use. Table 5-3 illustrates this by comparing 
car ownership with gasoline sales. In Buenos Aires almost all cars use 
gasoline and almost all of the larger trucks and buses consume diesel. 
There are reasons other than reduced car usage per car that the two trends 
depicted should differ but the magnitude of the divergence indicates 
beyond any shadow'of a doubt that unit utilization was declining throughout 
the period covered.' In Santiago, Chile there were only a few train 
services in the urban area in the nineteen sixties and car ownership then 
was very much lesser than it was in Buenos Aires. One would have expected 
therefore that the rate at whilst car utilization was falling per car have 
been less than in Buenos Aires. This is what one reference actually 
provides evidence in advising that in the mid sixties in Santiago traffic 
growth was at the rate of 10% annually compared with 11% for the size 
of the fleet (and 9% for gasoline sales). 
Table 5-3 
PROPORTIONATE GROWTH IN GASOLINE CONSUMPTION AND CAR OWNERSHIP 
IN THE CITY OF BUENOS AIRES IN RECENT YEARS 
Year Index gasoline 
consumption 
Index car ownership 
1969 100 100 
1970 108 117 
1971 114 133 
1972 114 , - • 149 
1973 114 164 
1974 109 179 
1975 96 • ,, - • 195 
1976 ,..100 207 
Source: Asociación de Fábricas de Automotores (de la Argentina). 
/ I t i s 
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It is possible that those who use cars during the peak periods in 
the cities of Latin America travel faster door-to-door than were there 
to be no private car use at all. But it may be more likely that the 
converse be true. It is certainly undeniable that the private car has 
brought about a deterioration in the travel conditions of those who do 
not travel by car, but who nonetheless pay' taxes to cover the cost of 
infrastructure installed to bring travel conditions to something like 
the level they would be at were there to be no. private car travel during peak 
periods. It is a sad fact that the cities of Latin America have tended 
to attempt to rescue themselves from the burden enforced by peak period 
car travel by the provision of infrastructure rather than getting to the root 
of the problem by placing limitations on the use of the car in periods of 
high demand. Attempts at traffic restraint by the limitation of city center 
parking are generally quite recent, enforcement is spasmodic, and policies 
are inconsistent with one authority within the city maybe stimulating car 
traffic, whilst another is doing the opposite. 
Cities continue to try to emulate those of the United States and 
elsewhere where resources are more widely available for the provision of 
infrastructure than in Latin America. The employment of foreign consultants 
has surely done nothing to improve matters. Attempts to impose logical 
solutions fall on deaf ears. For instance some years ago the World Bank 
made a loan to Venezuela for an urban highway in Caracas on the condition 
thai; a study be realized into the possibility that the city require that 
the users of congested road space in the city make a payment to reflect 
the costs they create. The study was duly carried out and reported 
favourably on a simple scheme by means of which those wishing to enter the 
city center in the morning peak would have had to have bought a licence 
so to do. But nothing happened. Instead the city is presently constructing 
a Metro which will not improve highway speeds as much as the licence 
scheme would have done and which costs more by a large and as yet unknown 
factor. There is little doubt that the car has taken over Latin American 
cities and the attempts which are made to improve conditions often take 
as given that there should be no forced transfer of persons from the private 
car into forms of collective.transportation. Cars are the sacred cows of 
Latin America. In this perhaps lies the most significant difference to date 




RECENT GROWTH IN THE FLEET OF CARS, BUSES, AND TAXIS IN 
IN BUENOS AIRES (CAPITAL) 
Year § cars # buses # taxis a/ 
1955 100 666 4 605 
1956 104 993 4 762 
1957 110 508 4 421 
1958 121 166 4 513 
1959 137 268 4 527 
1960 151 816 4 697 
1961 149 292 3 179 
1962 161 217 2 949 
1963 58 983 334 




1968 241 314 5 564 23 491 
1969 278 809 6 471 24 193 
1970 325 147 7 897 24 387 
1971 371 625 9 633 : • 24 955 
1972 415 143 11 079 25 817 
1973 456 882 12 050 27 925 
1974 499 062 12 743 . 29 008 
1975 543 305 - , . 13 670 30 000 
1976 576 821 14 638 30 000 
Source: Asociación.de fabricas de automotores. 
a/ Also included on cars. 
/Table 5 -2 
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Table 5-2 
POST WAR GROWTH IN AUTOMOBILE FLEET OF GUANABARA (RIO DE JANEIRO) 
Year No. cars Year No. cars 
1947 37 784 1962 103 311 
1948 44 400 1963 139 247 
1949 47 778 1964 163 980 
1950 53 211 1965; 193 227 
1951 60 413 1966 202 888 
1952 67 913 1967 213 174 
1953 70 246 1968 225 952 
1954 72 579 1969 261 446 
1955 74 539 1970 299 806 
1956 76 549 1971 
1957 77 491 1972 343 462 
1958 80 000 1973 ' 
1959 83 735 1974. 374 804 
1960 85 182 1975 452 637 
1961 94 246 1976 541 304 
Source£? Anuario Estadístico do Brasil, various editions. • 
~ Josef Barat - Estructura.metropolitana e sistema de transportes: 
estudo do^as(T^o<lSo'7de,^^aror '' ""' ** 
/ F i g u r e 5 - 1 
Figure 5«1 
MODAL SPLIT OF PERSON TRIPS BY MECANIZED MEANS (INCLUDING HORSE - DRAW 
STREET.CARS) IN RUE, CITY OF RIO DS JANEIRO 1870 - 1975 
100% 
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VI. THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONCENTRATION OF CAR 
OWNERSHIP IN LATIN AMERICA 
1. Concentration by social class 
In Latin America, car ownership is highly concentrated by social 
class. This in turn implies a concentration of cars in the cities of the 
Region, where they do the most damage to the social fabric. Those who own 
and use cars, enforce on those who do not inferior transportation services. 
Thus car ownership and usage in Latin America is a regressive influence 
in the distribution of the fruits of economic progress. 
In the central countries, when the automobile was young, it was only 
owned by the very rich. As production expanded, scale economies were 
reaped thereby permitting a lowering of prices. Competition forced such 
a lowering. Personal incomes grew and became better distributed as the 
excess pool of unskilled labour was mopped up. Cars became more and more 
a consumer good for all rather than a plaything for the rich. Nowadays, in the 
central countries, the car is an everyday necessity, the non»*availability 
of which causes severe social disruptions. This is clearly evidenced by 
events in the gasoline shortage which started in the United States in 
the early summer of 1979. Car owners were prepared to spend hours in line 
for the topping up of their already nearly full gas tanks; they sometimes 
resorted to the law of the jungle were they to personally consider that 
they were being unfairly treated in any way. The elasticity of demand 
for gasoline in the United States over a two year period has been estimated 
at 0.1. There can be no clearer evidence of the degree to which modern 
central country society is wrapped around the automobile. 
In the central countries, the more affluent members of society can 
afford more and/or better cars, but everybody who wants a car and who is 
legally and physically able to drive one, can acquire a 1961 Chevrolet 
Corvair or a 1962 Austin Mini. Some people do not want a car, especially 
those living in densely-packed inner areas with good collective transportation 
and nowhere to park. 
Latin America, in regard the level and distribution of car ownership, 
is quite reflective of the central countries of bygone years. The Sao Paulo 
/of 1974 
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of 1974 is the, Detroit of 1934, or the Coventry of 1954, or the Milai*o , 
of 1964, or, maybe, the Bogotci of 1984. In Latin , America cars are often 
expensive,, incomes are badly distributed, and their mean levels are low. 
Cars are the preserve of a privileged minority. , 
The high prices of cars in Latin America are renown., There are 
few exceptions to this general rule. The countries have either imposed 
high import duties to raise revenue or to foment .the development of a, 
local production.capability, with certain exceptions. In Argentina a 
locally produced Ford Taunus (Cortina) costs in the neighbourhood of the 
equivalent of US$ 20,000. In Chile a.Volkswagen Brasilia costs the 
equivalent of US$ 9,000. In Brazil cars.are cheaper than in most parts, 
of the Region due to this country having developed an efficient national , 
automotive industry. Thus, for instance, the Volkswagen Passat sells in 
Brazil for the equivalent of US$ 5,700 to US$.7,500, very much the same as 
in the United States where the same car, under its americanized name of 
Dasher, sells at between US$ 5,500 and US$ 6,500. In the United Kingdom 
specific taxes, on automobiles push the price of the Passat up to the 
US$ 8,000 to US$ 9,000 equivalent range. However, when expressed as a 
fraction of the per capita GDP of the country concerned, the price of the 
Passat is 5.28 in Brazil, 0.81 in the United States, and 1.89 in the United 
Kingdom. . . 
It is true to some extent that the availability of used cars makes 
car ownership less inaccessible for many Latin Americans than it would 
otherwise be. However most countries do not allow the-import of used 
cars which would otherwise make car ownership possible for many people of 
the Region who now cannot aspire to such things. The form of the income 
distribution in most Latin American countries would imply that initial 
depreciation rates on cars be quite high, since there would be comparatively 
few people in the income range such that they just cannot manage to afford 
a new car but could run to a clean used vehicle. The usual supposition is 
that depreciation rates of car prices in Latin America are low by the 
standards of the central countries, but analysis does not also prove this. 
A Passat of four, or five years of age seems to be worth a slightly higher 
proportion of the price of the equivalent new car in the United Kingdom 
/than in 
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than in Brazil, although the rate of physical deterioration would no 
doubt be greater in Brazil (due to higher accident rates, inferior road 
surfaces, etc.). Vehicles stay in circulation in Latin America for many 
more years than in the central countries. Pre-war cars are still a 
regular sight on the roads of countries such as Chile, Argentina and 
Uruguay.: Cars take very many years in Latin America before they are 
valued as nothing better than scrap, due to the high prices of new cars 
and the preparedness of many persons to devote considerable time and energy 
to keeping operative elderly vehicles, even if only for occasional uise 
at weekends. In this manner it is true that the availability of used cars 
does permit that car ownership filter down to some degree through the social 
classes.-
It is of• passing interest to consider the impact of the skewed income 
distribution on the total amount of car ownership. At very low average 
income levels, a switching of income- from the mean person to the richer 
individual could enable the latter"to buy a car whereas he could not-so 
have done were he not to. have benefited from the transfer. Thus at the 
income levels of Bolivia, or Honduras, the fact that the distribution of 
incomes be skewed probably tends'; to raise overall car ownership. However 
were: income transferred, from the mean person to the richer individual at 
a higher average income level this might imply that funds be switched from 
somebody with a high propensity to buy a car to somebody with a lower 
propensity, due to a high probability of already owning one. Thus the 
skewed income distribution of Brazil or Chile may tend to depress car ' 
ownership. • • 
However, 'regardless of the actual overall level'of car ownership, 
in Latin America such ownership is highly concentrated by social class, 
or income group, due to the skewrtess of the income distribution and the 
often high dollar equivalent prices of cars. In many Latin American countries, 
only the more affluent families own cars. Ownership of a reasonable modern 
car is largely a synonym for being a privileged member of society. 
We present some numeric evidence of the extent to which car ownership is 
concentrated by social class by example of Sao Paulo, in Table 6-2. Note 
that in the city of Sao Paulo car prices are very low by Latin American 
/standards, average 
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standards, average income levels are high, and their distribution is probably 
less skewed than in many other parts of the Region, due to the relative 
shortage of some qualities of unskilled labour. Hence one would tend 
to expect that car ownership in Sao Paulo be less concentrated in the hands 
of the privileged classes relative to the situation in other parts of the •-' 
Region. But even so it is a quite sobering realization that in Sao Paulo 
(in 1977), of all cars registered in the city, 18.1% are second cars 
(in one family), and 3,6% are third cars. There are more second and third 
cars in Sao Paulo than cars•of any kind in the possession of the less 
affluent 65% of families, 
2® Concentration by location 
It is generally recognized that in Latin America the higher family 
incomes tend to be much more highly correlated with demographic density 
than in the central countries. In the Region» agriculture is still well 
within the phase that it was in the United Kingdom in the midst of the 
past century, or continental Europe in the earlier years of the present 
century, when advances in labour productivity were rendering available 
large quantities of unskilled labour from farms, which depressed rural 
incomes, at the same time that demand for labour was increasing in the 
cities, thereby raising urban incomes. We present in table 6-1 some 
evidence of the disparity in family spending between selected rural and 
other parts of Brazil, and we show that the disparity in spending is reflected 
in spending on private transportation. 
In the central countries it is common to find that car ownership be 
higher in rural states and countries than in urban boroughs and wards. 
There is generally a lesser income disparity between the urban and rural 
areas in the central countries (compared with the countries of the Region) 
and car ownership tends to show itself to be more responsive to the fact 
that the utility of a car is greater in rural areas, due to. the lower level 
of accessibility in general, and especially accessibility via collective 
transportation. But in the countries of the Region the income disparity 
between the rural and urban areas generally domitates the effect of relative 
accessibility so that car ownership per capita is much higher in the more 
/urbanized areas 
urbanized areas. Figure 6-1 provides evidence of this for the states and 
territories of Brazil. It illustrates the positive correlation between 
the percentage urbanization of the unit of the federation and the car 
Ownership rate. The correlation is not perfect; it cannot be since it 
is .the joint product of a less than perfect correlation between the degree 
of Urbanization and income per head and a further imperfect association . 
between income levels and car ownership levels. Three states stand out 
from the overall trend, these being Parani, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande 
do Sul, These states are of relative european aspect with rural sectors . 
somewhat on the style of the central countries, being quite efficient and 
affluent, by the standards of the northeast'states for instance. Hence 
the rural-urban income disparity in „these three, states is.less pronounced 
than elsewhere, and the relative accessibility factor may come more into . 
play. _ . __ , _ , . 
As we shall go on to discuss, the propensity; in Latin America that 
car ownership be concentrated in cities rather than, in -rural areas implies 
that such ownership be located where it does .the most social harm.• 
In the central countries too it is a general feature of car ownership 
patterns that within cities (as well as between cities.and.rural areas) 
ownership be at higher levels in those parts less densely populated* due 
to the preference for the more affluent to live in greener districts on 
the outskirts of town, or beyond, and to the tendency for car ownership 
to be lower in those inner districts where collective transportation is 
good and space to park a car is hard to come by. The same trait is not 
always observable in Latin America, especially in those cities which do 
not possess reserved track collective transportation., systems of reasonable . 
quality between the outlying suburbs and the central area. Thus, in the., 
case of Rio de Janeiro, to mention a somewhat extreme example, although 
the city possesses a quite extensive suburban rail network between the 
central area and the north zone, this is not up to the quality that appeals 
to the higher income, families. In Rio de Janeiro certain high density 
inner suburbs, notably Copacabana but also others such as Botafogo, Flamengo 
and Ipanema, have high rates of car ownership whereas ownership rates are 
probably less in certain northern suburbs, such as Deodoro and Novo Igua^u, 
/where densities 
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where densities are lower. Thus, even at the micro-level within cities, 
in Latin America, car ownership may be concentrated in those densely-packed 
areas where it does the most social harm. It is reputed that Copacabana 
has the highest density of car ownership per unit area of any comparable 
district in the world* and it is clear from mere observation that the social 
costs of such dense concentration are very high. 
. < • • It should be borne in mind however that the probable positive 
correlation between car ownership rates and demographic densities of Rio 
de Janeiro is an extreme case and not necessarily typical, although we 
lack sufficient data to prove the point one way or another. In. Buenos 
Aires the quality of the rail services is such that the more affluent are 
prepared to use them and the concentration of car ownership in the denser 
districts does not occur; the highest rate of car ownership is in the 
affluent and sparsely populated Retiro. suburb. Even in Santiago, Chile, 
which has no rail network which links the inner and outer areas of the 
city, car ownership is not obviously centered in the denser zones. 
Nevertheless it is probably true that in Latin America there is a stronger 
propensity that car ownership.be concentrated in those zones with higher 
demographic densities than is the case in the cities of the central 
countries. 
3. Transportation demand by social class 
The concentration of car ownership is, thankfully, less than, the 
extent to which car usage, in terms of kilometers travelled, is concentrated. 
For instance, in 1976, the ratio of gasoline sales to cars registered in 
3 
the Federal Capital of Argentina was 1.48. (m ) whilst in rural Misiones 
State it was 4.08. It is probable that some car. usage in the Capital was 
performed with gasoline purchased elsewhere, and it is probable.that some 
of the gasoline sold in Misiones was bought by Brazilians taking advantage 
of cheapter prices in Argentina, but the general conclusion that cars 
registered in outlying areas travel more than those registered in cities 
is undoubtedly true. 
However, the same conclusion cannot be drawn were one to consider 
travel consumption in terms of number of trips made rather than in terms 
/of number 
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of number of kilometers traversed. Table 6-3 provides evidence that -the . 
number of trips made is pdsitively correlated with family income* Also 
it is boosted by car ownership, independently of the income of the family .-
It is shown too that trip rates are higher in the outlying, parts of 
cities than in the more central districts, although soine of the trips 
originating in the former would doubtless be made to the.inner areas, 
especially commuting trips. Thus the table provides us with some evidence 
that the more affluent place the higher demands on the urban transportation 
system since trip-making responds positively, with income, and trip-making , 
is stimulated by.the ownership of a car and car ownership is concentrated 
amongst "the more affluent. 
Further evidence that the more affluent place .higher demands on the 
transportation system, which is largely provided at public expense, is 
given by figure 6-2. This shows, once again, using the case of S30 Paulo 
rather than Buenos Aires as in table 6-3, that trip-making•correlated 
positively with family income. Furthermore,;it illustrates that the 
richer make a higher relative and absolute number of their trips by car. 
The car is recognized as being a much greater consumer of road space than 
a bus, since it carries on average only 1 1/2 persons against maybe twenty 
times this number in the case of a bus, whilst traffic engineering studies 
have estimated that the impact of one bus on the traffic stream is the 
equivalent of only three cars. Furthermore cars are more consumptive of 
expensive parking space than collective transportation vehicles. Thus we 
have another reason, the third, to back our claim-that the rich make 
disproportionate use of publically provided urban road space, i.e.,that the 
absolute and relative number of trips made by car increases with income. 
A fourth reason is that it appears that the rich make more of their • 
trips "in those hours when there is the highest ratio of demand for supply 
of road space, i.e.,the peak hours. That this be so is nor conclusively 
proven, but it is a deduction which one makes from the most comprehensive 
trip-pattern data available to us, for the city of Sao Paulo, and it is 
seemingly backed up by observation in other cities. It may be a phenomenon 
unique to Latin America. Table 6-4 shows trip rates in Sao Paulo by journey 
purpose and by family income. Of the journey purposes listed those which 
/tend to 
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tend to be concentrated most in the peak periods are work trips, trips 
for education, and trips to serve passengers. These trips account for 
most of the increment in the number of trips made as family income 
increases. On the other hand trips for other purposes vary quite little 
with income. The rich tend to make more intensive shopping trips by car 
to the supermarket rather than frequent journeys on foot or by bus to 
the neighbourhood grocery store. In Latin America the rich are able to 
reduce the number of personal business trips they make since they are able 
to hire the services of despachantes and also can substitute their home. 
telephones for physical movement. The richer are more able to avoid trips 
for health reasons by staying more healthy in the first place, and also ! 
the very rich can better afford treatment in their own homes. Even trips 
for recreation and visiting do not respond very much to income, for 
reasons that, can only be suggested. In Latin America such trips are 
generally more a way of life than in most central countries. It is possible 
that growing affluence, changes people from their traditional behaviour 
patterns towards the lifestyles of the central countries. 
Thus, to sum up, there are the following reasons why the rich place 
higher demands on publically provided urban road space than the poorer in 
Latin America: 
(i) Trip-making correlates, positively, with income., 
(ii) Trip-making is stimulated by the availability of a car at any 
income level. 
(iii) The rich make more of their trips by the private car. 
(iv) The rich.seem to concentrate their trips more in the peak periods. 
H. Impact on distribution of real income 
It is possible that the extra demands on the transportation system 
made by the rich are worth the social costs expended to cater for them. 
But one doubts whether many of such demands be worthwhile. Certainly, 
the prices paid by the affluent for the trips they make would often not 
cover the social costs of providing them. Thus the affluent weigh the 
benefits they would receive through travelling with only some of the costs 
involved. Therefore they would tend to make some trips which cost society 
in general more than the trips are worth. 
/There are 
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There are several reasons why trips made in urban areas» and.: :> • 
especially, those made at peak periods and by automobile, are likely to 
cost society more than the price perceived by the trips maker. They"'include: 
(i) Intensive use ofrurban roads leads to demands (justified or 
not), for. the provision of more infrastructure at public expense, either 
more roads or metros. These would be often paid for through general . 
taxation revenue rather than by those who use them. 
(ii) The trip would often generate noise and atmospheric pollution 
which affects those walking along the streets concerned and living or 
working in the neighbourhood, which persons are not compensated for the 
costs forced upon them by those who are responsible. 
(iii) When a car or other vehicle enters a congested traffic stream 
it slows down the vehicles already there,, -thus forcing extra delay and 
operational costs on the latter. The driver of the marginal vehicle would 
necessarily pay the costs of his own time and his own operating costs but 
he would not generally be called upon to cover the costs which he forcesr 
on others. Many of these others may be bus travellers unable to afford 
the luxury of private car transportation,but who nevertheless are adversely 
affected by the actions of. the car owner. ' 
(iv) It has been found that car drivers rarely know their trUe marginal 
car operating costs, since they have no idea of how much maintenance cost 
nor tyre wear, etc., follows from each kilometer travelled.. Thus, depending 
on the taxation on car usage, a driver can even make ttfips which really 
cost him more than the benefit.he derives from realizing, them. (On the 
other hand, bus fares are quite obvious and well perceived.) 
In this chapter we wish to concentrate mainly on item (iii) in the 
above listing. In so doing it should"be stressed that we are underestimating 
the extent to which the travel behaviour of the more affluent adversely 
affects society in general, and the less affluent classes in particular. 
Note that in rural areas the costs attributable to car travel are 
rarely more than those paid by the trip maker himself. Where there is no 
congestion the introduction of one more vehicle to the traffic stream does 
not interact with other vehicles already there. Furthermore, even were 
one to choose to assign the costs of the highway used to the various users, 
/the relatively 
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the relatively light and inoffensive car should receive very little of 
the total costs allocated. Only in exceptional cases, such as on Sunday 
evening approaching Caracas from the west where considerable congestion 
developss does rural car travel cost society any more than the amount paid 
by the trip maker. , , 
The costs imposed,by urban car trayel vary markedly,from place to 
place within any one city and from one time of day to another. The extent 
to which one marginal car slows down the traffic stream varies with the 
relationship between speeds and flow for the road concerned and the volume 
of traffic. The interaction between speeds .and flows is greatest on 
narrow roads with friction from frequent intersections and parked vehicles. 
The highest costs forced upon the other users of the highway are thus on 
city center streets and also, even more so, on roads such as radial routes 
in peak periods when capacity is utilized to and beyond design limits. 
Generally when a road is operating at very close to its physical limiting 
capacity the social costs associated with the marginal vehicle can be very 
high indeed. For Caracas it has been estimated that the, total post of 
accomodating one extra vehicle (including, both the private, costs naturally 
borne by the driver and the social .costs forced upon others, both car 
occupants and the collective transportation users) on a three lane road 
is 0.75 bolivares per kilometer were the traffic volume to be 1,750 units . 
of one passenger car per hourjl/ were the. volume to be 2,000 car units 
the extra costs would be Bs. 1.6 per km; , and, were the. volume to be .2,250. car 
units the extra costs would be as high as Bs, 4.8 per kilometer, all in 
1971 prices. 
Taking once again the case of Caracas in 1971, figure 6-3 shows the 
variation throughout the hours of the.day both in the private cost of 
travelling on an inner area circuit (per km), which cost is borne by the 
trip maker, and in the social cost, which cost is forced by the trip maker 
onto others. Note that, in the case of such a circuit, the private costs 
hardly vary at all throughout the day, whilst the social costs vary ' 
enormously. The trip maker would indeed have little incentive to travel at 
those, times of the day when he costs others less. 
1/ Counting a bus as being equal to three car equivalents, etc. 
/The information 
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The information; for Caracas is taken from the findings, of a study-
realized some years ago which sought to determine the feasibility for: this 
city of systems whereby the driver of the car, and other vehicles, would 
be. made to. cover the costs of the congestion?he causes, i.e., be forced to 
pay the whole social costs of the congestion he creates. The study 
developed a simple scheme which would have required drivers to have bought 
a licencé to be allowed to enter the central area of the city in the morning 
peak period.1/ The; price of the licence would be determined by the costs 
forced upon other road users by the marginal car. Such schemes, known" 
generically as "road pricing" in the literature are well known amongst" 
. transportation economists. But if Can be argued that they do not go fai» 
enough». . .. - •'::••• . • • 
, • • - The private car is essentially the intruder to the urban transportation 
scenej as detailed in chapter V» It is the polluter; Those "polluted; 
against" are-the users of collective transportation. ' Road pricing schemes 
can only be argued to strictly adhere to.the ."polluter-pays-principle"' 
should the revenues collected-;fróm the polluters be circulated-back to 
those polluted against to fully compensate them for their inconvenience. 
Some items of road..pricing literature claim that such revenues should be 
spent on expanding road capacity, for the benefit of those paying the fees 
rather than those, the .users of collective transportation, on whose account 
the fees are partially being paid. Furthermore, the principle of Pàreto 
would require that- the introduction of car traffic 'into the urban scene 
be justified only were, the users: of cars able-to compensate, and actually ' 
make payments to those rendered worse off. Thus one should conclude that 
road pricing schemes such as that proposed for Caracas only be sufficient 
were the toll revenues in reality used to compensate those disadvantaged,' 
to. the extent necessary., with any amount left over being left to subsequent 
analysis as to what should be'done with it. 
1/ The scheme was not implemented in Caracas, due to political and other 
difficulties.. However, the .World Bank, which was responsible for 
the commissioning of the study, has been instrumental in introducing.. 
basically the same scheme which was designed for Caracas in Singapore. 
- " - ' /The impact 
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The-i^âct'which traffic congestion has on cities in rèspeet of 1 -
those-who travel by collective modes is somewhat different in Latin America-
than in the central countries, large ly - due to the fact that, bus services-' 
are rarely operated by thë 'pub-lic- authorities with certain social objectives 
in mind, but rather are, for the most part, operated by private companies 
and individuals (-see sectionV-) undêr l o o s e public Supervision. 
Furthermore it is important- to stress that; the impact of a given slowing 
down of biié Services in a 'Lâtih: American city may tie greater than the 
equivalent in the central countries 'sincej in: the'Region , the^.central 0 
country tendency for the less" affluent to. live closer to the .center whilst -
the richer;take advantage'of better ambientai conditions in the periphery 
is to some extent inverted.' The poorer;., there fore have to'travel, in. many: ... 
cases, very long distances froitij- for instance, where they live to.where 
they work thereby exacerbating--1 the impact of any deterioration in 'the - '- • 
quality of bus servicès. Tablés 6-5 and 6-6"give some, idea of the greater 
travel times1to which the less affluent are subject in Sao Paulo relative 
to the mòre affluent. ..: . t'--̂ "1. •'•' ' •••>"• • . •>• •• „-, 
It is possible' tò;trace through - a certain chain of events which follow 
from the slowing dòwn: "of'bus'- services- by a\itoTîtôbilé*genèrated congestion. 
First' of* all, the previous'* fleet size is «tab-le" to deal-^with the -demand 
for travel by collective transportation w-ithin a given time period.- The 
immediate consequence of this . iç; overcrowding,, from, which follows public 
clamor for improved services. The private operators are often limited 
in their ability to provide more buses due to the fact that the.fares that 
they are allowed to charge by the supervisory public authority are tied 
to changes in operating costs. There may be no provision for the raising ' 
of fare levels" on account of the desirability of' incurring extra capital 
expenditure to ease the degree of overcrowding in the formulae used. 
Moreover, in the formulae used by some authorities, the overcrowding may 
effectively ,even lead to a reduction, in the extent to which,cost,increases 
be passed oh às fare increases, through the spreading: of the", extra costs 
amongst more passengers. . . 
Even 
were there to be no 'control of fares, by thé public authorities, 
the bus operators would be limited in the extent to which they be able to /raise fares 
raise fares to cover the acquisition of more buses by the extremely low 
purchasing power of some of.their passengers. In Brasilia and Sao Paulo, 
for instance, the poorest families may spend 20% of their income on 
collective transportation,. clearly leaving little scope for the elevation 
of fare levels. : , , ... .. , . 
The quantitative significance of the, adverse impact of automobile-
generated congestion on bus seryices has not been fully estimated. The 
study for Caracas referred to earlier considered, the., effects of charging 
all car, driver trips in the,morning peak period a toll of B$. 3.00, in a 
situation in which the operation of the Caracas metro line was simulated. 
From the findings of the study it c,an be deduced that the size of the bus 
fleet necessary to carry a given volume of travel would fall by 12% and 
fares could fall (through lower operating costs) by 6% were 32% of the 
car trips .diverted to. other modes o f transportation. , The latter figure 
may be considered excessive in relation to the former, two, but it should 
be borne in mind that these 32% of car trips are marginal trips in the sense 
that they are the ones which derive the least benefit by being made by car 
, in the first, place since they are the first to be diverted by the toll. 
Moreover it is,, probable ..that. better relation between benefits to bus 
passengers and reduction in car trips be achieved by tolling only those trips 
bound for the central area of the city,. .... 
Policy Implications 
It would seem that to redress the inequities caused by the affluent 
forcing upon the less affluent worsened travel conditions in the cities 
of the region, there must be devised schemes whereby car travellers 1/ in 
the peak be tolled, the revenues thereby gained to be at least partially 
utilized to compensate the captive collective transportation riders for the 
1/ In general the concept should be expanded to include users of modes 
other than the' c&r during periods of congestion. For example collective 
taxis sometimes generate more costs on account of the congestion they 
create than the value of the services they offer. They should be 
taxed too. It would probably tend to occur that, per person, the 
richer would be charged more than the poorer since the. richer tend to 
use those modes of travel which are the more wasteful of road space 
per person conveyed. >; • . 
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inconvenience that congestion, forces, uppn them. There are a wide variety . . 
of schemes which conform to this general pattern.. None have seemingly 
been introduced in Latin America« 
Were it to be considered undesirable, from either the political, or 
legal .(or other) standpoint to raise revenues,from peak hour car travellers, 
other non-monetary, schemes to redress the equilibrium could be substituted. 
Such alternative cpuld involve the. withdrawal ,9f a part of urban road 
capacity in peak periods from being utilized by cars, so, that collective 
transportation may function at speedsnot pignificantly different from those 
which would have prevailed were there to have been no inordinate growth in 
car usage. Relatively passive devices of this nature include .the reservation 
of lanes by buses. More extreme forms than this are not discussed in public, 
but there may, on occasion, be a. very good, case to be made out for the 
complete banning of cars* on certain thoroughfares and in all central parts 
of cities in the peak periods.. 
No. Latin, American city h^s implemented any kind of. pricing scheme 
on car users, and o t h e r s i n . the peak periods., the revenues from which 
are^circulated back to those.who, are disadvantaged by such usage. The road 
pricing investigation for Cc^acas concluded that the simple scheme devised 
would -be worthwhile in socio-economic terms., whether or . not a metro be 
constructed in- the city. The scheme has not been implemented, but the 
metro is being constructed., The metro was recommended by a study realized 
before the road pricing investigation,, and it could not, therefore, have 
been examined whether or not the metro would be., worthwhile were the. surface 
transportation system optimized, as it would tend to be were the rqad 
pricing regime introduced. This is illustrative'of a trait observable in 
other Latin American cities as well as in Caracas (-Rio de Janeiro., Sao Paulo 
and Santiago, Chile, for instance-) tofprefer expensive capital intensive 
"solutions" to urban transportation problems which, seek to improve the 
conditions of travel of collective transportation users whilst not intruding 
on the "right" to use the private car, which seems to be treated as something 
akin to a Latin Amrican sacred cow. It is generally not the case that 
metros are financed by the users of cars, the costs of the metro system 
being: usually paid fori by fares and from more general taxation revenue, 
/which, in 
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which, in Latin America, may -be to.a large extent contributed by taxes on 
sales rather than- the generally more progressive taxes on income. Note 
too, as is indicated in table 6.6, that in Sao Paulo at least, the metro 
is utilized by high income persons who probably also:own cars. 
r There are certain signs, however, that certain cities of the Region 
are starting to consider the adoption of schemes which would physically 
transfer road space from the car user to the collective transportation 
passenger. Buenos Aires has several lengths of reserved bus lanes, one 
against the flow of traffic. But in other cases the prime mover behind 
such schemes does not seem to have been the desire to remove some of the 
incumberances forced on thé user of collective transportation, but rather 
something else. Thé improvement;in the travel conditions of the transit 
user is almost a by-product. For instance, Santiago, - Chile, has recently 
removed parking meters from "city center streets in an attempt to reduce 
the amount of car usage to the center of town (less than two years after 
they were installed in the first place); but the prime reason for this 
seems to be to attempt to alleviate the amount of atmospheric pollution 
over the inner areas of the city 1/ and not to improve the fluidity of bus 
movement. In Rio de Janeiro a: plan was announced in June 1979, to resérve 
two lanes on AvenidaNossa Senhora de Copacabana.for buses. But one of' 
the reasons for the adoption of this scheme, and maybe the principle oné, 
is that there would result an expected saving in .petroleum consumption. 
There is without much doubt a real c o n c e m i n Latin America that 
the travel conditions of the less affluent social classes must be improved. 
This is evident through speaking with those responsible for urban transportation 
by the bold actions taken in the construction of metropolitan railroads, 
by the actions taken by some public authorities in acquiring supplementary 
bus fleets,- etc. But there seem to be little in the way of attempts to 
tackle the problem at the fundamental level though restraints on the excessive 
amount of car travel at inconvenient times, which largely created the problem 
of poor travel conditions for thé less Well-off.in the first place. The 
1/ For which the private car may not even be significantly responsible -
see table 7.5. 
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solutions attempted are not only possibly somewhat regressive in certain 
aspects; they are also inordinately expensive. The first line of the 
Rio de Janeiro metro cost more than US$ 53 millions to construct per 
kilometer. Were the problems; to be, .tackled at the basic level by reducing 
the quantity of car travel at peak periods not only would the "polluter" 
be called upon to cover the costs of his contamination, but the total 
costs of achieving the desired level of improvement would be lowered. 
/Table 5-2 
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>?:• i'. 7- Table. 6-1 v 
TOTAL AND AUTOMOTIVE-RELATED FAMILY SPENDING IN 1975 IN 
SELECTED PARTS OF BRAZIL' 
(In cruzeiros) 
Area (Indicating unit 












Rural MA, PI, CE, RN, PA 
PE, AL, SE, BA 7 543 21 4 88 
Whole region idem. 13 229 66 29 338 
Rural PR, SC, RS 19 028 145 51 596 
Region idem . 29 038 255 116 1 128 
Rural RJ 14 006 99 27 357 
Region RJ 40 078 265 165 1 001 
Source: "Anuario Estadístico do Brazil: 1977".I.B.G.E., Rio de Janeiro, 
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Tablé 6-2 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF CAR. OWNERSHIP BY FAMILY INCOfflE 
IN SAO PAULQVIN 1977 
Monthly in- Percentage of families with: Percentage 
come on Cr$ o '• ;'• L„:;v 2+ No of all 
Cars ' Car ; Cars Cars reply familiés 
0- 700 96.6 2.5 " 0.5 — 0.4 1.22 
701- 2000 91.7 7.7 0.5 0.0 : 0.0 10.25 
2001- 4000 81.0 17.7 1.0 0.0 0.2 24.15 
4001- 6000 - 62.2 34.4: . 2.8 0.3 0.4 18.34 
6001- 8000 45.6 48.2 . 5.4 0.5 , 0.2 11.45 
8001-12000 27.9 58.3 12.2 1.3 0.3 11.75 
12001-16000 16.0 • 61*1 18.6 3.8 -0.5 5.68 
16001-20000 11,4 54.3 ^ 26.2 " . 7.3 ' 0.8. 4.37 
above 20000 5.8 42*6 38.0 . 13.4 . 0.1 6.78 
All 54.6 34.5 8.3 2.1 0.5 93.99 a/ 
Source: Information provided by the Empresa Metropolitana dos Transportes 
Urbanos of the city of Sao Paulo. 
a/ Excludes families which did not respond to the income question. 
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Table 6-3 
TRIP-RATES PER DAY FOR FAMILIES IN BUENOS AIRES BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
• ' STATUS ' a/»1CÀR OWNERSHIP,: AND WHETHER OR' NOT THE 
FAMILY RESIDES IN THE MORE BÙILT-UP AREAS 
Socio-economic. Carr-owning . :.1 ..:. _ . .Trip..rate for families in: 
status or hot Federal capital Rest of Metropolitan 
- — 
" v ' area 
High yes 12.53 8.75 
no> 8.07' 5.12 -
Medium yes' O.i 8.41' : 6.53 
no ö •M: 5.7l:>- 4.75 
Low. yes 6.53 5.36 
no 4.13 3. 89 
Source: "Estudio preliminar del transporte de la Región Metropolitana", 
Ministerio de Obras y Sérvicios Públicos. Buenos Aires,1972. 
a/ Highly correlated with household income." 
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Table 6-4 
.DAILY .¡TRIP RATES BY PURPOSE FOR-FAMILIES IN SAO PAULO 




Trips per day 
Work Educ. Shop 
Per family for purpose; 
Pers. Health Recreat.Serve Home 
bus» - • — visit. •• pass. 
Total 
0- 700 0.17 0.02 0.05 0.20 0.06 0.15 0.00 0.47 1.12 
701- 2000 0.83 0.08 0.06 0.27 0.10 0.21 0.06. 1.37 2.98 
2001- 4000 1.47 0.19 0.08 0.35 0.14 0.27 0.10 2.14 4.73 
4001- 6000 2.04 0.36 / 0.13 0.49 0.13 0.38 0.13 2.82 6.41 
6001- 8000 2.20 0.51. 0.12 0.59 0.14 0.42 0*17 3.22 7.36 
8001-12000 2.42 0 .75 0.16 -0.62 0.14 0.56 0.24 ... 3.70 8.58 
12001-16000 2.54 1.01 0.24. 0.79 0.13 0.66 0.42 4.14 9.94 
16001-20000 2.35 0.98 0.26 0.85 0.15 0.74 0¿58 4.41 10.02 
above 20000 2.42 1.29 0.37 0.89 0.18 0.94 0.51 4.74 11.44 
All -y 1.81 0.49 . 0.14 0.51 0*14 0.43 0.20 2.86 6.59 
Source: Interpreted from information provided by_the Empresa Metropolitana 
dos Transportes Urbanos of the city of Sao Paulo. 
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Table 6-5 
MEAN TRIP DURATION AS A FUNCTION OF'HOUSEHOLD INCOME. 
SAO PAULO,- 1977 
Monthly.. incQm: in Cr$ .. . . . . Minutes..i>er trip.... 
... ... ,P-.-. ; .7.0.0 
' 1 • * 701 - 2000 
• 2001 - 4000 
:4001 - 6000 
• '6001 - 8000 
8001 - 12000 
' 12001 - 16000 
ir 16001 - 20000 
• above 20000 
Source• Interpreted from information provided by the Empresa Metropolitana 




• 46.4 ' 





/Table 6 - 6 
Table 6-6 
TRIP DURATION FOR HOME-TO-WORK JOURNEYS BY SELECTED 
COMBINATIONS OF MODES 
Mode(s) Minutes home-work Mean family 
Industry Commerce Service income in 
Cr$ of users 
of mode(s) 
Bus 46.9 48.0 47.2 7837 
Car 24.3 26.0 27.6 14680 
Bus + bus 77.9 76.7 79.9 6920 
Metro 38.3 34.6 33.6 12920 
Other train 73.0 74.4 72.0 5070 
Bus + bus + bus 100.5 105.7 87.1 6400 
Bus + bus + train 110.4 98.7 115.9 6810 
Source: Interpreted from information provided by the Empresa Metropolitana 
dos Transportes Urbanos da cidade de Sao Paulo. 
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Figure 6 . 1 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RATES OF MOTORIZATION, IN VEHICLES PER THOUSAND PERSONS, 
SHOWN ON THE "Y" AXIS AND DEGREE OF URBANIZATION, IN TERMS OF THE 
PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION THAT LIVES IN URBAN AREAS, SHOWN ON 
THE "X", FOR UNITS OF THE FEDERATION OF BRAZIL IN 1975 
o 3¿ ¡fo 5Ü~ 6ö~ 
."toi3T»pe ; Anuario e s t a d í s t i c o do B r a s i l , 1976 
Figure 6 . 2 
QUANTITY OF INTERNAL (TO SAO PAULO CITY) TRIPS PER DAY PER FAMILY AS 
A FUNCTION OF FAMILY INCOME: IN TOTAL AND BY AUTOMOBILE 
/Figure 6 . 3 
Figure 6.3 
THE DIURNAL VARIATION IN, (a), DRIVER'S TIME AND OWN CAR 
OPERATING COSTS AND, (b), THE COSTS FORCED UPON OTHER ROAD 
USERS DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF AN ADDITIONAL CAR FOR A CIRCUIT 
IN INNER CARACAS, IN BOLIVARES OF 1971 PER Km. AND USING 1971 
WEKDAY MEASURES OF TRAFFIC FLOW AS BASE INPUT 
B's per 
/ « T T CNSNF 
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VII. SOME ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF THE AUTOMOBILE 
IN LATIN AMERICA:' ACCIDENTS AND POLLUTION • 
Introduction ., . 
An automobile undoubtedly confers on-its, owner, l̂ enefits, derived from. 
the greater .accessibility which it.permits. These benefits ar^ ¡probably 
large although hitherto non estimated. This current paper too makes no 
attempt ¡ait- estimating the benefits derived, from the., accessibility generated ¡.  
by the automobile in any quantit̂ Ltiye manner , ($aweye£..-in .Annex 2 we 
present 3 methodological framework which could be adopted for their estimation.) 
Since we make no attempt to estimate.-, the user benefits which the .car unleashes 
it may be considered -unfair -to^dwell <too%:long on.the matter of the various 
environmental•and other-social costs,for which the cap is responsible, since 
so to do.may bias the -.reader's opinion towapds a belief that the automobile in 
itself is an undesirable object, . - We are .„-not trying to say that we believe that 
the automobile is undesirable for.Latin America, although we do believe that it 
is allolwerdj to be used. in such -a way, /that; the owner and user does ncjt consider 
the whole costs of his, action- to .society when he: decides, to buy a car and. use 
it. .-i.For instance, as explained .in section.,,:VI, the- car . user does qot.pay for 
the costs he,forces on-.tî e-û ejiv-q-f,̂ llectiŝ .,:transport3t4p]& when he-makes a 
trip along a. :congested-urban, street which ¡contains, a bus.ronte^, .. 
In the. same way the; par usezv generates both, air and noise pollution,-
for,,which, he may. not cover the cqs-ts..;,. He also, starts .each journey with a • . 
non-̂ zero probability of killing ,or injuring, somebody:,, maybe himselfbefore 
he arrives at his destination;, of which probability he has little knowledge 
and which -he can be argued to underestimate. In Latin America the non-
appreciation of the dangers of car gravel is seemingly very much greater . 
than it is .„in the central countries the evidence of the eye is anything 
to go,by (failure to wear seat belts,, lack of lane discipline* etc.).. The 
non-recognition, ofgpch costs implies, „that some trips would be made and 
some .catrs vjô ld be bought when ,the benefits which follow on from such action 
be less than the costs involved. Thus there would be tendency.,for both, too 
many cars and too much use of cars. Only were the potential car buyer and 
trip maker to be fully responsible for the costs of his action can 
/there be 
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there be much hope'thaf the right volume of car ownership and car usage 
be hit upon. 
2. Accidents due to the car in Latin America 
(a) Accident rates in Latin America 
. There is no doubt that, from the standpoint of road safety, Latin -/j 
America is a very dangerous part of the world in which to live. The bare 
statistics show this to some degree, although not always to the justified 
degree since one suspects that there is a positive correlation between the 
accident rate of a country and the.-rate at which those, accidents which do 
occur fail to be reported, and hence-recorded in the official statistical 
returns. Further evidence of the danger of being on Latin American roads 
is.provided by regular hair-raising newspaper photographs and stories of 
the previous day*s disasters on the highway, and by quite alarming and 
socially irresponsible behaviour seen whilst driving to work in the morning. 
Table.7-1 shows some illustrative statistics of mortality rates in 
certain Latin American countries (for which data is readily available) in 
recent years, together with similar rates for some central countries for 
the years 1976 and 1955. We choose to concentrate on mortality rates rather 
than overall accident - rates since it is suspected .that differences in 
coverage and definition for overall accident rates-between countries make : • 
inter-country comparison meaningless. .There are difficulties too, of-a 
like nature, in the case of death rates, but to a- lesser degree; for instance 
some countries classify a death due :to a road accident as being a mortality 
occuring within 30 days of a highway accident ^nd .causally linked to it-;, 
(which definition is used by the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe) whereas other countries count only those deaths.which actually take 
place at the place of the accident, whilst still others, use intermediary 
definitions. The rates in the table-.are specified per motorized vehicle, 
although a better base for comparison would be the traffic volume in terms 
of vehicle-kilometers;. : The latter information is not available, for most 
countries of interest.: - , -j. 
/Taking as 
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Taking as an arbitrary base .for .comparison the simple average of the 
rates for the United States and the United Kingdom in the two years of 1955 
and 1976, it would appear that Brazil in the 1974/1975 period was 6 1/2 times 
as dangerous, Chile between 1968 and 1973 was about ten times as dangerous, 
Colombia in 1969 was 15 times as dangerous , Ecuador .in 1975 was 25-1/2 times 
as dangerous, Peru in 1972 was 4 1/2 times as dangerous, Venezuela in 1975 
vfes 7 times as dangerous, whilst Uruguay - in 1974 was comparatively safe at 
merely 1 1/2 times as: dangerous as the base point chosen-. 
Data on accidents on highways for Latin American countries do not 
generally exist in a reliable and consistent form over a sufficient number " 
of years to permit the determination of long-term trends. In the central 
countries, however, death rates on the roads per vehicle declined significantly 
from the mid-fifties to the mid-seventies: for instance1 the rate (in terms of 
deaths due to highway accidents per 1,000 vehicles per annum) in the United 
States, fell from 0.61 to 0.34; in the United--Kingdom it fell from 1.17 to . 
0.41; in the Netherlands it fell from 4.12 to 0.59; in France it fell from 
1.92'to 0.74; in Italy it fell from: 4.62 to 0.51. The available data would 
suggest that the rate in Chile fell from 1968 to 1971 to'1973, but there were 
other influences at work during this period; rfor'instance in 1973 there were 
at times difficulties in' buying gasoline . The Latin countries of Europe 
(Spaii*, Portugal, Italy and France) all lowered their death rates during thé 
period however.- The indications are that the rate was generally falling in ' 
Brazil from.1972 to 1976, although remaining at very high levels. " 
(b) Reasons for the high accident rates in Latin America 
The reasons why accident rates are so high in Latin America have not 
been fully explained. There are many quite obvious contributory reasons, such 
as inexperienced drivers, cars of antiquated design, and inadequate sign-posting, 
but the true quantitative significance of each one has not been identified.!/ 
V There has been some seemingly pertinent statistical analyses to achieve 
such identification in Sao Paulo.State. We have not- had access to 
the complete results. 
/The British 
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The Br i t i sh Transport and .Road Research Laboratory however, has 
conducted some illuminating research into accidents in developing countries 
in general.; I t found t h a t , looking at .crc^s-sectional information from a 
variety of countries, the higher i s the car ownership, ra te the, lower i s the 
accident r a t e per vehicle. . But this relationship i s certainly not in i t s e l f 
causal. The increase in the level of .car ownership i s generally accompanied 
by improvements- in the level of education, perception of s o c i a l responsibi l i ty , 
and quality of highway infras t ructure , and i t i s s,uch tendencies which lead 
t o reductions in .the accident ra te and not higher car ownership in i t s e l f . 
I t i s probable that the accident ra te in Ecuador, which country in 1975 had 
the highest death ra te per .vehicle of a l l entr ies in table 7 - 1 , increased as 
car ownership increased in. this, country as a resul t of the o i l boom of this 
country in the early and mid nineteen seventies . In the longer term however, 
such riches, would be transformed into a raising of the leyel of education and 
highway infras t ruc ture , e t c . , . t o eventually be ref lec ted in a lowering of the 
accident ra te per vehicle. The Br i t i sh inst i tut ion compared information for 
a number of developed and developing countries for the years 1961 and 1971 
and concluded that "the percentage,changes in f a t a l i t i e s and injuries do not 
appear to be closely re la ted to changes in vehicle ownership". 
The same ins t i tu t ion suggests that "the decrease i n . f a t a l i t y r a t e per . . 
vehicle (through the passage of many years) could be due t o the f a c t t h a t 
vehicles with the highest, ,rates are decreasing in .numbers". I t goes on .to 
r e l a t e comparative accident rates with the ownership of bicycles and motor-
cyc les , which are recognized to be not amongst the safes t of vehicles . 
Also pedestrian interact ion i s l ikely to be important; fo.rs instance, the 
switching, of. shopping from the neighbourhood grocery s t o r e , butcher's shop, 
baker's shop, e t c . , to the supermarket reduces the degree of vehicle-
pedestrian fr ic t ion» .The countries which received the most attention from , 
the developing world in the Bri t ish i n s t i t u t i o n ' s analyses were in Africa 
and Asia; in Latin America the motor-cycle and the bicycle are less typica l 
than in the countries of the two other regions. But a study of transportation 
in the metropolitan region of Buenos Aires examined data on vehicle usage 
/and accident 
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and accident data to' estimate accident propensities for different types of 
vehicle- in this M i r y . Thè indek calculated for a car was M, for a taxi 2, . 
for a bus 19and ' for a trnick-14; 
For Buenos Aires these Indices-are entirely plausible. Taxis are . 
individually owned and operated by drivers who can' be classed as professionals 
and who would stand to lose a lot of revenue Were their vehicle to be off the 
road for any period of time due to having been involved in an accident. 
Buses too are in very much the- same category with the important differences 
that their drivers feel that drivers of other vehicles fear them more than 
they féar other drivers- (due to the greater size and weight of a bus 
compared witW most 'other vehicles) ahd that a bus can take scrapes and other.; 
minor impacts without-having to be withdrawn from service. In some Latin 
American cities, although this is not as evident iw Buenos Aires as>. 
elsewherè, bus drivers stand to gain more revenue by driving in a sometimes 
quite reckless manner so as to maximize the time between their own vehicle; ; 
and the vehicle in front of them on the same route;. Truck drivers; too 
sometimes take advantage of thè fact that they drive vehicles which' are. 
generally biggèr and weightier than most- other vehicles on the road, and that 
they can carry on operating their vehicles even Were they to have been 
involved in minor accidents. 
As time passes and incomes increase one would expect that cars, 
especially, and taxis incitease as a proportion of the total fleet and that 
the proportion of trucks-and buses decline. Thus, the mere passage of time 
would tend to reduce-the accident rate per vehicle. 
The same British institution proved the statistical correlation between 
road width' and the frequency of junctions and number of accidents inr Jamaica. 
In another developing country away from the region the number of accidents, 
was found to depend on horizontal curvature, junction frequency, surface 
irregularity, and vertical curvature* Thus one- would also expect the . >• St-
acci dent rate per car to decline in a general way through time as the quality 
of the highway stock improves, through the provision of freeways with--¡limited 
access, and the paving of rough gravel roads, etc. 
/The Brazil ian 
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The Brazilian Ministerio da Justina has- also conducted some research 
into accidents on highways. It was found that on the ViaDutra (between, th.e. 
cities of Río de Janeiro and Sao Paulo) in the first three months of 1975 
the accidenta.-which did occur could be attributed to: 
. driver fault ;. ,39.6%,; 
... vehicle fault . . - 14.4% 
-highway;: j 27.6%. 
. ambiental conditions . ,6.7% 
. others - - v ,11.8%, ,,, 
In urban areas 7.0% of accidents were attributed to the fault of the 
driver* Speeds are also likely to be influential. The Brazilian Departamento 
Nacional' de Estradas e-, Rodagem claims that the introduction of the policy to; -
limiting speeds to. 80.km/hr, to economize on the, consumption of gasoline, 
coincided with a falii of 12% in the number of accidents and 19% in the : 
number of deaths. •• ' .-- ::>••<-.7; ••. .-i 
(c) The intrinsic safety of the Latin American-car, 
One factor which does-not -show up in- the evidence quoted above on., the . . 
causes of accidents ,is the nature of the Latin American automobile,:which,- is-
inherentlyj more dangerous than cars elsewhere. . ¡Whether there .,be, an accident ,, 
due to the fault of the driver, the fault of the roa<},,:the ,weather,.or a.¡ 
mechanical defficiency -.in- the vehicle, there- would.,be a higher chance that 
the acfcident have sferious consequences 4 n Latin America thep -in the .central., 
countries due to the inferior quality of the L.^tin. American car. 
One contributory factor to the unsafe nature-j;of -cars in the region is , . 
the usruálly very high' cost of.-new cars. -This provides an. incentive to maintain 
in operation longer than desirable older automobiles constructed with bygone 
concepts of safety in mind, and also less safe due to physical deterioration , 
as a function of usage. In some countries vehicles have to be inspected for 
safety features in order to obtains licence to circulate,..but;,cthese are 
not always sufficient to ensure that vehicles conform with the desired 
standards. • :-.-. 
/A further 
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A further contributory factor to the unsafe nature of Latin American 
cars is the fact that most of the cars produced in the region are built to 
designs long since out of production in their countries of origin and which 
would not meet current safety standards in such countries. For instance in 
Argentina in 1978 the following models were in production but n o t so in their 
original homelands: Citroen Ami 8; Dodge Coronado; Dodge folara; Fiat 600; 
Fiat 125; early sixties Ford Falcon; Ford Fairlaine; old model Chevrolet 
Malibu; Renault 6 and Peugeot 404. 
Latin American countries have generally been slow in adopting safety 
features in the cars produced within their boundaries. Consider, for example, 
the Volkswagen Beetle. When this vehicle ceased to be produced in Western 
Germany in 1977 it had many more safety features than its Brazilian equivalent. 
Amongst these features were three-point safety belts, sesit head-rests and a 
• ,. . •< • ... 
body front portion which collapses on impact.' Certain other features were 
installed in the Brazilian version only in 1976 when the Brazilian Government 
issued a decree enforcing the inclusion of certain safety equipment in cars 
produced nationally. On the other hand, the Brazilian Volkswagen Passat is 
virtually identical as regards safety features with the German model, since 
the entire design was imported from Germany, safety,features and all, due to 
the desire of the. Brazilian subsidiary to get the car onto the market with the 
minimum delay possible. In Brazil the car producers claim that they do not 
voluntarily install safety equipment in their vehicles, since the buying public 
does not demand them. They are undoubtedly right in this respect. It requires 
that there be government action to protect drivers from themselves in Latin 
America, and, even more important, to protect them from others. 
However, there are grounds for optimism regarding the safety features of 
Latin American cars.. Some countries, such as. Chile and Argentina, are tending 
to open up their home markets to imported vehicles, which would tend to 
conform to international safety standards;, since it may be less profitable to 
modify the car for the sake of a few Latin American sales rather than §e 11 the 
car with some equipment which.the manufacturers would prefer to extract. 
(There however are some instances of foreign manufacturers taking advantage of 
the lack of enforcing regulations in Latin America regarding the quality of the 
/cars sold; 
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cars sold; in the pollution fi?ld?„ for ,ins tan ce, smali. i]̂ port©d cars with 
two-stroke, motors are sold.in, Chil$ without the filters which,are required 
in Japan. Cars produce^ in Jj>atin America are steadily being more and. more. , 
sold on the.international,market, especially those from Brazil (which havev . 
been eaqsorted to many countries, ŝ ch.,as Western Germany, Algeria, 
Philippines,). ; Thusj the product has jfo conform to th$ safety standards of 
the export market , and in. most cases, one would expect that the manufacturers 
choose to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and produce the same version 
for the hojne market as for the export., market. Furthermore government, action 
in the area of requiring that, new cars produced and/or, sold have certain 
minimum.safety standards will probably increase, to some extent, maybe, since 
by upgrading .the cars produce^ to international, safety standards^new export 
horizons could be opened, up* . t.., -, 
(d) . The relative importance, and cost of highway accidents as a source of 
death: conclusions 
Deaths from highway accidents figure quitè highly in figures of death 
from all causes in Latin America. In developing countries'in generai road 
accidents cause more deaths' than either typhoid or tuberculosis' or smallpox 
or malaria. Table 7-2 shows soma data' o£ deaths from road accidents and 
other causes in certain Latin American còuntriès. J 1 
The estimation of the cost to the nation Of road accidents' is a-'subject 
fraught with difficulty. À crucial problem ik how to value human life. To 
a non-Chris ti an the Value of his li fé£'may: be infinite. Since every year in 
every country'non-Christians die in highway acci dèh ts then the costs òf such 
accidents every year may be infinite. 
There are several alternative procedures to value human life (or the 
loss of human life). These are: • • . , ' • . . 
(i) One may estimate how much persons are willing to p'ay"to reduce ' 
the probability that they die. There are a'number of difficulties herè. A 
person generally does not know thè dangèr ft<5 himself 'of crossing a busy road, 
flying by a certain airline, smoking so many cigarettes of a certain ' 
manufacturer per day, etc. ' Furthermore hé cannot reasonably ' be expected to p -
pay on account of the pain and grief that his own death would cause others'. 1 
Finally, it is sobering to takè note óf the concluding tèmarks oif one 
/researcher who 
researcher who has attempted t o value l i f e by studying how much people are'", 
prepared to pay to stand a b e t t e r chance of not dying are ^'Precisely how the 
translation from private preferences to; s o c i a l welfare functions should be 
performed we hesi ta te tP suggest". ^ 
( i i ) The l a t t e r problem, and. maybe the one of the loss fe l t -by friends ' 
and r e l a t i v e s , would be avoided were one able to determine how much- governments 
are prepared to spend t o save the l ives of the people for which they are 
responsible. But even governments may not know what the relevant probabil i t ies 
are . The behaviour of one ministry may not be consistent with another. And ' 
there may be some c i r c u l a r reasoning involved; for instance, the benefits-
from highway improvements uti l ize, an assumed value of l i fe ' (savedby reducing 
accident ra tes by providing b e t t e r ; r o a d s ) . So were one to stuffy the behaviour 
of governments as to how much they spend to. save l ives by instal l ing safety 
equipment on highways,¡and were one not to e r r in one's calculat ions , one 
should derive that the.value of l i f e by.the value which was assumed in the 
f i r s t place . .. ; . 
( i i i ) One co.uld feasibly take as the value of l i f e the discounted net 
future earnings of the deceased on the. grounds that society would be that 
much the worse off through the victim not being alive i Clearly there are a 
large number of problem with t h i s .^proach.;: : It : places no. value on the extent 
that the deceased would prefer to be alive rather than dead. . Also the same 
procedure, would usually conclude that most women, many elderly men, most of 
.those living in the developing world, and young children everywhere would 
benefit the r e s t of us were they t o cease t o e x i s t , a conclusion which i s 
c learly ridiculous. . Nevertheless this approach, has fpUnd considerable 
acceptance amongst the somewhat col^-hearted-engineers.and.economists who 
provide cost data for transportation studies. Were the approach to be 
combined with (i,) i t could, however, yield acceptable r e s u l t s . 
( i v ) One. could gain an,insight into the costs borne by the friends and 
r e l a t i v e s of the deceased by studying awards in court cases claiming- ' 
compensation for losses i n f l i c t e d . This possibi l i ty too could be used in 
association With ( i ) . One may also, u t i l i z e the awards laid down in 
conventions, such as that of Warsaw., which specify how much the bereaved 
/should be 
should be compensated fpj? ,th,e loss of their,loved ones in transport accidents. 
A, practical problem with .this .approach is the inconsistency of the results, . 
obtained depending.on the .convention chosen., . 
Nevertheless, a study of transportation in the metropolitan are^a of 
Buenos. Aires used method (iii) .above to determine that the .every death in a 
road accident, in Buenos Aires ,corresponded to a cost due to all accidents , 
on the roads of this city of approximately 1.3 million pesos, of 1973. ThiSj 
figure does include, some allowance for the losses felt by .the bereaved, but. 
f.or the most part is based on the value of lost production and. costs of 
repairing men and machines. Using the value estimated for Buenos Aires,, and 
making suitable adjustments f;or inflation,, one may use .the result to (very, 
crudely) estimate the cost of road accidents as a proportion of the, GDP of 
Latin American countries. The estimates. made are subject to many errors.f. and 
their true significance, is not wholly obyious, nevertheless they vary, .for 
the Latin American countries dealt .with in table 7 - 1 from, a low percentage 
of 0.8% for Peru in 1972 and the Repftblica Oriental del Uruguay in 1974 to, 
as much as 4.8% for Ecuador in 1975.: The British Transport and Road Research 
Laboratory has estimated that the, posts,, of road accidents to developing 
countries in, mainly, Africa and. other, countries,, with relatively... low levels... 
of motorization , to be .ground 1% of Grpss Natipnal. Product. In Latin America 
one would, expect that "the percentage be somewhat, higher than in developing , 
countries on average, due to more vehicles ^nd more accidents. The Brazilian 
Ministerio da. Justi^a in the report referred to earlier provides information 
of material damage costs and "vitimas com ferimentos." (which may or may not 
include the lost production thrqugh the person, getting himself injured) from 
which it can be deduced that in 1972 and 1,873 the cost of highway accidents, 
so defined, was somewhat, less than. 1% of Brazilian, Gross National Product. 
Nevertheless, perhaps the wbole , idea of estimating -the costs to a, , 
nation of the death and other ..damage, paused by. road accidents is futile. 
Some nations, such as the,.United States,, United.,Kingdom and Sweden, spend 
vast sun® in attempts to reduce, the number of highway accidents (while riot 
discouraging car usage). At the. limit a. cpuntry. could spend most of its 
Gross National Product on minimizingTroad accidents,, in which case the, costs 
/ o f the 
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of the accidents tteTOèlyès^.wo^J/j^ekrly. iKxt-btf-̂ fâir 'indication of the 
amount of the wealth of the _ nation, aotsunçtion because of 
road accidents, _ t .J • 
It is without doubt however that road ; accidents v-are both a significant 
cause of death in Latin America and that they: ;cD,st : the nations of thé Region 
too much. There should .be ippre -legislation int^duced -to minimize such : 
costs. Much of the current, legislation is.; antiquated-and inadequately 
enforced. In Argentina the laws which govern:vehicleuse date from the*late 
nineteen forties. They. do: not, for instance, require-cars to have révèrsing 
lights. Although revised since, their initial, specification, fines' seem to 
have been overtaken by „inflatipn. Some of thejr dispositions, such as thé • 
40 km/hr urban speed limit, are. not heeded, • 
In Chile it has been found that knowledge of.the'code of transit is 
very poor. In some cases there.^seyen passive encouragement by the. responsible 
enforcing authorities tp breaH ,the basic rules #f .-the road, such as giving 
way to traffic on roundabouts.. In Santiago, ! Chile, the cause of road 
safety is not helped by the installation of ,a large, number of traffic lights 
which seem to exceed the ability^of the. responsible authorities to maintain 
them. Their proliferation and mal-functioning seems to be a reason why they 
are not well-respected. .. . . , "' 
In Brazil, one may be forgiven .fô  thinking that .only buses obey the' 
80 km/hr general speed limit whilst cars may. not heed.to it. '••'•'•' 
There is clear ly, considerable,hope that road safety in Latin America 
improve in the future, even if only, because there is so much room for 
improvement from the present.unsavory situation;. The improvement needs to ; 
be on all fronts, by minimum safety.standards for cars, by updating transit 
laws and raising fines and levels of enforcement, but maybe especially by 
driver education. . v .. . 
, . , ... .... v/3." 'Thfe 
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3. The automobile and air pollution in Latin America 
(a) Principal, automotive-related air pollutants 
In chapter VI it was made clear that automobile ownership, arid to a 
lesser extent, «usage was concentrated in the urban areas of the region. This 
has social implications as pointed out in that chapter* It also has 
implications from, the standpoint of air pollution, in much the same way. as 
the social implications already indicated;; the automobile forces costs on 
society in general,, and the captive users of collective transportation more 
than most, through lowering traffic speeds,- and^ in the same way, it generates 
air pollution which affects all and the costs of which are not reimbursed by 
those who create-the nuisance. It regresses the income.! distribution. 
There are several forms of air contaminant produced by the automobile 
in significant quantities. These are introduced below. ••. 
Carbon monoxide. This gas is liberally emitted by gasoline-powered 
motor vehicles, all other sources being insignificant. CO combines chemically 
with the hemoglobin in the bipod, thereby decreasing the. capacity of the 
bloodstream to carry oxygen to the parts of the body which,depend on it. 
The effects have not-been fully researched to a degree that permits the. 
relevant authorities to agree on the level of danger; some authorities feel 
that the effects of CO become significant when there has been exposure at a 
concentration of 30 parts per million (ppm) for four hours. The contaminant 
may lead to some loss of mental ability and may consequently.be a cause of 
traffic accidents in city streets. However one respected medical authority 
has put the true significance of CO in some perspective by;claiming that with 
each puff of a cigarette a smoker inhales seven times as much carbon monoxide 
as the highest concentration found in heavy traffic. 
Hydrocarbons. By chemical reaction HC may contribute to the formation of 
smog, which is a serious concern in some cities. There is no,direct evidence 
that the kind of concentration of HC found in city streets is harmful, although 
there have been suggestions that it be connected in some way with lung cancer. 
Gasoline motors are much more contaminating than diesel motors, and the major 
source of the total hydrocarbon pollution is the motor vehicle, as pointed 
out in table 7-3. 
/Nitrogen Oxides. 
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, • Nitrogen Oxides. The. real long-term-effects of N0x are largely unknown 
at the present*.. The gas ;contributes. to smog formationand can lead to 
respiratory failure- in high concentrations not':found at the streetside. .-Some 
authorities Consider that the effects of NO^-may ?be more .harmful than those, 
of CO".Again'vehicular .transportation is the major source of nitrogen oxide 
contamination , and the petrol:engine is generally more polluting than the diesel 
motor,; •• •>',», .. : • .», .. * >•,» * ... » . .. , 
. . Lead',. Lead pollution. may * take the form of either particulate ; matter or 
volatile compounds. There is no evidence that lead pollution usually'produced 
by automotive, sources is a health hazard, although there.is no doubt ,that 
harmful effects follow from the ̂ingestion of much higher ..concentrations. The 
element accumulates in the body and can seriously impair mental ability, 
especially when ingested by children. Lead is added to gasoline to improve 
efficiency and reduce knock. • • . 
Table 7-3 shows quite clearly that the gasoline motor is generally more 
polluting than the diesel; motor^/and that motors are generally more polluting 
in those modes found in urban traffic, iwe., idling,accelerating.and 
decelerating, fit should be borne 'in mind too. that older cars without special : 
pollution control devices may produce more than 50% more CO than new cars • 
which: are well-tuned. There are many cars on. the roads of Latin America which 
are both old and badly tuned,. Furthermore in some of the smaller countries of; 
Latin America, which rely on. car;.imports :f£-om outside the region the. pollution 
problem is made very much worse through the expansion of the fleet of small 
imported cars ,with two-stroke motors. These cars have engines..which are 
lubricated via the combination of oil with gasoline. The burning of such oil 
causes considerable pollution, somewhat alleviated were the cars fitted with 
a special filter. In Chile, at least, cars with two-stroke motors are • 
imported without filters. Many motor-cydes too have two-stroke motors, and, 
in same way, are' significant contaminators. ...  
On the other hand the'diesel motor is relatively innocent, although'•this-: 
fact is not-well appreciated by-public opinion in. Latin America. In some.cities 
diesel buses and trucks are hailed.as being contaminators of the air whilst 
cars with;less visible exhausts are quite exonerated. . ,The :fact that diesel • 
fumes are visible hides the fact that such fumes contain'fewer gases of types . 
/which are 
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which are thought to be potentially dangerous to human health, In the United 
States those gasoline powered ears with Government-stipulated catalytic 
convertors are still worse than diesel motors from-thé standpoint of HCand 
CO emissions, and all diesel engine ; cars in the United States meet current 
regulations from the standpoint of the other pollutant which is the subject 
of federal control in the United. States, ; NO-i In the United: States' <? 
investigations are proceeding apace to try and detect any association between 
the particulate matter emitted by-the diesel-motor and forms of cancer, but 
to date they have failed to prove any significant relationship. A diesel 
car emits around 5Q: times as much particulate- matter, as a gasoline car, but 
it. should be borne .in mind that the major originators of particulate matter 
in the air are usually fixed sources such as coal and oil-powered power 
stations.. 
The available evidence does suggest that from the standpoint of humai 
health, the diesel motor is: quite innocent. Thus the concern in Latin America 
for the fumes produced by buses and trucks .is consequently equally ill-founded 
on this ground, although there: are undeniable costs : associated with the 
diesel on account of laundrybills and dirty building facades. There are 
very few diesel cars , in .,Latin America; in Buenos Aires there are some diesel-
powered taxis,, which-are also found elsewhere; in Brazil diesel car production 
is prohibited by l$w so.as. to:reserve the consumption: of.the subsidised diesel 
fuel for trucks and buses (and a few German Mercedes-Benz.diesel cars 
imported by diplomats of high rank, :which cars Use fuel subsidized for 
the social reasons mentioned). On thé other'hand* there are quite a 
few petrol powered trucks and buses in Latin America so that the pollution 
derived from vehicular sources is not a matter which is confined to the 
automobile. . • . • 
(b) The contribution of the automobile, to total pollution in Latin America 
There is little information on the'contribution of the motor .vehicle 
to total pollution levels in Latin American cities, although information' 
is now being generated on a much greater scale than previously, especially 
in those cities, such as Sao Paulo and Santiago', . Chile, which admit to 
having .a pollution; problem, and also some others , such as Buenos Aires where 
the...problem is less , obvious but still, thought to be worthy of being monitored. 
/Table 7-4. 
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Table 7-4 shows the total contribution from transportation sources of certain 
important pollutants in two cities of the region and two cities elsewhere. 
It shows that transportation, and largely road transportation and predominantly 
the car, is the main producer of HC, NO and CO. • Some of the differences 
between the cities portrayed are probably not real, being rather due to 
differences of measurement1 principle. Others are real. For instance in 
Buenos Aires power stations produce large quantities of NO » which is . 
X 
avoided by Santiago through greater reliance oh hydroelectric energy. Also 
in Buenos Aires the bulging of garbage is a much greater generator of CO 
j 
pollution than in Santiago. 
Table 7-5 refers to Santiago, Chile, and illustrates a fundamental 
difference between this city and those in.the central countries in that the 
private car is a minor source of contamination compared with taxis and buses. 
The reasons for this are that many buses are gasoline.powered in the city, 
that car ownership relative to the size of the taxi fleet is small, and that 
buses and taxis may have worse maintained motors than private cars. 
Santiago is no doubt an extreme case since it relies to a greater extent on 
diesel buses than most other cities of the regions in:Brazil, for instance, 
there are virtually ho petroi driven buses at all. Furthermore, in Santiago 
the mean ago of the taki fleet is apparently great, even by the standards 
of Latin America, and its components are often badly maintained by their 
owner-drivers. But nevertheless, on a lesser scale, one would expect that 
in Latin America the responsibility of the private car for atmospheric 
pollution be less than in the central countries. Thus, the" implications of 
automotive-sourced air contamination in the region would be made less severe , 
than otherwise would be the case since, to a large degree, those who benefit 
from the accessibility afforded by those vehicles which create pollution are 
the same persons as those who are malaffected by the contamination generated. 
Were the major part of such contamination produced by the users of private 
automobiles this would be regressive in terms of the distribution of welfare 
since such privileged persons would inflict any evils which.follow from air 
pollution on the population in general, including the less affluent who do 
not benefit from the increased accessibility which the pollution makes . 
possible. /Overall city-wide 
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Overall city-wide information on pollution, however,, may not be a very 
good guide as to the maleficial consequences of such pollution,, even when, as 
in table 7.4, the information is presented by type of pollution, j. In cities 
with reasonably good air circulation, such as Buenos Aires and Montevideo, any 
given amount of pollution would have less consequence than in.a.city, such as 
Santiago, Chile, where there is inferior circulation. Even less meaningful 
is information, widely quoted, on the total weight of. pollution generated by a 
city. It is extremely unlikely that one ton of CO have the same disadvantageous 
qualities as one ton of Np2, in the same way that one gallon of beer has a r 
different degree of harm from one gallon of gin, even .though the consumption, 
of either may have undesirable effects. 
(c) Specific concentration of pollutants associated with the automobile 
A better guide as to the possible harm imparted by automotive-generated 
pollution may be given by concentrations measured.at the streetside, of which 
some samples have.been taken in cities of the region.. In Sao Paulo CETESB 
has monitored CO and N02 levels at two city-centre stations since. 1976. There 
is clear evidence that levels are falling from their once,very high 
concentrations, thereby indicating some success for the.environmental 
protection being carried out in that city ... 8 hour maximum levels for CO were 
30 ppm in mid-1976 declining to almost half this concentration by the end of 
the following year. In California a concentration of 30 ppm during an 8-hour 
period, is classed as serious by the state air quality standards whilst the 
same term is used in New York for an intensity of one-half the serious level 
of California. In Sao Paulo city centre concentrations of N0_ have fallen from 
a high of 93 ug/m on average for one month in 1976 to generally 10% less than 
this during 1977, with there being higher concentrations in the winter months. 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency classifies an annual mean of 3 
190 ug/m as being needed to protect humans. N02 does not figure amongst those 
pollutants monitored in Sao Paulo for the purposes of the emergency action 
plan. (See below.) 
In Buenos Aires some very high streetside concentrations of CO have been 
recorded during the evening peak period, up to 77 ppm, although typical levels 
vary from 5 to 25 ppm. The accepted "serious" 1-hour concentration in 
/California is 
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California is 120 ppm whilst, once again, the standard for i-Tew York is one 
half that for California.. The Buenos Aires readings are not significantly 
different from those in other, cities in the central countries. 
Higher levels still have heen measured in Santiago, Chile, where; 
the daily average of CO level In the , centre of the city has attained 64 ppm. 
The 8-hpur serious level in California is. 30 ppm, whilst New York uses a 
standard of one half that of California, whereas the, Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) of the United States sets at 9 ppm the 8-hour- concentration needed 
for the protection of human health. 
In central Santiago annual „average .'lÔ  levels have reached 61 ppm, whilst 
momentary peaks of 440 ppm have been measured. 
The most abyssmal air quality in all of Latin America,1/ however9 probablj 
occurs in the road tunnels. of the city of .Río de¡ Janeiro, In the. tunnel ••••... 
Reboucas of this city the intensity of lead has been measured as reaching 
3 37 ur/n on average; in the period before.the rush hours the ventilators in 
this tunnel are disconnected with a consequence that the concentration of lead 
3 rises to 70 ug/m . There.are comparatively few standards laid down for lead 
3 
pollution, but the level, in Rio compares with a typi.cal intensity of 10 ug/m 
3 
on a busy highway and 15,ug/ra .in a road tunnel of Río de-Janeiro but they, 
are probably extremely high. To remain in any such tunnel during a spell v-
when the traffic flow be stopped for any reason would almost certainly be 
harmful from the health standpoint. . . ' : 
One cannot conclude too much, due to.lack of information, about the levels 
of contaminants in the air at the streetside in the cities of Latin America 
except they are often above the accepted international standards in many cases. 
Even though agreed safe levels for most pollutants have not been set the 
levels of the cities in Latin America are high enough to warrant public concern 
and action by the authorities. Unfortunately the past history does not. 
indicate that the response to air. pollution from automotive sources by the 
1/ Except, maybe in busy underground parkin,-; lots, from which no 
measurements are known to have been made available. 
/ a u t h o r i t i e s concernec 
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authorities concerned in Latin America has been up to the standards of most 
of the central countries. There has been legislation decreed to control 
contamination of the air but results are sometimes disappointing, 
(d) Some attempts to control automotive,sourced pollution in Latin America 
At least, two cities in the region .have adopted plans similar to that of 
Los Angeles in ,the United States9 whereby the levels of specific pollutants 
are monitored.so that when critical concentrations are attained avoiding action 
may be taken. The pollution control;legislation .which governs the city of 
Buenos Aires was enacted in law 20.284 of the.Republic as published in the 
* • 
"Boletín Oficial" of 3 May 1973,. Amongst the features ..of the. law is the laying 
down of three worsening levels of concentration for six contaminants. The 
attainment of the specified levels may brin£.forth,surveillance or actions, as 
deemed appropriate, to,bring the levelof contami.natiqnback down to acceptable 
levels. The "alert" level of contamination is declared when pollution has 
attained certain.specificconcentrations (see table 7-6) that, bearing in mind 
the prevailing atmospheric conditions, make it possible that the "alarm" level 
be reached. The highest.level specified,in the law.is the "emergency" level 
which is declared when;"alarmé intensities have already been attained and the 
attainmént of emergency;: levels ,is . possible. The law authorized the 
"prohibition :• and limitation of-, operations, and activities in the affected zone" 
so that concentrations be reduced. The intensities laid down in the law are 
detailed as table 7.6. They are not significantly different from the levels 
laid down in the United States and elsewhere for concentrations of pollutants 
which give rise for concern. 
The same Argentinian law also makes other stipulations. Amongst these 
is the requirement that all vehicles entering the fleet be submitted to tests 
of their emission levels for CO and IIC within three years of the passing of 
the law. Such venicles should have licences granted by the national health 
authority before they be. allowed to circulate... The text, of the law refers 
to norms fixed by it, and which have to be met, but the law itself makes no 
mention of what these norms are, it presumably being up to the health authority 
to set its preferred levels. On this matter the law seems to leave an 
undesirable air of ambiguity. Another failing of the law is that the emissions 
/ l i m i t s are 
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limits are laid down were the vehicle to be maintained as recommended by the 
manufacturer.. The owner of the vehicle is not- required to maintain his 
i • 
acquisition as specified by the manufacturer, and hence there is no guarantee 
that a non-polluting vehicle stay non-polluting once it has left the factory 
gate. 
The State of Sao Paulo, by means of law H° 997 of 31 May 1976, has a 
similar plan to Buenos Aires, also specifying three.levels of concern for 
various pollutants. It differs with respect to the kinds,of pollutants includec 
within its embrace and the concentrations permitted at each level. The 
descriptors of the levels too are different from those in Buenos Aires., for 
instance the "Alert" level of Sao Paulo corresponds to the "Alarm" level of 
Buenos Aires. Since the introduction of the law the alert level has never 
been reached, partially due to the effectiveness of other provisions; of the 
law. For example, all stationary polluting sources are required to be 
licensed. In Sao Paulo levels of automotive-related contamination have also 
been reduced through other measures, such as the. pedestrianization of streets 
in the city centre and the spread of the trolleybus and the metropolitan 
railway. . 
The approach adopted in Chile has been different. Chile is still in the 
process of determining the most appropriate legislative action to take on the 
atmospheric pollution front, but there have been a string of measures over 
the year to mid-1979, designed to combat pollution in Grand Santiago especially. 
From calendar year 1979 vehicles are required to have passed a carbon monoxide 
pollution emission test (in the case of gatsoline powered vehicles) in order 
to get.a license to circulate. There seem to have been problems in enforcing 
effectively this requirement. Many of the garages authorised to measure 
carbon monoxide concentrations did not acquire the necessary measuring 
equipment and, according to reports, resorted to measurement of this invisible 
gas by observing the color of the exhaust emitted. No vehicle in Santiago, 
whatever the quality of its exhaust gases, seems to have had trouble in 
obtaining the necessary certificate exonerating it from emiting significant 
amounts of CO gases. 
/Nevertheless Santiago 
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Nevertheless, Santiago is continuing with its attempts at controlling; 
emissions at the level of the individual car, probably the most direct way 
to tackle the problem, although the'prior experience of the city does not 
inspire too much confidence that the method be feasible in Latin American 
conditions. From the first of June, 1979, heavy fines were to be applied 
to the owners of gasoline powered vehicles which exceed the following 
concentrations of CO in their exhaust gases: 3 1/2% for. vehicles of manufacture 
in 1978 and 1979; 4 1/2% for vehicles produced since. 1972; and 6% for older 
vehicles. '•' 
Other measures taken in Santiago, Chile, with the; specific objective 
of controllihg pollution include the -'removal of parking meters from some 
downtown streets (less than two years after they were: installed), and the 
withdrawal from service, much, delayed due to the impact on the quality of 
the collective transportation of the city, of some 30,0 Chevrolet microbuses. 
Public concern about pollution--in Santiago is higher than in other. Latin ; . 
American capitals, and indeed' the problem is compounded by. the unfortunate 
situation of the city which is conducive to .smog. There -is; still some confusior 
about the desirable policy but it seems that the city is in the process of 
switching from a programme of encouraging the use-of cars to the city centre, 
as evidenced by ;the provision of public parking blocks in the centre and 
the installation of parking meters, to a more restrictive-stance. .There are 
also discussions about further means, such as the levying of tolls or 
licences from those who pollute, and the prohibition of the importation of 
vehicles which do not conform with the emission regulations of their homeland. 
Buenos Aires has also recently issued a decree that would require 
emission tests on vehicles registered in the city, as published in the 
"Boletín Municipal" of 14 December 1979. Prototypes of each new model produced 
in or imported into the country must be Submitted for inspection for emissions 
of CO and HC in order to be granted'permission to circulate. Checks also may 
be subsequently required on examples taken from the production line or from 
imported batches, with slightly greater tolerance levels. The permitted 
emission levels are generally those laid down by the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe. One doubts whether this law will be very successful 
in reducing pollution levels. It does nothing to require that vehicles be 
/maintained in 
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maintained in a non-polluting state; it is generally appreciated that the 
imperfect regulation of motors can markedly increase emissions. Howevers in 
view of the difficulties which Chile is experiencing in controlling emissions 
on vehicles already in circulation, maybe ..the Buenos Aires law is reflective 
of what can reasonably be achieved. 
There is no Latin American nation which has taken firm steps to control 
the concentration of lead in gasoline. Table 7-7 shows lead concentrations 
in the gasoline in various countries. 
Table 7-7 
LEAD CONCENTRATION IN THE GASOLINE OF VARIOUS NATIONS, 
IH 1979 a/ 




Western Germany 0.15 
France . 0.45 
England 0.45 
Greece . , : ... 0.84. 




United States 0.34 
Western Germany (1972) 0.613 
Canada (1972) 0.655 
United States (1972) : 0.557 - 0 779 
Mexico (1972) •••••: „ . .. 0.75 '- 1 08 
Source». "Journal do Brasil" of 23 May 1979, taken from research findings • 
at the Federal University of Río de Janeiro; and "Las gasolinas 
en Mexico" by Francisco Ramirez (paper presented at the first 
meeting on the problems of environmental contamination, Mexico, 
January 1973). 
( 
a/ Except where stated. 
~ /The central 
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Hie central countries have generally taken steps to reduce „the 
concentration of lead in rasoline in recent years, but this has not generally 
happened in Latin America, due to its adverse effect on combustion efficiency. 
It may be concluded, in general terms, that the experience of the 
region, from the incomplete knowledge available to us, regarding the control 
of automotive emissions through- legislation and other action by the relevant 
authorities has not been very successful. . Some laws seem to be badly drawn 
up, while others have been beyond the capacity of the authorities to enforce 
them. That they have been decreed at all though is plain evidence that the 
countries of the! region are concerned about the concentrations of pollutants 
in the atmosphere. There seems to be some lack of basic research into what 
is the best type ..of actian,. . t a . w h e t h e r there . should_be broad limits set 
with plans of action developed'to restrain emissions when critical levels be 
attained, whether it be' sufficient~to-inspect just-new vehicles', or whether 
< 
there should be regular checks on vehicles already in circulation. There 
are also conflicts of interest from which the cause of air pollution reduction 
may come of second best. For instance in Chile, it is desired that'small 
cars should be imported at only a 10% of import duty so that the lower middle 
class may have better access to cars; many of such cheap cars with two-stroke 
motors, are inherently polluting. The reduction of lead concentration in 
gasoline tends, to increase specific fuel consumption. The opportunity to 
acquire relatively inocent'diesel cars in Brazil is forbidden to all 
but the higher diplomatic ranks since they would make use of fuel subsidized 
for the benefit of truckers and bus companies. To take out of circulation 
buses which cause severe pollution may cause the reduction of the quality of 
collective transportation to below already very low levels. 
Latin American countries have in the main tended to follow the measures 
adopted in the central countries, for instance on permitted levels of 
pollutants. There is no guarantee that they be appropriate in'local 
conditions. This underlines the need to consider the problem, if indeed 
it is a problem, on a more consistent and global approach than has often • 
been adopted to date. - •« ... .. 
/Table 7-9 
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Table 7-6 
AIR POLLUTION NORMS AND DANGER CONCENTRATIONS AS LAID DOWN IN 









CO (ppm) 10 - 8 hr 











SO (ppm) 0,03 
(monthly mean) 
1 - 1 hr-
0.3 - 8 hr 
5 ' 10 
Oxidants in , 
gen. (ppm) 0,10 - 1 hr 0,15-- 1 hr 0,25 0,40 
Par. in suspension 
(ug/m3) , 150 
(montly mean) Hot applicable 
Part.sediment. 
(ug/m3) 1,0 
(30 days) idem. 
Source: Boletín Oficial de Buenos Aires, edición del 3 de mayo de 1973. 
/Noise pollution 
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Noise pollution from the automobile In Latin America 
The evidence would s.ugpest that noise pollution is of much lesser 
concern to Latin Americans than to North Americans and Europeans. The matter 
has received comparatively little attention in the region and evidence abounds 
that the Latin American tolerance for hi^h levels or noise is ample. The 
noise.from traffic and other.sources which so disturbs foreigners in Río de 
Janeiro is not commented upon by Cariocas; non-chileans praise the curfew 
in the night hours of Santiago due to the quietness it affords airports are 
placed well within city limits, on occasion, such as Galeao in Río de Janeiro 
and Aeroparque in Buenos Aires, to an extent which would not be tolerated in 
most central countries. • • • 
In contrast the situation with "regard to air pollution, noise pollution 
tends to involve diesel vehicles more than those powered by gasoline, and thus 
remains outside the main concern of this paper. Other responsible vehicles 
are motor-cycles and petrol cars which are either badly-maintained or tampered 
with by their owners with the object of being a noise nuisance - mainly rods 
and sports models. Table 7-8 indicates the relative noise nuisance of the 
components of the traffic stream in a location in England. One would expect 
that the' component of the total noise nuisance due' tt>" the car be slightly 
higher in Latin America, but this would scarcely raise the car to being a-
significant noise source. 
Some noise measurements have been made on streetsides in Buenos Aires in 
1973 and 1978. It was found that overall noise levels fell over the period 
covered, but the peaks in 1973 were sometimes the higher. The arithmetic 
mean of readings on a selection of downtown streets in 1978 was 70„47 dB(A)l/, 
not significantly different from what one would have expected in the central 
countries. The investirations in 1978 concluded that the noise level was 
adversely affected by: (i) defficient silencers, (ii) inadequately maintained 
bodywork, (iii) the unnecessary use of car horns. 
1/ As measured 1.20 meters from ground level near intersections. 
/There seem 
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There seem to have been few serious attempts at limiting automotive-
sourced noise in the region except with regard to the sounding of car horns. 
In Río de Janeiro even the prohibition of the sounding of car horns, except 
in emergencies, was only enacted in 1975 and then only.on a selection of 
residential streets in highly trafficked areas hemmed in by tall buildings. 
- •• In Buenos Aires maximum- noise levels are laid down for each type of 
vehicle by Ordenance AD 560.10 of the city of Buenos Aires as shown in 
table 7-9. This ordenance lays down as well strict procedures to be followed 
for the measuring of noise levels from specific vehicles. These are no doubt 
necessary since noise readings depend critically on factors such as the 
distance of the microphone from the source, and the background noise level, 
but they make it virtually impossible that an offender be apprehended, unless 
the policing authorities be virtually 100% sure that he be guilty since 
otherwise there would be a public outcry due to the hauling away of vehicles 
to a special site for noise reading purposes. One notes that in the United 
Kingdom in 1970 there were only two successful prosecutions of motorists for 
exceeding permited noise levels, and these jointly generated a revenue from 
fines of US$ 5. 
Were the countries of the region to decide that automotive-sourced noise 
pollution should be controlled this should may be proceed via: 
(i) The inspection of vehicles when applying for licence renewal for 
faulty silencers, etc. 
(ii) The insulation of noise generators in new vehicles, 
(iii) The concentration of traffic on as few a number of thoroughfares 
as practical, since and x% increase in volume on a street increases the 
noise nuisance by much less than x%. 
(iv) Assistance to those who have noise contamination forced upon them 
(but not those who have volunteered to buy dwellings or rent offices known to 
be close to noisy streets) so that they may install double-0lazed windows 
and other insulating devices, ideally financed by a tax on the users of the 
offending vehicles. 
/Table 7 - 1 
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T a b l e 7 - 1 
DEATHS DUE TO HIGHWAY ACCIDENTS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES 
III VARIOUS YEARS PER MOTORIZED ROAD VEHICLES 
Country Y e a r Number o f deaths 
Death r a t e p e r 
10 v e h i c l e s 
B r a z i l . 1 9 7 5 15 4 7 1 2 . 4 9 
B r a z i l 1974 ' 14 012 3 . 0 7 
C h i l e 1973 1 658 4 . 2 9 
C h i l e .1971, • 1 871 5 . 4 2 
C h i l e 1968 1 4 4 8 5 . 6 9 
Coloiiibia : 1969' 1 935 . • : 6.,50 
Ecuador 1975 1 405 1 1 . 2 4 
¡Paraguay 1976 138 
P e r u 1972 ' . - 727 . 2 . 0 6 
Uruguay , 1974 , 170 0 . 7 2 . . 
Venezuela 1975 4 001" ' 3 . 0 2 ' 
Uni ted S t a t e s 1976 45 482 0 . 3 4 
U n i t e d S t a t e s 1955 . 38 426 • ' 0 . 6 1 
Canada 1975 6 .061 0 . 5 5 
Gr'eat B r i t a i n 1976 6 570 0 . 4 1 
G r e a t B r i t a i n 1955 . > " 5 526 ' . 1 . 1 7 
Sweden 1976 1 168 0 . 3 8 
Sweden 1955 902 1 . 2 1 
Spain 1976 ' 4 759 0 . 7 4 
Spa in 1955 . 1 501 6 . 4 3 
P o r t u g a l 1976 2 520 1 . 9 1 
P o r t u g a l 1955 ' 520 3 . 8 4 
Hol land 1976 2 432 0 . 5 9 
Hol land 1955 1 552 „ : 4 . 1 2 
I t a l y ' 1976 8 927 ••r,'. 0 - 5 1 
I t a l y 1955 5 752 4 . 6 2 
E i r e 1976 525 0 . 8 5 
E i r e 1955 282 - 1 . 6 2 
Greece 1976 1 063 1 . 4 2 
West Germany 1976 14 9 7 8 0 . 7 4 
Denmark 1976 • 857 0 . 5 3 
F r a n c e 1976 13 577 0 . 7 4 
F r a n c e 1955 8 0 5 8 1 . 9 2 
/ ( C o n c i . ) 
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( C o n c i . ) 
Country Year Number of deaths 
Dea|h rate per 
10 vehicles 
Cyprus 1976 67 0.78 
Cyprus 1955 86 5.31 
Belgium • 1976 . .. . 2 488 0.82 
Belgium 1955 828 1.29 
Austria 1976 1 903 0.83 
Austria 1955 1 485 7.13 
Sources: "Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations", 1977 and 1979 
editions. "Demographic Yearbook of the United Nations", 1977. 
"Statistics of Road Traffic in Europe", United Nations, 1977. 
"Diretrizes de Seguran$a de Transité", Ministerio da Justina, 
' Brasilia, D.F., 1978. 
/Table 7-9 
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T a b l e 7 - 2 
DEATHS FROM SELECTED CAUSES IN CERTAIN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
Number.of d e a t h s i n 
J a m a i c a Colombia Peru B r a z i l Venezue la 
( 1 9 7 1 ) ( 1 9 6 9 ) ( 1 9 7 0 ) ( 1 9 7 0 ) ( 1 9 7 1 ) 
C h o l e r a 0 o: 0 0 0 
Typhoid 284 488 55 3 
B a c . D y s e n t e r y , 
a m o e b i a s i s 1 595 154 129 315 
E n t e r i t i s , e t c . 688 16 356 10' 227 10 598 5 085 
T u b e r c u l o s i s 66 V, 3 240 5 079 . 3 743 1 0 5 8 
Smal lpox 0 . 19 0 3 0 
M a l a r i a 2 930 43 74 15 
S y p h i l i s , e t c . 6 1 92 4 1 256 82 
O t h e r i n f e c t i v e , 
p a r a s i t i c d i s e a s e s a/ 255 4 840 2 946 3 690 2 474 
ROAD ACCIDENTS 364 1 170 1 919 1 569 3 0 8 1 
T o t a l 1 4 4 1 27 526 20 897 20 117 12 113 
S o u r c e : "Road a c c i d e n t s as a cause o f death i n d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s " , by 
J a c o b s and B a r d s l e y , T r a n s p o r t and Road Research L a b o r a t o r y 
Report SR 2 7 7 . 
a/ E x c l u d i n g p l a g u e , d i p h t h e r i a , whooping couph, s t r e p t o c o c c a l s o r e 
t h r o a t and s c a r l e t f e v e r , meningococca l i n f e c t i o n , a c u t e p o l i o m y e l i t i s 
and typhus and o t h e r r i c k e t t s i a l d i s e a s e s . 
/Table 7-9 
Table 7-3 
REPRESENTATIVE COMPOSITION OF EXHAUST GASES IN EHGLAilD IN PAP.TS PER MILLION 










69 000 trace 
5 300 400 
30 60 
29 000 1 000 27 000 trace 39 000 trace 
1 600 . . 200 1 000 100 1 000 300 
1 020 3.50 650 240 20 30 
Source: Sharp and Jennings, op. cit,» taken from "Air pollution from road traffic" by 
Sherwood and Bowers Road Research Laboratory Report LR 352. 
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T a b l e 7 - 4 
THE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POLLUTION WHICH DERIVES FROM TRANSPORTATION 
SOURCES IN CITIES II? LATIN AMERICA AND ELSEWHERE 
C i t y Y e a r HC HO 
X 
P a r t . S ° 2 
CO 
Los Angeles 73 90 75 50 12 100 
Tokyo 73 ? ' 69 5 4 ? 
S a n t i a g o , C h i l e 78 85 86 ? ? 99 
Buenos A i r e s 72 70 47 12 4 81 
S o u r c e s : V a r i o u s , i n c l u d i n g t h e r e p o r t o f CORFO-Chile "Programa p a r a e l 
c o n t r o l de l a contaminac ión a t m o s f é r i c a en e l Area M e t r o p o l i t a n a 
de S a n t i a g o " a s r e p o r t e d i n s e v e r a l e d i t i o n s o f " E l H e r c u r i o " 
o f S a n t i a g o ; i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d by t h e S u b s e c r e t a r í a de E s t a d o 
p o r Obras P G b l i c a s y T r a n s p o r t e s o f t h e R e p u b l i c o f A r g e n t i n a ; 





THE DISTRIBUTION OF AIR POLLUTION CAUSED- BY LiOBILE SOURCES 




Percentage of emissions from vehicle type identified 
• Carbon monoxide -Hydrocarbons Oxides of nitrogen 
(CO) (HC) (NO • ) X 
Private cars 6.5% 5.5% 2.0% 
Buses 40.9% 34.7% 66.8% 
Taxis 51.2% 44.2% : 16.0%-
Total transportation 98.6% 84.5% 85.2% . 
Source; "Programa para el control de la contaminación atmosférica en el área 
metropolitana de Santiago. Recomendaciones, junio 78", as quoted in 




PERCENTAGE OF VEHICLES OF DIFFERENT TYPES PRODUCING NOISE PEAKS- OF 
85 dB(A) OR HOKE DURING SURVEYS REALIZED IN ENGLAND 
IN COMMERCIAL STREETS 
Type of vehicle " % in excess of 85 dB(A): 
Motorcycle 




Source: Transport and Road Research Laboratory Reports N° LR 586 and 
; LR 603 as quoted in "Transport and the Environment" by 
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Table 7-9 
A COMPARISON OF PERMITTED SOUND LEVEL ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 8 OF 
ORDENANCE AD 560.10 OF THE CITY OF BUENOS AIRES AND THOSE OF 
A TECHNICAL DIRECTIVE Of THE EEC OF FEBRUARY 1970 
Type of vehicle Maximum permitted sound level in dB(A) 
EEC equivalent for 
•same vehicle 
Motorcycle up to 50 cc .",.. 75 : . ; • 74. a/ . 
Motorcycle 50-125 cc ' 82 ••' • • , 81 a/ 
Motorcycle above 125 cc 86 ^ 85 a/ 
Motor vehicle to 3 1/2 86 83 (cars) 
tons tare - . .. . . 85 (trucks, 
. .. • etc. ) 
Motor vehicle above 3 1/2 tons 90 y 90/92 b/ 
Source : Information provided by.Argentinian Subsecretary of Transport and 
Public Works and Sharp and Jerinings ,~ op. cit. 
a/ Not part of EEC directive: as adopted by France in 1972. ' " 




THE DETERMINATION OF STATISTICAL RELATIONSHIPS TO.EXPLAIN 
CAR OWNERSHIP AND TO FORECAST OWNERSHIP RATES 
As has been reported in chapter 2 of the text of the paper to which 
this is. an.annex, we developed ..statistical relationships, separately for 
the years 1950, 1962 and 1974, which associated car ownership per head 
with income, using the GDP proxy, per head. From these relationships the 
conclusions of chapter 2 and chapter 3 were drawn. This annex attempts 
to explain the derivation of the relationships used. 
1. Introduction: some previous analyses to relate 
• car ownership and income 
It is quite obvious that income and/or wealth is a determinant of 
car ownership. Countries with high per capita incomes have higher rates 
or car ownership (in this paper Tie use as the definition of the rate of • 
car ownership, the number of cars per thousand people) than do countries 
with lower incomes per capita. One may observe that car ownership seems 
to be higher in Venezuela than in Bolivia, in Australia than in Papua-New 
Guinea, or in the United States than in the United Kingdom. Wealth too may 
be seen to be an influential factor; for instance, in 1974 per capita income 
in the R.O. del Uruguay was about the same as it was in Brazil but Uruguay 
was even richer in per capita terms 24 years in 1950 and had built up 
wealth from its previous higher income a part of which was made manifest 
in the car ownership rate, which was higher than that in Brazil, a country 
which was very much poorer in 1950 than in 1974. 
But quite obviously other factors are important. Amongst these may 
be enumerated the following: 
(i) The income distribution, as explained in section VI of the paper, 
(ii) Car prices and credit terms to the user, also as explained in 
chapter VI. 
(iii) Car operating costs, with gasoline being an especially well 




(iv) The age structure of the population; clearly the young, because 
they are legally incapacitated, and the old, usually because they formed 
their way of living'irf a sociéty less car-addicted than today, are less 
likely to own cars than are thé other people, 
(v) The degreè of Urbanization, Those who live, in rural areas have 
a higher propensity to own a car since they have lower levels of accessibility 
by other means of transportation than those in towns; but note that in 
Latin America the tendency for the rural areas to house the less affluent 
may dominate the car rural-urban balancer of ownership propensities. 
(vi) Restrictions on car usage. 'Those who live in. city centers may 
own fewer cars for this reason. In Singapore, car ownership was observed 
to fall in certain areas when strict limitations onncity center car usage 
were introduced. ... .-. . 
(vii) The state Of the road .feystem may have an effect; although this 
has not been statistically proven, at the limit it would be true (in that 
were there no roads there would be few cars). 
(viii) The degree of accessibility by collective transportation; this 
effect is very difficult' to'identify statistically, although reason would 
dictate that it does have' an impact* 
(ix) The cultural acceptability of the automobile; this impacts In 
various ways sometimes raising ownership propensities,, sometimes lowering them. 
(x) The range of cars on the market; it is said that the introduction 
of new models stimulates demand and not always merely switches purchases to 
them from existing models. • 
Clearly to include' all of these influences or even some of them, in 
any statistical attempt to explain car ownership would be fruitless. Even 
wère-data to be available there would be severe problems of autocorrelation. 
These difficulties have been appreciated by previous researchers in the 
fieldi The problem has' more often than not been reduced to the development 
of associations between car ownership rates and income :per head. Some 
attempts, especially"in countries such as the United Kingdom where data 
availability is quite good, have incorporated other variables, such as.an 
index of Car costs to the User» with varying degrees of conviction. 
/However, the 
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However, the reason for developing the relationships sought by the 
present research* 'is ' e s s e n t i a l l y -to identify those countries, which have 
either higher or lower rateis of-'Car-ownership than.others on the /basis ¡.of • -
recognized, powerful, and readily-available independent variables, so that', • 
the impact of secondary influences, such as car prices or cultural factors, 
be facilitated once the association between the dependent .¡variables and the. 
chosen independent Variables has been determined. The recognized,most 
powerful!-influence is incotiie per head. Thus we have attempted to. relate. 
car ownership rates with income per head, through the not necessarily .; 
perfect substitute of GDP per head (due the better availability of data>on 
the latter), and, as it were,; leave worrying.:about the secondary, influences 
to afterwards. However, when making uSe of• the .relationships. developed. . -< 
for the making of forecasts we do explicitly introduce an allowance for the. 
age structure of the population, and implicitly for many other variables •. 
listed above. "••••• •' 
Most previous attempts, to statistically explain car ownership of. 
the relatively„few. which have-been made, have been for the. purpose of fore-
casting. One notable exception, however, was the analysis, made for the CEPAL 
study "El transporte en America Latina" United Nations,New York,.1965. In 
this study a single constant elasticity relation-ship was developed between 
car ownership per person and the level of GDP per person using data-for, . 
different years. Countries with greater or'lesser rates-of ownership were 
identified,; versus the trend calibrated, and some discussion was entered 
into as to why they should so differ, in much the same way as .'we:'in this -. -'. 
study had in mind." However, the utility of the previous•attempt is seemingly 
limited by several methodological defficiencies, for instance: •• 
(i) The relationship fitted assumed that the'elasticity of car ownership 
with respect to GDP';per-head be constant, i.e., independent of the level of '' 
GDP per head. This may possibly be adequate At relatively lofo (per capita), 
levels, such as thbseof Latin Arserica-at that .time,-but the. calibration was 
also over countries in Europe and North America. The calibrated function 
implies that were per capita GDP to be.US$ 1,000 then, everybody, whether man, 
woman or child, would, on average, own.'one car. This is clearly> not Very : 
reasonable. 
/ ( i i ) Although 
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(ii)'Although the relationship. is calibrated for both the year 
1950 and the year I960, the estimation procedure apparently made no allowance 
for inflation between these two years* 
(iii) The .calibrated function, is biased to the extent that a country , 
included-for one year is not always included in the other year. 
(iv> No allowance is made for. the probability that car ownership may 
change through time at given income per head' due to any trends: not related 
with income, such as a change in the age structure or degree, of urbanization. 
(v) As we have, had to do, GDP data were substituted for income data. 
Thus* making an overall appraisal, one, would conclude that this previous 
attempt was not generally reliable- although probably adequate for the 
making of the conclusions that its authors actually derived from it. 
A further,United Nations study which has developed statistical 
relationships between product levels and car ownership.was "The Motor Vehicle 
Industry!', prepared by UNIDO - and published in 1972. Unfortunately this 
attempt seems even less, trustworthy than,the one,referred to above, although 
the methodology used is inadequately described in the report published thus, 
prohibiting making a complete appraisal. The objective of the.; exercise 
was to forecast car- ownership., Amongst the deficiencies which this attempt 
seems to have enveloped are: - . • • • . . . . 
; (i) It is claimed that the observed, points', show .that the relationship 
between vehicle ownership and GDP per head be linear:{by region of the world) 
whilst the graph- plotting such, data points indicates otherwise; all points 
between those with extreme "x" axis values are either on or below a line 
joining .the two extreme values. 
(ii) The graph referred to in (i) was with respect to' vehicle ownership 
rather than car ownership. The authors, over and above wrongly -interpreting 
the relationship as being of a simple -linear form, also interpreted that 
the same linear form relates car ownership and GNP (which was used rather 
than GDP). 
(iii) One sentence in the published report states "A similar observation 
(that the relationship between cars per person and per capita GNP,be linear) 
was made in 1960 by Hondermanmarcq, Director General of Bridges and Roads 
in the Belgian Ministry of Public Works, though in terms of the logarithms 
/of the 
- 126 
of the two functions". A further sentence on the same page reads "If 
each set of projections is confined to the countries in a geographical 
area, natural, rather than logarithmic functions may be used, owing to the 
fairly' small differences in per capita GNP". This indicates that the analyses 
encountered some problems of nomenclature and would have ignored that GNP 
per capita was considered to increase through time thereby rendering the 
fact that present GNP be deemed to be of restricted range within any one 
geographic area (which is of doubtful validity anyway) of dubious Utility. 
There seem to be serious defficiencies with the projections made by 
UNIDO due to methodological difficulties in the development of the forecasting 
equations and it is not clear that the statistical analyses were adequate 
for the use made of them. 
A very interesting and exhaustive report of the Methodology used1 
for the projection of car ownership rates by the Transport and Road Rësearch 
Laboratory of the' United Kingdom, itself based on many years of development ' 
and study of similar investigations being undertaken elsewhere, is found ' 
in the "Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A", volume 141, 
part 1, 1978 Under the title "Long-term forecasting of vehicle ownèrship and 
road traffic" presented by J.C. Tanner." The sophistication of the procedures 
used in the United Kingdom is permitted by reasonably good data•availability 
and-stimulated by the criticisms which have been made of fleet size forecasts 
by the environmental lobby, which is aware of the importance of such 
forecasts in the economic evaluation of highway schemes. Much of Tanner's 
discussion is of little immediate relevance to the present paper since 
we have no chance of obtaining as much basic informàtion as Tanner Had 
available to him, but nevertheless the paper does provide some pointers to 
direct the type of procedure usedi 
The Transport and Road Laboratory (TRRL) used for many years a 
projection equation of the following form: 
Vehicles per person = saturation level of vehicles per person ( 1 ) , 
1 + a e 
in which "t" denotes the year to which the data point applies. It came to 
be realized by the TRRL that a function of the form of (1) may not be 
/reasonable insomuch 
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reasonable insomuch that it is symmetrical about an inflexion point, and, 
thus,, that the growth.pattern implied was such that.it would take the same 
number of years to attain 50% of the.satyration level of ownership as it 
would do to reach 100% from, the 50% point. The,available information would 
seem to infer that the latter period be the longer. The TRRL analyses used 
time series data,, rather than cross-sectional analysis. 
• • t ' .. , • j "» . „ ' "• • • - . . . 
We have accepted the TRRL1s point that the curve should more rationally 
be non-symmetrical in that the change in "x" axis value to the,inflexion 
point from the point where "x" equals zero should be less than the change in 
•x r » , 
the "x" value from the inflexion point -to whére the saturation level of 
ownership is closely approximated. But we diverge from Tanner's other guide-
lines in several ways. Firstly, we have not included'some of the sophistication? 
which Tanner invoked, which can be said to bé overmuch for even his • 
case. Secondly, we chose to use cross-sectional data over a number of 
countries rather than'time series analysis, due to the nature of Our problem. 
Thirdly, and hence, we used' a proxy for income per head, rather than time- • 
as the independent variable. 
The TRRL work is a sophisticated version of others which have been 
conducted! in various parts of the world. The present author has used ! 
basically the same procedure in New South Wales (Gosford) and Malaysia 
(Kuala Lumpur) for instance. Nevertheléss the methodology is arguably 
inadequate for the projection of fleet size were it not to treat the 
importance of operating costs and limits ón the usage of cars in'a behavioural 
manner, which has not really been enveloped by analyses to date. On the 
other hand, were it to be applied for several years separately using cross-
sectional data, the secular change in the position of the curve could describe 
the effect of changes in such explicitly excluded variables, 
-.?• The development of. the relationships 
The basic data is shown.in table 2.1 of chapter 2. It embraces, for 
each of the three years examined, 27. countries in all, both within the 
Latin American Región ánd elsewhere. The inclusion of countries elsewhere 
was so that the functions be adequately defined in.the high income range, 
beyond'the levels attained in Latin America, but, hopefully, to be reached 
/in the 
in the not-too-distant future. Were such non-Regional countries not to 
have been included one would not "nave been able to have had much confidence 
in the position of the curves implied by the relationships at the GDP 
levels of the'richer Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Venezuela 
and Uruguay. 
The form of the function fitted was, after some experimentation; the 
same in each of the three years considered, these being the evenly-spaced, 
one of Í950, 1962 and 1974. The form was, 
, „»rt _ saturation level of cars per 1 000 persons cars per 1 000 persons = , • * ^ — 
1 + aY5 (2) 
where, Y is per capita income in 1970 US dollars. _ 
The calibration was performed separately for each of the three years 
to allow for the possibility that between each successive pair the expected 
number of cars owned at given real income change, due to a wide variety of 
possible causes, such as those listed at the beginning of this annex; for 
instance through the passage of time, and independent of the influence of 
real income, car ownership probabilities may change due to gasoline prices 
falling, as .they did in real terms from 1950 through 1972 (net of taxes). 
It was hoped that an analysis of any difference in the curves calibrated 
for the different years would give an insight into the effect of such 
secular change in car-ownership propensities, and perhaps an indication of 
which factors were the more important. GDP was chosen as the independent 
variable in the calibration exercise since it was much more widely available 
than income measures, which would have been preferable. 
. The GDP data was obtained from "Series Históricas del Crecimiento de 
América Latina", CEPAL, Santiago, Chile 1978, for the countries of the 
Region. For the other countries embraced in the calculations data was 
assembled from various editions of-the U.N. Státistical Yearbook, generally 
by adjusting the 1970 GDP per head data by indices giving changes in GDP 
per head for other-years relative to this base year. The car..ownership 
data was generally derived too from the. U¿N¿ Statistical Yearbook. For some 
countries the. information on car ownership, is not consistent throughout 
the 1950 to 1974 period, due to corrections of series, redefinition of what 
constitutes a car, as opposed to a light truck (for instance),etc. In such 
/cases, to 
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cases, to the extent that was possible, the data for previous years was :.. 
corrected to'the 1974 definition. 
It was found that the type (2) equation provided an adequate fit for 
each of the three years, but that thé type (1) form was acceptable for 
1950, when the car ownership of most countries were severely distorted still 
by the after-effects of the second world War. Nevertheless we chose to 
rely on the type (2). form for all thrèe years to provide consistency for 
the inter-temporal comparison. 1 
The calibration exercise differed in one important respect from some 
previous attempts at the same kind of problem, for instance those conducted 
by the English TRRL. In such previous studies the saturation level of 
ownership was determined exogenously by, for example, studying ownership 
rates in states of the United- States and countries'of the United Kingdom in 
an attempt to plot ownership rates against income per head for a wide variety 
of areas so that the trend may be extrapolated to yield an estimate of.the 
saturation ownership rate at very high income levels, as yet unattained 
either in the United States or the United Kingdom. In our calibration 
exercise we treated the saturation level as an endogenous variable. Generally, 
we followed the procedure of assuming a particular low saturation level 
(for each year) and then deriving the best fit values for "a" and "b" of 
equation (2) given this assumed saturation,level. The value of "r " was 
noted for this assumed saturation and the best fit parameter values. Then 
the saturation level was increased to a higher level and the process repeated. 
The chosen saturation level was that determined by the equation with the 
2 
highest value for "r " over all the combinations of best-fit values of "a" 
and "b" and saturation levels considered. The saturation level was increased 
for each year until the best-fit equation calibrated assuming it started to 
decline. 
This procedure gave saturation-levels of car ownership, which are high 
by the standards of previous attempts by other researchers. For instance, 
the best equation for 1974 implies that the saturation level of car, ownership 
is 900 cars per 1 000 persons, which would be' close to being reached were 
GDP per head to be US$ 213,000 in 1970 prices.". The saturation level thus 
has academic value only since it is very unlikely that .any significant area 
/of the 
- 130 -
of the planet on which we live ever attain such a degree ©f, affluence. 
It is worthwhile to consider why the saturation level, so derived through a 
procedure which should result in the level of saturation which best 
conforms to the facts, be so high„ One reason is certainly the tendency 
for those countries with the higher GDP per head figures to have lower 
birthrates and societies more used to car-using lifestyles so- that even 
relatively elderly people are not adverse to car ownership. Thus the , 
proportion of the population legally and physically able to own,a car would 
be an increasing function of GDP per head. Use of the equations, calibrated 
far away from the range of GDP values over which, they were estimated would 
probably infer that the percentage of people physically and legally entitled 
to own a car exceed one hundred. (The forecasts given in chapter.3 of the 
paper, and explained in this section,.make allowances for such variation in 
the structure of the population-.as a function of GDP per capita.) One would 
anticipate that, were the equations' to have been developed for car-ownership 
per member of the population between the ages of 15 and 75, -the, saturation 




where, "z" represents the number of cars per 1,000 persons, and Y denotes 
GDP per capita in 1970»United States dollars. In each case n =,27, the 
same 27 being used throughput. The countries are identified in 
table 2,1. 
Although the equations were developed.essentially for the purpose of 
analysing the tendencies in ' car ownership by country and through time over 
the period since. 1950, they can also be used for forecasting. The first 
/problem encountered 
eye. . , -."-. >•=.>. ......... 
The.equations found to best, fit the data were: 
For 1950, • . , . 
_ 800 , r = 0,843 
1 +. 19 032' 352 Y~ 1 V 8 9 5 6 5 4 
and for 1962, „ 
900 , r = '-0,925 z = * 
1 + 5 890 013 Y'"1'7937'7'1-
and for 1974, ^ 
1 + 5 224 080 y- 1» 8 1 4 8 7 7 
900 ., , r 2 = 0,977, 2 = — ' ' ' ' 
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problem encountered when utilizing the work conducted so far for forecasting 
is which equation to use. , We have a choice from three., or alternatively 
we may use some combination of them. The one for the year 1950 may be 
disregarded since it refers to a hopefully unusual situation in the history 
of the world when a recovery was being made from devastating war. The 
equation for 1974 implies higher car ownership levels at any income between 
zero and infinity than the one for 1962, thereby indicating a raising of 
car ownership propensities through the intervening period. One may assume 
that the change in the propensity to own a car at given income as occured 
from 1962 to 1974 increase at the same secular rate into the future. This 
would imply that the joint impact of changes in car prices, running costs» 
the income distribution, etc., be in the future as it was in the past. This 
may not be considered reasonable. 
Changes occured regarding variables when influence car ownership 
in the period 1962 to 1974 that may never again recur with the 
same intensity. The period of steadily declining fuel prices is probably 
forever behind us; car prices generally fell from 1962 through 1974 due to 
the reaping of scale economies on a degree that may not be possible in the 
future; many cities in Latin America, and also to some extent elsewhere 
adopted policies of catering for the car during the 1962 to 1974 period, and 
may never do so again, etc. So, alternatively, it may be that the projections 
of ownership should assume that the propensities to own cars at given income 
levels of 1974 remain at the same values"to the end of the forecasting period. 
It may even be reasonable, for the purposes of the projections, to assume 
that the tendency for car ownership at given real income to increase, as it 
did in the past, to reverse itself in the years to come. However, since 
we have no objective means at our disposal of determining to what extent 
such reversal may occur, we have not made any projections based on this 
premise. 
Both sets of forecasts, both that which takes as fixed for the future 1974 
propensities of own cars at given income and that which assumes that such 
propensities continue to increase at the same annual rate as they did from 
1962 to 1974, were made on the basis that a country which in 1974 had a 
GDP per capita (in 1970 US dollars) of "x" maintain into the future the 
/proportion of 
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proportion of Its population in the age-group where car ownership is.:-, 
concentrated, taken for analysis purposes as being between 15 and 75, as it 
had in 1974, rather than take on the population structure of countries 
which in 1974 had GD? per head levels equal to what the country concerned 
will have in the future. The making operational of this assumption required 
that the relationship between the percentage of the population aged between 
15 and 75 and GDP per head, in 1974, be established. Using data for a 
variety of countries obtained from the United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 
it was deduced that', 
D = 2,9684 + 8,4387 log Y 74 (6) 
where "D" is the percentage of the population aged between 15 and 75. 
Figure A.1.1. plots the observed data points in'relation to this fitted 
curve. It is admitted that were more exhaustive analysis to have been made, 
the coefficients of the equation may have been-slightly different from 
those derived. 
Thus, on the basis of the above discussion, it was derived that, were 
car ownership propensities at given income to remain to their 1974 levels, 
the forecasting equation should be, 
2t = 900 
1 + 5 224 080 Y 
.900 
t 
-l,814877j 2,9684 + 8,4387 log Y ? 4 
1 + 5 224 080 Y -1,814877 
2,9684 + 8,4387 log Y 
log (1,421568 Y ? u) 
-] 








is car ownership per 1,000 persons in year "t" 
is GDP per capita in year "t" in US$ of 1974 
is GDP per capita in year 1974 in US$ of 1974. 
In the case where the annual changes observed from 1962 to 1974 in 
car ownership propensities at given real per capita income continue into 
the future, the first term of equation (7a) comes to, 
. 9 0 0 
1 + 5 890 013 - 55 494,42 (t - 1962) Y" 1' 7 9 3 7 7 1 + ° > 0 0 1 7 5 8 8 3 " 1 9 6 2> ' ' - - t 
whilst, the second term, which deals-with the impact of the age structure, 
remains as in equation (7a). The forecasts of chapter 3 were based on the 
! /equations presented 
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equations presented above. The GDP per head forecasts, needed as independent 
variables, were taken from the forecasts of GDP to 2,000 AD of the Centro de 
Proyecciones Económicas de la CEPAL whilst population projections are the 
"trend" population estimates of "Boletín Demográfico" year XI, number 22 
of CELADE. 
The estimates of the income elasticity of car ownership with respect 
to income per capita tabulated in chapter 2 were derived by manipulations 
of equations of the type (7a), for each year separately. Thus the 
elasticities too assume that as the income per capita of a country increases 
there is no accompanying change in the structure of the population. Therefore 
they refer specifically to changes in income rather than being affected by 
any evolution of the demographic and social structure of the population, 
which influences would only serve to distort the elasticity measures were 
they to be included. The elasticities were derived from the following 
formula, using the case of the year 1974 as an illustration: 
e197M 9 1181 0 6 3 Y" 1» 8 1 4 8 7 7 - 1 (8) 
1 5 224 080 y - 1» 8 1 4 8 7 7 i o g (1,421568 Y) 
The equations for the years share the same form, with the parameters 
differing in value to reflect the equations calibrated for these other years. 
/F igure A . 1 . 1 . 
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Figure. A. 1;U 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN % OF POPULATION BETWEEN AGES OF 15 AND 
75 AND "GDP hiHi CATITA IN''1974 IN U3$ i'ER COUNTRIES EXAMINED' 
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• Annex 2 
A SUGGESTED METHODOLOGY FOR THE QUANTIFICATION OF THE BENEFITS AiJD COSTS 
OF THE.PRIVATE AUTOMOBILE 
1. Introduction 
As far as the author is aware, -there, has neven been any attempt anywhere to 
derive benefit: cost relationship for the private,.car, treating it as an investment 
project, not even in a ¡conceptual manner. In view of this it is perhaps, at best, 
surprising, and at worst* alarming that the private car has so often been singled 
out as a social evil whose impact on civilization should be minimized. There 
has befen an overconcentration on. the social costs associated with the automobile. 
Sometimes there is admission that these costs are accompanied by benefits, largely 
to the user, but there is no attempt to estimate .the magnitude of such benefits. 
It is true that the estimation, of the benefits which derive from the. private 
car is not easy in practice, and even presents considerable conceptual 
difficulties. Were there to be fewer difficulties with such estimation then 
presumably somebody would have made an attempt at such estimation. In this 
appendix 1/ we suggest a methodology, albeit on a very, sketched form, which is 
considered to be inplenentabie in practice, in some cases without any recourse 
having' to be made to newly acquired survey data. It would be very interesting 
indeed to have had the opportunity to work .through' the proposed methodology for 
at least one Latin American¿country with good data, such as Brazil, but 
unfortunately during the present study there has been insufficient time to permit 
this.' The procedure: could be -used.on an iterative manner to determine that level 
and distribution:of car ownership which optimizes welfare.,, 
2. The estimation of user benefit from automobile usage as a 
function of• the level of such usage 
The type of vehicle considered in this annex, the private car, is generally 
owned by families, the members of'vehicle travel. Their most worthwhile trips 
could be made even without a car being available, even though the availability of 
a car considerably increases the convenience of travel, it is. noticeable, as 
1/ The methodology is illustrated on outline .form as figure A.2.2. 
/shown in 
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shown in chapter 6 of the paper to which t h i s i s an annex, that the a v a i l a b i l i t y 
of a car to a family resu l t s in the generation of t r ips that would not 
otherwise have been made, independent of income levels and other considerations. 
When a car i s acquired, i t may be thought of as , in the f i r s t instance , 
being used instead of walking, taking'.thé. bus, or whatever, in accomplishing 
the same t r ip making pattern as was carried out in -the days when no- car was 
avai lab le . In r e a l i t y , the car would tend to cause a change in ;trip., making 
patterns through, for instance, stimulating theJ transference o f th§ population 
from inner areas to the outer suburbs. But we s h a l l e r r .on the conservative • 
side regarding the benef i t s from the car and consider the s i tuat ion before the 
family has been able to react to take f u l l advantage"of^the.opportunities that 
the private car provides. ' • ,,-g . .. v -
The benef i ts that the Users of cars derive from-.such.,Use instead of 
c o l l e c t i v e forms'of t ransportat ion , -or walking, are exprèssable.as the -
difference in the user cost of the given amount of trip-making via car versus, 
by the i n i t i a l mode. Figure A.2 .1 . expresses the derivation of such benef i t s 
graphical ly. For successive increments in the kilometerage performed by ;-the 
car , the 'd i f ference between the user• cost via the .previous. mo.de .of \ 
transportation and the user cost by car can be' enVisioned as' declining 
moriotonically, per kilometer, -considering that the f i r s t : kilometers traversed 
by the car subst i tute f o r the r e l a t i v e l y "most inconvenient t r ips previously 
made by the other modes. In the diagram the car i s shown as being used for 
Oqo kilometers (per week or whatever other time period) ins tead of the previous 
means'of transportat ion. Even the l a s t féw kilometers subst i tuted by the 
car for other means "of transportation show a considerable net benef i t from 
the subst i tut ion to the trip-maker. Note that in the .ca lculat ions i t would 
generally be necessary to recognize that t r i p s by car .may cover more, or l e s s , 
distance than the equivalent t r i p when i t was made by other means. 
However, as we have pointed out in sect ion 6 of the paper , . the car 
resul ts , in more t r i p s being made and more kilometers being covered, than in 
the case when no car was avai lable , .The way in which i t i s proposed to measure 
the benef i ts from such extra trip-making i s also i l l u s t r a t e d in f igure A.2 ,1 . 
I t may reasonably be assumed that a family which acquires a car (or more 
correct ly acquires the use of a car) covers iftore and more vehicle-kilometers 
/in i t 
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in i t unt i l the next vehicles-kilometer would not resu l t in any (perceived) 
net worth to the members of the family. Thus the l a s t kilometer run (per 
week or whatever) can be associated with zero net perceived benef i t (although 
maybe a p o s i t i v e , or a l ternat ively a negative benef i t were some costs to be 
incorrect ly perceived). One may trace a curve, as done in the diagram, 
between the l a s t known benef i t per vehicle-kilometer, that associated with 
the Oq kilometer, to the l a s t kilometer run by the car in the week, i . e . , 
th 
the Oq̂  kilometer. The curve may reasonably, maybe, be assumed to conform 
to an extrapolation of the'implied form-between "x" equals Q and "x" equals 
0qQ. I t nay be possible to trace the exact form of the curve i n . s p e c i f i c 
instances through studies to determine the revealed preference structure of 
the trip-makers. 
The bas ic principles described in the above paragraphs, should be 
qual i f ied in a-few respects ; F i r s t l y , there would need to be adjustments 
to the : calculat ions- in recognition of the f a c t tha t , in general, car users 
do not act as i f they knew.the f u l l marginal costs of t h e i r decision to 
t rave l . They may recognize, for instance, only the tax- inclusive fue l cos t s , 
which, oVer and above, not r e f l e c t i n g the true opportunity cost of the fuel 
consumed, ignores the extent to which marginal t ravel resul ts in t i r e wear, 
maintenance cos t s , and so on. -
Secondly in'the* case of a'.multi-car family, the same bas ic type of 
'analysis should be conducted separately for each extra car , noting that the 
second car may, to a certain extent , replace the use of the f i r s t car 
result ing in extra convenience; for instance the lady of ..the house may not. 
have to drive her husband to the coiun,uter ra i l raod stat ion or to the o f f i c e 
every day, instead of leaving him t o drive himself whilst remaining with the 
second car for her own use. I t would be possible through s p e c i f i c observation 
of case studies to place a monetary value on such extra convenience, and in 
some instance exist ing data r?ay ,be adequate that such estimates be made 
without recourse to further surveys. . 
/Thirdly, the 
Thirdly, the benefits per family by type-of family (as varying by 
geographic location within the country, structure, and so on) must be 
aggregated to yield an estimate of thé total user benefit for the whole 
nation being examined. 'It may be important to give, due consideration to-
the probability that the first families to acquire cars be those which would 
make the greatest use of private transportation, although the degree of 
affluence of the household is Obviously too a factor influential in the ,t . 
decision to acquire or riot to acquire a' family car. (The desirability of 
categorizing families by income is thus clearly indicated.)-; 
Finally, since it would be'a prime object of any investigation realized 
along the lines suggested in this appendix to determine the optimum amount 
of car ownership for a country in a given context, it would be necessary.to 
determine the total user benefits for varying total-levels of; car ownership. 
This would rèquire that relationships between the total amount of car 
ownership in thè country and the number of families- in- each type owning cars be 
developed. It may be assumed that any attempt to ration car ownership be on 
thè basis of price, in which case, for each type of.family, it would be 
necessary to develop functions relating car>prices with the proportion of the 
total number of families in the category which would own varying numbers of 
cars. This may be very difficult to achieve. Were time series data to be 
available on car ownership levels by -type' of family it may be possible to 
develop robust relationships between total car ownership and the proportion 
of households of each type that own various numbers of cars. This aspect of 
the methodology may be considered to be the weakest link -in. the chain. The 
existing work which has been carried out in this general area has. been devoted 
principally to the estimation of the variation of car ownership by type of 
household as the overall family income level changes. It may be difficult to 
translate the relationships deduced-in this way into a form which would relate 
car ownership to policy variablés-which may be used to control car ownership 
levels, such as taxes which affect car prices and registration fees. . 
/3. The 
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The costing of the external effects of car operation 
The estimation of the private costs of car usage and ownership is 
relatively straightforward, even were such costs to be expressed in social 
terms, i.e., the opportunity costs to the nation concerned acknowledging 
the preference structure of the society concerned. More difficulties are 
associated with the determination of non-private costs of car usage, and to some 
extent acquisition. Such costs are the consequences of actions unaccounted 
for by the user. For instance the car user takes no account of the congestion 
he forces upon others, unless he be unusually socially responsible. Some of 
the problems associated with the quantifying of such external costs derive 
from the estimation of the physical magnitudes' involved rather than from the 
development of unit costs to apply these magnitudes, although the latter are 
not necessarily always well-defined either, and especially so In the 
.field of pollution. In the case" of private costs, i.e., those naturally " 
recognized in the car user's accounting calculus, the physical magnitudes 
are well known as a result of engineering investigations * for instance, one 
knows with a good degree of confidence how much tire wear will follow from 
the operation of a certain type of vehicle on a certain type of road at 
a certain speed for so many kilometers. What is much more difficult to 
quantify is the extent to which the introduction of one extra vehicle to a 
traffic stream forces extra tire wear on other vehicles through disrupting 
the traffic flow to some marginal degree. 
The first stage in the estimation of the external costs of car usage 
would be the allocation of car ownership to specific regions, distinguishing 
between cities and rural areas, probably as a function of relationships of 
car ownership with income level "and of income level with greographical area. 
Some of the analyses necessary for this task may already have been realized 
in the tasks of section 2 of this appendix wherein car ownership propensities 
are determined by family type. The ultimate objective would be the estimation, 
for differing sizes of the overall car fleet, how many cars would be 
concentrated in each area. 
/The assignation 
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The assignation of cars to areas by ownership would then be used 
to derive distribution of car usage by areas through a knowledge, partially 
published by surveys for transportation studies as a matter of course, and 
more thoroughly available from, the analyses of such studies in an unpublished 
form. The output from, this stage would be a listing of private car-kilometers 
by geographical area. 
The impact in terms of external costs of any one car-kilometer would vary 
according to where this car-kilometer were to be performed. For each area one 
would define relationships between the volume of car travel and the mean speed 
of all traffic, recognizing that each extra unit of car travel slows down the 
traffic stream and thereby forces extra costs on society in terms of delays and 
higher vehicle operating costs. The required relationships have been developed 
for highways in. a number of areas in Latin America. One should take note that 
the-traffic speeds calculated in this operation affect the costs of private car 
travel in a way that may cause a revision of the user benefits referred to in 
section 2 of the appendix. Accident rates have been found to vary with a 
variety of factors, but are often expressed for simplicity as being dependent 
on the type of roadway and its location. Hence, in a manner as sophisticated 
or as simple .as the data may permit it would generally be possible 
to determine accident rates per car-kilometer for each area thereby allowing 
the estimation of social costs of accident per kilometer travelled. A third 
type of external cost considered to be important is that of the various types 
of pollution, i^e., air contamination, and noise and others. Whilst it is 
possible to estimate the physical magnitudes of such pollution generated by 
each car-kilometer in each area it is impossible at the present stage of 
evolution of the necessary, arts to unambiguously place monetary values on such 
costs. 
Nevertheless, by such principles it is possible to place some kind of 
estimate on the external costs of congestion, accidents, and, maybe pollution, 
on each car-kilometer in each area into which the country has been divided. 
Multiplication of the unit costs so derived by the quantities of car-kilometers 
per area results in the total cost due to externalities, per area. Summing over 
areas results in estimated total external costs for the nation, which total may 
be calculated for varying levels of total car ownership. 
/There i s 
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There is another type of. cost, which in most cases would have a negative 
value, which may be classified as an externality but which may be estimated in 
more direct, manner. Such costs are the difference between the resource cost 
to the nation, and the cost to the. user of car operation. On gasoline, 
especially, but also on other, components of car operation, the user usually 
pays indirect taxation. Each kilometer travelled results in a transfer of 
resources from the traveller to the government which imposes the tax. Thus 
each such kilometer results in a benefit to the community as a whole through 
the intermediary of the government over and above the private gain through the 
trip concerned being made to the. user, which benefits should be offset against 
the external costs of congestion,, pollution and accidents discussed above. 
4. The estimation of-the costs;of car acquisition . 
Cars may be either produced locally, assembled locally from, to some 
extent, imported parts, or imported fully made up. In each case the cost to 
the nation of the acquisition may be estimated starting from the base of what 
the buyer pays for his purchase. Adjustments generally have to be made to such 
purchase prices so as to fully reflect opportunity costs. 
Where the vehicle be produced locally, any direct sales taxation would not 
be part of the cost of the vehicle to the nation. On the other hand some of 
the ingredients which make up the car may be assessed in the final price to the 
user at values different from those which reflect opportunity costs to the 
nation. The opportunity cost of the labour involved may be less than the wages 
paid on account of the low productivity of alternative work. On the other hand 
the capital invested in the sector may have had valuable alternative usage were 
it to have been invested elsewhere to an extent greater than that reflected in 
market discount rates. 
Were a vehicle to be partially or completely imported, any import duties 
should be extracted from the sale price so as to approximate to the opportunity 
cost to the nation. After having done this the import price in foreign 
currency should be converted into local currency using a shadow rate of exchange 
which may or may not be well reflected by the commercial exchange rate. Further 
adjustments of the kind mentioned in the previous paragraph may be necessary 
were there to be local assembly. 
/5. The 
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5.' The optimization of the level of car ownerships 
This would be achieved via the comparison of "the net benefits, basically 
user benefits less the external costs of usage, with capital costs, i.e., the 
opportunity costs of the cars themselves, at different levels of total car : 
ownership. The best level of ownership would be that which results in the 
greatest excess of benefits over costs. The comparison w'ould follow the normal' 
rules of benefit: cost analyses. 
The analyses would also furnish extra information of a type'extremely 
useful in planning private transportation. Especially important would be ' 
indications of where car ownership should be concentrated so that the ! ; 
environmental consequences of any given total amount' of car ownership be J 




TO ILLUSTRATE DERIVATION OF USEE BENEFITS FROM PRIVATE CAR 
Value of 
benefi ts 
on monetary • • 
units/f. ' 
qc> q 
Vehicle-kilometers of family car 
0qo = quantity of vehicle-kilometers by,car In replacement of 
walking or Col lec t ive transportation, per time period 
Oq, = t o t a l number of vehicle-kil iraeters performed by car 
during time period 




THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE VARIOUS TASKS 
COMPRISING THE OVERALL PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
Congestion 
costs by area 
Divide famil ies by type 
based on income structure, 
and locat ion 
xl 
Calculate user benefi ts 
from replacing other modes 
of transportation by private car 
vi-
Extrapolate to derive benef i t s 
to users from extra t r i p making 
I 
Total user benef i ts per 
family type 
vi' 
- Total user benef i ts 
Car owiership by area I 
. Car usage by area 
Accident 




- Total l e v e l of car 
ownership 
Pollution 
costs by area 
Taxation benef i ts 
Total soc ia l costs 
Private cost of car 
acquisit ion 
Socia l costs of car ^ 
acquisi t ion 
v 
Not benef i ts of given 
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